Class, Race and Corporate Power Volume 8 Issue 2 Article 1 2020 Two Decades of Imperial Failure: Theorizing U.S. Regime Change Efforts in Venezuela from Bush II to Trump Timothy M. Gill University of Tennessee, Knoxville, [email protected] Joseph Marshall Brown University of North Carolina Wilmington, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/classracecorporatepower Part of the Politics and Social Change Commons Recommended Citation Gill, Timothy M. and Brown, Joseph Marshall (2020) "Two Decades of Imperial Failure: Theorizing U.S. Regime Change Efforts in Venezuela from Bush II to Trump," Class, Race and Corporate Power: Vol. 8 : Iss. 2 , Article 1. DOI: 10.25148/CRCP.8.2.009641 Available at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/classracecorporatepower/vol8/iss2/1 This work is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts, Sciences & Education at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Class, Race and Corporate Power by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Two Decades of Imperial Failure: Theorizing U.S. Regime Change Efforts in Venezuela from Bush II to Trump Abstract Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez ushered in the Pink Tide and the rise of the left in Latin America at the turn of the 21st century. Chávez initially won presidential elections in 1998 based on the promise of participatory democracy and tackling economic inequality, and thereafter by championing 21st Century Socialism. From the beginning, Chávez challenged U.S. global leadership by condemning its vision for the world and by cultivating an anti-imperial nexus of allies. This pattern has continued under current President Nicolás Maduro. In response, the U.S. has opposed the Venezuelan socialists throughout three successive presidential administrations: Bush II, Obama, and Trump. Taking influence from Michael Mann’s IEMP model of social power, we detail the ideological, economic, military, and political strategies these administrations have used to undermine the Venezuelan government and assist right-wing opposition parties and civil society groups in Venezuela. While Bush II and Obama primarily sought to depose Chávez by bolstering right-wing political parties and groups that aimed to unseat Chávez at the ballot box, Trump has recognized a parallel government open to an extra-legal change of government and openly called for coercive regime change through a military coup d’état. Keywords Venezuela; socialism; U.S. Empire; imperialism; Hugo Chávez Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. This article is available in Class, Race and Corporate Power: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/ classracecorporatepower/vol8/iss2/1 Introduction Since nearly the inception of the U.S., the country has maintained an imperial relationship with Latin America. Early U.S. leaders envisioned the Western Hemisphere as their unique sphere of influence and believed it was their God-given responsibility to safeguard the region from European influence and intervene when necessary to ensure that Latin American leaders behaved correctly, a policy enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 (Go 2011; Grandin 2006; McPherson 2016). Though U.S. leaders cloaked their imperial behavior in the language of anti- colonial solidarity, the U.S. practiced formal colonialism in Cuba and Puerto Rico, among other places, and dispatched U.S. Marines to continually invade and occupy regional lands, illustrating the tenuous reality of territorial sovereignty (Grandin 2006; Mann 2013; McPherson 2016). The use of formal colonialism, however, dissipated after World War II, and, although the U.S. has continued to use military force and to provide aid for particular militaries throughout Latin America, U.S. imperial strategies have taken alternate forms since the days of the Monroe Doctrine. U.S. imperial ambitions in the region have long contained a mix of objectives, and we can assort and examine these objectives and the strategies used to achieve them, utilizing the IEMP social power framework designed by Michael Mann, with the acronym referring to ideological, economic, military, and political forms of power. According to Mann (1986, 2013), the exercise of social power involves multiple bases, and no one group or state agency necessarily possesses control over all bases of power. Some groups can effectively wield power in one realm in order to ultimately exercise domination in another realm. Military members, for instance, have at times mobilized their arms capabilities to overthrow existing governments and capture political power. Some political leaders have sought to garner control over economic resources as a result of their institutional position, and vice versa. As a result, Mann (1986, 2013) points out that various crystallizations of power can emerge, and, depending on the conjuncture, groups with an inordinate share of one set of resources can use them to dominate society writ large. In the contemporary world, Mann (2013) sees globalization as characterized by the extension of these four forms of power into the broader world. Indeed, although imperialism has long been a feature of modernity, it too has taken on different forms in Latin America at the turn of the 21st century. Yet, we can still analyze and assess U.S. foreign policy objectives and strategies along these same four lines. First, at the ideological level, the U.S. has long championed a liberal democratic vision of how societies should operate (Bulmer-Thomas 2018; Go 2011; Immerman 2010). These ideas are rooted in the writings of politicians and thinkers such as John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, and Adam Smith. Despite the realities of who and what governments U.S. leaders have actually promoted, they have at least rhetorically embraced a vision that champions individual rights, civil liberties, and freedom from government intervention. This involves free- market economic policies, but it is not entirely reducible to it. For instance, it also involves a strong emphasis on freedoms of speech and religion, and the right to bear arms. It is an encompassing view of how societies should operate. Second, economic objectives exist, and have surely often shaped and sometimes determined the direction of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, economic objectives sometimes directly clash with broader ideological visions of what the U.S. allegedly stands for, including current U.S. diplomatic support for the Saudi monarchy. U.S leaders have remained interested in economic issues, such as the assurance of loan collection, expropriations of U.S. business, the creation of markets for U.S. products, and access to labor and resources. Broadly speaking, U.S. leaders have wanted to ensure that Latin American leaders service their loans, respect U.S. property, and allow entry into its markets and access to cheap labor and resources. Such interests have at times lent themselves to the usage of force or, Mann’s third base, military power. Even before the Cold War, Marines routinely invaded and occupied the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua to ensure that U.S. property was respected, loans were repaid, and, in the instance of Nicaragua, that they did not build an interoceanic canal with the British (McPherson 2016). U.S. force, though, has also been deployed for additional reasons, such as to ostensibly stop Serbian forces from ethnically cleansing Kosovar Albanians and to capture terrorist groups responsible for the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. Finally, on the political end, U.S. administrations have continually demanded that Latin American leaders broadly align with the U.S. and its national security interests before the interests of any other country. For example, when former Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz as well as the Sandinista government in Nicaragua began to work with the Soviet Union, U.S. leaders sought to overthrow these governments (Go 2011; Grandin 2006; Mann 2013; McPherson 2016). Both Arbenz and the Sandinistas took control over formerly U.S.-owned industries. However, they were far from the only governments during the 20th century to exert such control. The Venezuelan government took control over the oil industry in the 1976, and the Bolivian government nationalized mining and tin industries in 1952. The difference, however, lay in how they cast these takeovers, and how extensive their ties with the Soviet Union were. While the latter governments did not align with the Soviet Union and explicitly made their allegiance with the U.S. clear, Arbenz and the Sandinistas embraced a more radical form of politics and explicitly insisted on their autonomy from the U.S. In more recent years, concerns with socialism/communism have broadly given way to concerns with terrorism. Yet, since the turn of the 21st century, Latin American citizens have elected several leaders who have once again embraced socialism and challenged U.S. hegemony. Though there has been an ebb and flow of such leaders coming to power over the last two decades, we have seen them elected in places as diverse as Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The most outspoken and controversial set of such leaders has emerged in Venezuela. Though some statespeople in the aforementioned countries have criticized neoliberal capitalism, no set of leaders has more directly confronted the U.S. than former President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) and now Nicolás Maduro (2013- ). Beginning with Chávez, the Venezuelan government limited military relations with the U.S., condemned the War on Terror, sought control over several formerly U.S.-owned businesses, aligned with U.S. foes such as China and Russia, and routinely portrayed the U.S. as bent on undermining its socialist revolution. There is no question that recent U.S. administrations have opposed the Chávez and Maduro governments. Indeed, Bush II, Obama, and Trump not only opposed the Venezuelan government but also worked to destabilize Chávez and Maduro, and bring right-wing opposition groups into power, who have generally embraced the U.S.