The Money of Monarchs The Importance of Non-Tax Revenue for Autocratic Rule in Early Modern Sweden Klas Nilsson Cover illustration: Woodcut from Olaus Magnus’ History of the Nordic Peoples (published in ), illustrating the collection of taxes by an armed bailiffand his men. © Klas Nilsson Faculty of Social Sciences and Department of Political Science ISBN ---- (print) ISBN ---- (pdf) ISSN - Typeset in LATEX Printed in Sweden by Media-Tryck, Lund University Lund The king was the state. He was its ruler, spiritual, temporal and financial. Between royal private pocket and public purse there was but small distinction. “The Treasury is the root of kings,” speaks an ancient maxim of Hindu political theory. Another maxim hammers home that “the Treasury, and not the physical body of the king is . the real king.” Financial administration and government, therefore, are inseparable. — Carolyn Webber & Aaron Wildavsky (, p. ) Acknowledgements The American artist Cy Twombly once said that “When I work, I work very fast, but preparing to work can take any length of time.” I feel that the process of putting together this thesis has proceeded in a similar manner; an awful lot of preparation capped by a much shorter period of very intense work. I can only imagine that this way of doing things has taken its toll on my two supervisors, who have rarely seen a piece of writing before its due date, and most often only after that date has come and gone. I feel much gratitude toward Martin Hall and Jan Teorell for all the support and encouragement they have nonetheless managed to give me over the years. I have benefited immensely from having two supervisors who are equally keen readers yet tend to see very different things. Martin has always impressed me with his ability to dissect a text, disregard the chaff, and address its analytical core, while Jan has a breadth of expertise that overturns E. E. Schattschneider’s claim that an expert is someone who “chooses to be ignorant about many things so that he may know all about one.” What I appreciate the most, however, is the fact that I have always left our meetings feeling somewhat more lighthearted and hopeful about my work. That, I think, is the hallmark of good supervision. Martin also deserves some credit for encouraging me to apply for a position in the PhD program in Lund. As someone who rarely embellishes his words he simply told me that if I did not care too much about making money, avoiding stress, or enjoying a rewarding social life, I should really consider becoming a doctoral student. I only heard the implicit praise, of course, but at least I cannot complain that I was not given fair warning. A number of proficient people at the Department of Political Science in Lund have read earlier drafts of this manuscript and offered valuable comments and suggestions. I am especially grateful to Björn Östbring, Per Andersson, and Augustín Goenaga who have time and again given me both intellectual and moral support. Many thanks also to Magnus Jerneck, Ted Svensson (a diligent reader if there ever was one), Lisa Strömbom, Erik Ringmar, and Björn Badersten. As a political scientist meddling with historical analysis I also appreciate the feedback and kind encouragement I have received from two proper historians, Harald Gustafsson (Lund Univ.) and Mats Hallenberg (Stockholm Univ.). The latter may characterize himself as ‘a grumpy historian’ but do not believe him; he is nothing of the sort. Sir David Ratford has performed valuable proofreading of the final manuscript. My good friend and colleague Tony Ingesson deserves a special mention for his generous help with just about everything. I have begun to worry about the day when he will ask me to start returning the favor. I consider myself very lucky to be part of a great PhD community at the Department, which includes not only the candidates here in Lund but also our good friends at Malmö University’s Department of Global Political Studies. You are too numerous to all be named here, but I want to mention my closest circle of colleagues, those who started the program with me: Linda Nyberg and Mikael Kylsäter, who I first met at the start of the Master’s program in what now feels like ages ago; Annika Fredén, with whom I share an academic origin of sorts, at the University of Gothenburg; and Kurt Boyer and Fabio Cristiano who have made it quite impossible for me to fall into a complacent, unreflective state of Swedishness. I treasure the fact that we are all quite different people and that there is almost no overlap between our respective research topics. My heartfelt thanks go out to all other friends and colleagues at the Department, including a most professional and helpful administrative staff. One member of that staff, who’s work often goes unnoticed, is Praphasri Palm. She is one of the most dependable sources of sunny smiles at the office (and I suspect that she has kept my plants alive behind my back). I am grateful for the financial contributions I have received from Landshövding Per Westling Minnesfond, the Swedish Research Council, the Fiscal Sociology Workshop, and the European Consortium for Political Research—contributions which have made it possible for me to present research and take courses outside of Sweden. I want to thank the Markussen Foundation in particular for their generous grant which has given me much-needed relief in the final phase of writing. Talking about relief: there are many people in my life—friends from back home in Småland, friends from my current home in Malmö, and friends from everywhere in between—who have given me tremendous relief by caring little for my dissertation but caring a lot for me. This takes the edge offone of the predicaments of being a doctoral candidate, namely that even though few of us nurture any illusions about what kind of impact our work will actually have on the world, most of us nonetheless need to be repeatedly reminded and reassured that we are not our research. My three siblings have offered similar reassurance whenever I have needed it. This book is dedicated to the two people who, by intention or accident, put me on the academic path, and who also gave me the resources needed to reach the end of this particular project. Those two people are my parents, Ann-Karin and Kjell, and the resources they gave me involve a basic affection for books and storytelling, languages and linguistics. Contents Introduction Situating the Thesis, Main Contributions A Note on History Writing and Method Plan of the Book, Part I Of Rule and Revenue A Momus’ Window Studying the State from its Fiscal Side The Price of War, – Contentions of the Purse, Taxation and Political Rule in Historical Europe The Contractual Narrative, – The Coercive Narrative, – The Conflictual Narrative, Explaining the Variation On the Need to Broaden Our Fiscal Scope Non-Tax Revenue in Historical Europe On the Variety and Longevity of Non-Tax Revenue Crown Domains, – Venality, – Tolls, – Royal Trade and Colonial Plunder, – State Property in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, The Tax Bias Why Non-Tax Revenue Matters Of Rule and Non-Tax Revenue The Rentier State Theory The Rentier Effect on Regime Type, – Extending the Rentier State Theory, Historical Roots Concluding Thoughts Part II Concepts and Theory The Cause: Proprietary Revenue Mapping Non-Tax Revenue The Defining Attribute, Proprietary Revenue Revenue as Property of the State, Taxes as Public Revenue What About State Debt? Conceptual Benefits The Outcome: Autocratic Rule Absolutism Versus Autocracy Autocracy and its Alternatives Toward a Triangular Understanding of Regime Formation, – Hybrid Regime Types, Analytical Benefits Devices of Government, The Mechanisms: Tax Relief, Spending, Repression The Cogs and Wheels of Causality Causal Mechanisms, The Rentier Mechanisms The Mechanisms Applied to Historical Polities Concluding Thoughts Part III Historical Investigations The Curious Case of Swedish Regime Formation Two Conflicting Approaches An Autocracy Without Motivation?, – Picking Sides, Sweden’s Constitutional Heritage Selecting Historical Episodes Difficult Data Gustav i (r. –) Constitutional Developments The Regime of Gustav i, Ecclesiastical Wealth Landownership, – Outcome of the Reformation, – The Arguments and Negotiation in Västerås, Riches Beneath the Ground The Mining Regale, – Silvery Fortunes, Tracing the Mechanisms Concluding Note, Karl xi (r. –) The Rise of the Carolingian Autocracy The Regime of Karl xi, The Regency Tribunal The Great Restitution The Land That Was Lost, – Restitution or Contribution?, – The decision of , – The Fiscal Outcome, Tracing the Mechanisms Concluding Note, Gustav iii (r. –) The Gustavian Autocracy The First Coup, – Toward the second coup, – The Regime of Gustav iii, The Proprietary Revenue of Gustav iii Failed Expectations The State Debt The Eleventh Hour of Swedish Autocracy The Money of Monarchs Recapitulation of the Argument Conclusions from the Historical Investigations From Theory to Empirics, – From Empirics to Theory, Some Bigger Answers Four Fiscal Trajectories of European Regime Formation, – The Historical Mirror, Unanswered Questions List of Tables List of Figures Bibliography Introduction he formation of political regimes in historical Europe is com- T monly summarized as a power struggle between monarchs and parliaments. In cases where the monarch gained the upper hand we speak of autocracy or absolutism, whereas parliamentary dominance is linked to representative government or constitutionalism. Figuring out why and how different countries developed in different directions arguably constitutes the main concern of the comparative study of regime formation (Koenigsberger, ; Mann, ; Ertman, ). The case of early modern Sweden rarely figures in these studies, which is perhaps not that surprising when you consider the language barrier and the fact that the country was a poor, peripheral third-rate power throughout most of its history.