Liberty and Self in the political argument of republicanism, liberalism and postmodernism Duncan Mackenzie Ivison Presented for the degree of PhD Government Department London School of Economics and Political Science April 1993. UMI Number: U062724 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U062724 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 r 70*4-0 xc2 1106^60 Abstract: This thesis examines the relationship between the concepts of liberty and self in three different contexts - republicanism, liberalism, and post-modernism - all of which are products of particular historical traditions, and which present themselves as alternative 'languages' and practices in political argument today. I attempt to delineate the relation between the self and the concept of liberty within which it operates in each context, and more generally, questions concerning the relationship between personality and polity. The tendency of much recent historical and analytical scholarship when looking at these issues, has been to emphasize the radical differences between the traditions and their conceptual foundations, especially between republicanism and liberalism. Without minimizing the obvious differences, I have sought rather in this thesis to emphasize some important similarities in the way each approaches the issues of agency, liberty, and the role and justification of social arrangements. This entails a distinctive reading of some aspects in the history of the development of republican and liberal political argument, particularly in John Locke. An important theme here is the tension between assumptions of natural liberty and autonomy, and the role of the community and government in constructing, fostering, and disciplining the very autonomy that is presupposed. Arguing that the differing accounts of the relation between liberty and self are, in important ways, constitutive of the debate between 'communitarians' and 'proceduralists', I turn to contemporary Rawlsian liberal political theory to see if we can't stand back from this conventional way of looking at the problem and re-think the relations. [Towards this end I make some remarks on the relation between the history of political thought and (so- called) 'analytical' political theory.] I argue that liberal political theory must be 'perfectionist', though not in the way that communitarians argue, and not in the way that liberals fear. Indeed it must be so if it is to have any chance for success, though 'perfectionism' is a particularly inappropriate way of talking here, and has been taken up too easily and uncritically in the literature. Civic republican practices have something to teach us in this context, though not simply the way they respect the 'negative liberty' of individuals within a scheme of mutually enforcing rights and duties. This leads me in part, to consider how liberalism tries to make transparent elements of not only state coercion, but institutional, social, and non-juridical forms of power which work on, or through, citizens of modem democracies, and how these power relations manifest themselves in modem concepts of liberty, and conceptions of the self. Finally, I consider some aspects of the work of Michel Foucault, particularly a series of lectures and papers he gave on liberalism and 'neo-liberalism' to see if he offers a vantage point ( if anything) from which to evaluate our conventional ways of talking about, and acting on, our concepts of liberty and self. Ackno wle dgements It was Charles Taylor and James Tully who first inspired and encouraged me to carry on in political theory, and (for better or worse), I am indebted to them for it. James Tully has been of particular help: always interested and supportive, he has remained an important influence ever since I left Montreal. At the LSE my greatest debt has been to John Charvet. He has supervised me from the beginning, and his careful, patient, and meticulous readings and supervisions have never been less than excellent. Brian Barry has cast a critical eye and ear to various drafts and presentations, and gave me the opportunity to expound on my vague formulations in his seminars, with great patience and generosity. I am grateful to he and Anni Parker for their many kindnesses. Janet Coleman was an enthusiastic discussant, and patient listener, when I was struggling to find my way. I am also greatly indebted to all my fellow graduate students, who endured my seminar ramblings and inchoate papers with good humour and sharp, critical acumen. I am especially grateful to Russell Bentley, Robert Dickinson (who also provided superb last minute help), Matt Matravers, Tim Stainton, and James Willson, for reading, or discussing with me, most of what is here: I always learned from them. I would like to acknowledge how much I am indebted to various presentations I have heard, or discussions I have had, in the course of writing this thesis, with Richard Aschraft, John Dunn, Stephen Mulhall, Pasquale Pasquino. Richard Rorty, and Richard Tuck. Robert Dickinson, Tim Stainton, Brendan and Caroline O'Duffy, Dave Powell, Ashley Taggart, and Paula Grasdal, deserve special mention, for all the good times and good friendship. Diana Irving literally saved me, and though she came in near the end, has made it all seem worthwhile. It would not have been possible without her. My greatest debt is to my mother and father (and Deb and Rob too), and not only for all the usual reasons. Their contribution has been such that I find it hard to express just how much they have been part of these past few years, even though I've been on the other side of the ocean. The thesis is dedicated to them, with love. Whatever is of worth herein is almost entirely due to all these good people. Table of Contents Preface........................................................................................... i Part 1 (Ad fontes)................................................................... 6 Introduction..................................................................................7 Chapter 1: Ciceronian Themes..................................................20 1.0 Introduction 1.1 A system of libertas. 1.2 Ad exterioribus ad interior a 1.3 What am I now? 1.4 To stylize a freedom Chapter 2: Humanism's change of heart.................................59 2.0 Introduction 2.1 Forms of Ciceronianism 2.2 Change of heart: Christian Humanism and the self Chapter 3: Machiavelli and Liberty.......................................... 89 3.0 Introduction 3.1 A Machiavellian world-picture 3.2 Moral personality and virtuous action 3.3 Machiavelli and modernity Chapter 4: Liberty and virtue.....................................................127 4.0 Introduction 4.1 Virtuous structures: Rome, Athens, or Jerusalem? 4.2 The juridical 4.3 John Locke, republicanism, and the juridical mode of government Chapter 5: John Locke and the government of men............ 197 5.0 Juris-prudence 5.1 Foundations 5.2 Be not conformed... 5.3 Civic liberalism Interlude..........................................................................................248 Part 2.................................................................................................261 Chapter 6: Michel Foucault: Early and late modern arts of government......................... 262 6.0 Introduction 6.1 Anxious questions and the enlightenment 6.2 Foucault on power - 1 6.3 Foucault on power - II 6.4 Liberal discipline Chapter 7: Liberal conduct............................................................ 319 7.0 Introduction 7.1 Natural foundations 7.2 The personal is political? 7.3 Liberal circumstances 7.4 Perfecting liberal autonomy Conclusion........................................................................................365 Bibliography .....................................................................................381 The passage from the state of nature to the dvil state produces a truly remarkable change in the individual. It substitutes justice for instinct in his behaviour, and gives his actions a moral basis which formerly was lacking/ Jean Jacques Rousseau,(The Social Contract). 1 don't believe in the old dirges about decadence, the lack of good writers, the sterility of thought, the bleak and foreboding horizon ahead of us. I believe, on the contrary, that our problem is one of overabundance; not that we are suffering from an emptiness, but that we lack adequate means to think all that is happening/ Michel Foucault, (1980). Preface In the last paragraphs of his speech to the Athenee Royal in 1819, Benjamin Constant, after having spent the bulk of his time carefully distinguishing between the liberty of the ancients' and the 'liberty of the moderns', a distinction which would become a horizon (if not a spectre) hovering over the political theory of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, moved to summarize his argument: Therefore, Sirs, far from renouncing either of the two sorts of freedom which I have described to you, it is