Sociology Faculty Publications Sociology Spring 1986 Romanticism and the Rise of Sociological Hermeneutics Dmitri N. Shalin University of Nevada, Las Vegas, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/sociology_pubs Part of the Social Psychology and Interaction Commons Repository Citation Shalin, D. N. (1986). Romanticism and the Rise of Sociological Hermeneutics. Social Research, 53(1), 77-123. https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/sociology_pubs/51 This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Article in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Article has been accepted for inclusion in Sociology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Romanticismand the / Rise of Sociological . • / DMITRI Hermeneutics*II ^ //BY N.shaun /'lthough biblicalexegesis and rhetoric,from which modern hermeneuticsderived its firstprinciples, are ancientarts, an effortto establishhermeneutics as a universalscience, and especiallyto extendits principles to thescience of society, is of a decidedlyrecent origin. "There is littledoubt," states Gouldner, "thathermeneutics' roots in the modernera are traceableto Romanticism."1Why is thisso, whatmakes romanticism fertile groundfor hermeneutical speculations? Hans-Georg Gadamer, a leading authorityon hermeneutics,makes this intriguing suggestionabout its origins: The hermeneuticalproblem only emerges clearly when there is no powerfultradition present to absorbone's own attitude into itselfand when one is awareof confronting an alien tradition to whichhe has neverbelonged or one he no longerunquestion- inglyaccepts. Historicallyit is worthyof note thatwhile rhetoricbelongs to theearliest Greek philosophy, hermeneutics cameto flowerin the Romanticera as a consequenceof the moderndissolution of firmbonds with tradition.2 Gadamerdoes notpursue the argument much further, yet his remarkoffers a clue fora potentiallyfruitful line of inquiry. Indeed, the onsetof romanticismwas markedby the break- down of a century-oldtradition. Precipitated by the French 1 Alvin W. Gouldner, For Sociology:Renewal and Criticismin Sociology(New York: Basic Books),p. 336. 2 Hans-GeorgGadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of Califor- nia Press,1976), pp. 46, 21. SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Spring1986) This content downloaded from 131.216.164.152 on Tue, 16 Jul 2013 14:28:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 78 SOCIAL RESEARCH Revolution of 1789, a crisis of major proportion swept over Europe, leaving its indelible mark on virtuallyevery form of practical and spiritual life. The romantic movement was in great measure an attempt,inconclusive and contradictoryas it might seem, to come to grips with the legacy of the French Revolution. The revolutioncompelled the reappraising of the past and made imperative a conscious stance with regard to the present. It underscored the historicityand fragilityof the tradition.Most frighteningly,the revolutionrevealed the con- stitutiverole of reason, its uncanny ability to revamp the natural order of things,which establishedman as a participant observer in the drama of history.The realizationthat man is a producer as much as a product of society- this major insight of sociological hermeneutics- was first formulated by the romanticthinkers in response to the promise and the threatof the French Revolution. A few preliminaryremarks on the meaning of "romanti- cism" as employed in this paper are in order here. The term has been the subject of an ongoing controversysince the beginning of this century.3 Some critics see little use in it because "it has come to mean so many thingsthat, by itself,it means nothing"4- too many differentauthors are lumped to- gether under the heading "romanticism,"too antitheticalare the ideas stamped "romantic,"too uncertain is the time span encompassing the "romantic movement." What useful pur- pose, indeed, may be served by bringingunder one head such unlikely bedfellows as Goethe, Tieck, E. T. A. Hoffman, Fichte, F. Schlegel, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, A. Müller, Marx, and Novalis? Lovejoy's unhappiness with the term and his preference for the plural form "romanticisms"5 3 The historyof thiscontroversy is reviewedin René Wellek,Concepts of Criticism (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1963), and LilianR. Fürst,Romanticism (London: Methuen,1969). The best substantivediscussion is stillJacques Barzun'sClassic, Romantic,and Modern(New York: AnchorBooks, 1961). 4 A. O. Lovejoy,"On theDiscrimination of Romanticisms,"inEnglish Romantic Poets: ModernEssays in Criticism(New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1960), p. 6. 5 Ibid. This content downloaded from 131.216.164.152 on Tue, 16 Jul 2013 14:28:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SOCIOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS 79 are quite understandable. Still, his argument overstates the case. What is peculiar about romantic thinkers,as Gouldner rightlynoted, is that "ever since Hegel, romantics have ex- pressed their distance from others by condemning them as Romantics'."6 It may be prudent to distinguish those con- sciously advancing the romantic cause (we can call them "romantics") from those who partake in it without openly subscribingto its tenets or accepting some of its forms (they may be called "romanticists"),but to deny Goethe, Hegel, or Marx a place in the historyof romanticismon account of their ambivalence about it is to engage in the "petty politics of cultural history."7Barzun hardly exaggerates when he calls Faust "a bible of Romanticism" in spite of Goethe's delib- erate attempts to put distance between himself and the ro- mantics.8 Hegel's contempt for everything romantic not- withstanding,his Phenomenologyof Mind is an outstanding piece of romantic philosophy, deservedly included by Peck- ham among the required readings for all studentsof roman- ticism.9Gouldner's interestin "Marx's Romanticism"10does no violence to the historicalrealities, even though it flies in the face of Marx's well-knownantiromantic sentiments. And cer- tainlya long list of romantic writerscompiled by Isaiah Ber- lin,11 which features among others Chateaubriand, Kier- kegaard, Stirner,and Nietzsche, is no sign of his indifference to the diversityof their respective views. The greater the stature of a thinker,the more likely he is to be in a class by himself; classing him together with other romanticistsis not meant to suggest that he is nothingbut romantic,only that he took part in the romantic discourse, shared in the romantic 6 Gouldner, For Sociology,p. 336. 7 Barzun, Classic, p. 8. 8 Ibid. 9 Morse Peckham, "On Romanticism,"Studies in Romanticism9 (1970): 218. 10 Gouldner, For Sociology,p. 339; see also The Two .Marxisms(New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1980), p. 192. 11 Isaiah Berlin,"Preface," in H. G. Schenk, The Mind ofthe European Romantics (New York: Anchor Books, 1969), p. xv. This content downloaded from 131.216.164.152 on Tue, 16 Jul 2013 14:28:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 80 SOCIAL RESEARCH problematics,and wittinglyor unwittinglycontributed to the vastfield of idiomsand meaningswhich sprang to lifein the aftermathof theFrench Revolution and signifieda breakwith the Age of Reason. All this is not to belittlethe formidabletask facing the studentof romanticismseeking to unravel the unityof the romanticmovement. This taskis exacerbatedby the violently contradictorystatements emanating from alleged romanticists. In the same breathwe findthem asserting the autonomyof the individualand the primacyof the whole, the rightto self-determinationand the dutyto the state,personal respon- sibilityfor the futureand the inviolabilityof tradition.These contradictionscannot be simplycharged to the factionaldi- visionswithin the romantic movement, for they are endemicto everygenuinely romantic thinker; rather, they should be seen as a manifestationof the "contradictoriness,dissonance and innerconflict of the Romanticmind."12 It is to the creditof such studentsof romanticismas Kluckhohnand Barzun, Peckhamand Abrams,Wasserman and Schenkthat they endea- vored to grasp the unityunderlying the romanticmovement withoutglossing over the artistic,intellectual, and ideological diversityof its protagonists. The followingaccount focuseson the tensioninherent in the premisesof romanticthought. Several of these premises are central to the present study. The firstconcerns the romanticists'political commitment and is predicatedon the idea that"Romanticism as well as Revolution. were united in theirimpassioned striving for freedom."13 Deploring revo- lutionaryviolence, the romanticists remained committed to the revolution'semancipatory goals. The novel elementin their politicalreasoning was the contentionthat individual freedom is not antitheticalto socialorder, that the formeris grounded in the latterand can be fullyrealized only in and through 12 Schenk, Mind, p. xxii. 10 linn., p. w. This content downloaded from 131.216.164.152 on Tue, 16 Jul 2013 14:28:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SOCIOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS 81 society.The second