Bioterrorism: the Invisible Enemy

Bioterrorism: the Invisible Enemy

Focused Question BIOTERRORISM: THE INVISIBLE ENEMY This paper was drawn up by Ms. Ludovica Serafini, European Defence researcher, under AN EXPERTISE FORUM CONTRIBUTING TO EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTING TO FORUM AN EXPERTISE SINCE 1953 ARMIES INTEROPERABILITY European Army Interoperability Center the supervision of the Permanent Secretariat. This focused question is a document that gives an initial reflection on the Finabel annual theme 2018-2019. The content is not reflecting the positions of the member states, but consists of elements that can initiate and feed the discussions and analyses in the domain of the theme. It was drafted by the Per- manent Secretariat and is supported by the organization. INDEX INTRODUCTION Introduction 2 n 1832, the Prussian General and mil- itary theorist Carl von Clausewitz was Section 1. writing: “War is to use the right amount Bioterrorism: origins & characteristics 5 of force at the right time and at the right place”. How could we read this sentence Section 2. nowadays? Would it still be relevant in the Bioterrorism examples & 21st century? the north korean case 8 I The method of fighting a war has changed Section 3. over time. Especially, the rapid develop- France & israel: how the aremd ment of biological science, particularly bio- forces are dealing with bioterrorism? 11 technology and synthetic biology, as well as the fast accessibility to networks, resources, Section 3.1. and expertise in these last 25 years led to an The french armed forces’ experience 11 increase in the proliferation and the use of more deadly weapons for massive civil dis- Section 3.2. ruption by both a number of states and non- The israeli armed forces’ experience 13 states actors. These kinds of lethal weapons are characterised by Chemical, Biological, Section 4. Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) materi- Conclusions & recommendations 16 als which pose a serious, unique, and global threat to all nations’ security, endangering Biography 19 public health and damaging economics. For Bioterrorism: the Invisible Enemy 2 the purpose of this paper, only the biological have signed the Convention, 6 States (Cen- agents will be taken into consideration, due tral African Republic, Egypt, Haiti, Somalia, to the fact that changes inUse the of global Chemical, security Biological, Syria, Radiological Tanzania) and have Nuclear not ratified Weapons yet, by Non-Stateand 10 Actors 03 context suggest the urgency of reinforcing Countries have refused to sign it: Chad, Co- and strengthening the current biosecurity moros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Israel, Kiribati, Mi- and biodefence globally. Introduction cronesia, Namibia, South Sudan, Tuvalu. Use of Chemical,The international Biological, Radiological community and Nuclear banned Weapons the by Non-StateUnfortunately, Actors one of the biggest challenge03 use of biological weapons for the first time in of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con- 1925 enforcing the Geneva Protocol, which vention is the lack of obligatory for Member Introductionwas limited to asphyxiating, poisonous gases. States to allow external checks on any illegal Only in 1972, the total elimination of these or suspected stockpiles. Furthermore, is the lethal weapons was achieved through the BTWC still effective and relevant nowadays? Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention The history and recent events are showing (BTWC), which includedFigure the prohibition 1: Chemical, of biologicalcompletely and an radiological opposite scenario. attacks acrossIt could the world from 1970 to 2014 development, production, stockpiling, acqui- be shocking, but as the Global Terrorism sition, retention, transfer, and delivery system Database reveals from 1970 to 2014 there of biological weapons. Currently, 181 States were a total of 143 chemical, biological, and Figure 1: Chemical, biological and radiological attacks across the world from 1970 to 2014 Biological Chemical RadiologicalBiological Chemical Radiological According to the UniversityFigure 1 of– Chemical,Maryland’sAccording biological Global and to theradiological UniversityCBRN attacks weaponsof across Maryland’s the are world some from Global of 1970the most to 2014 indiscriminateCBRN and weapons are some of the most indiscriminate and Terrorism Database, there were a total of 143 attacks – deadly weapons in existence today. Besides the physical 35 biological, 95 chemical, and 13 radiologicalTerrorism – using Database, theredamage were they a can total inflict, of 143 they attacks also have – the potentialdeadly weapons in existence today. Besides the physical CBRN weapons across the world from35 1970 biological, to 2014. 95 chemical,to inspire and fear, 13 provokeradiological panic, –and using cause significantdamage they can inflict, they also have the potential This information is captured in figureCBRN ª1. weapons acrosseconomic the world andBioterrorism: societalfrom 1970 disruption.³ to 2014.the Fortunately, Invisible Enemytothe inspire use fear, provoke panic, and cause significant 3 This information is capturedof CBRN in weapons figure by ª1. states and non-state actorseconomic has and societal disruption.³ Fortunately, the use Insurance is available to cover some of the effects of remained relatively rare to date. Nevertheless, theof risk CBRN weapons by states and non-state actors has the use of chemical, biological, radiologicalInsurance and nuclear is available presentedto cover bysome these of weapons the effects is not zero,of and insurersremained relatively rare to date. Nevertheless, the risk (CBRN) weapons by non-state actors. With this in may benefit from understanding the exposure of their mind, Lloyd’s commissioned this studythe by use Chatham of chemical, biological,portfolios to radiological plausible but andextreme nuclear events of theirpresented use. by these weapons is not zero, and insurers House with a view to providing a forward-looking(CBRN) weapons by non-state actors. With this in may benefit from understanding the exposure of their assessment of the global threat relatingmind, to the Lloyd’s use of commissionedA key incentive this study for use by of Chatham CBRN weapons is theirportfolios to plausible but extreme events of their use. these weapons. The report includes scenariosHouse withwhich a view to capacityproviding to cause a forward-looking significant disruption across sectors, are designed to be representative of plausibleassessment but of the globalas well threat as considerable relating to revenue the use loss of for governments.A key incentive for use of CBRN weapons is their extreme occurrences for the use of eachthese weapon weapons. type. The reportIn particular, includes cleaning scenarios up after which a CBRN incidentcapacity could to cause significant disruption across sectors, These scenarios were devised by Chatham House to require that people, buildings, infrastructure and the be illustrative of the types of events thatare insurers designed may to be representativeenvironment undergoof plausible a cost but intensive and lengthyas well as considerable revenue loss for governments. want to consider in their exposure managementextreme occurrences and fordecontamination the use of each process. weapon For instance, type. the cost Inof particular, cleaning up after a CBRN incident could underwriting strategies. Lloyd’s hopesThese that, by scenarios providing weredecontamination devised by Chatham after the 2001House anthrax to attacksrequire in that people, buildings, infrastructure and the an up-to-date, balanced assessment ofbe the illustrative present risk, of the typesthe US, of whichevents producedthat insurers almost may 3,000 tonnesenvironment of undergo a cost intensive and lengthy this report will help inform exposure wantmanagement to consider and in theircontaminated exposure management waste, is estimated and to have decontaminationbeen process. For instance, the cost of product innovation in the insurance industry.underwriting strategies.around Lloyd’s $800m.⁴ hopes that, by providing decontamination after the 2001 anthrax attacks in an up-to-date, balanced assessment of the present risk, the US, which produced almost 3,000 tonnes of this report will help inform exposure management and contaminated waste, is estimated to have been product innovation in the insurance industry. around $800m.⁴ a The Global Terrorism Database¹ is modified for terrorist organisations, and saboteur groups use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons. This dataset includes attempted CBRN attacks. In addition to this database, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has WMD Terrorism Databases.² a The Global Terrorism Database¹ is modifiedLloyd’s for terrorist Emerging organisations, Risk Report and –saboteur 2016 groups use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons. This dataset includes attempted CBRN attacks. In addition to this database, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has WMD Terrorism Databases.² Lloyd’s Emerging Risk Report – 2016 radiological attacks all around the world Too many questions need an answer, not only (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, for today but especially for the future. It is 2016). time to cope seriously with biological weap- ons! It is time to take action! Just for giving few examples of biological at- tacks since the enforcement of the BTW Con- The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 vention, in 1984 fanatic members of the In- provides an overview of the meaning and the dian guru Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh used Sal- origin of the term bioterrorism. Section 2 il- monella bacteria

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