University of Huddersfield Repository

University of Huddersfield Repository

University of Huddersfield Repository Owen, Robert Considered policy or haphazard evolution? No. 617 Squadron RAF 1943 - 45 Original Citation Owen, Robert (2014) Considered policy or haphazard evolution? No. 617 Squadron RAF 1943 - 45. Doctoral thesis, University of Huddersfield. This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/25017/ The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners. Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided: • The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy; • A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and • The content is not changed in any way. For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please contact the Repository Team at: [email protected]. http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/ CONSIDERED POLICY OR HAPHAZARD EVOLUTION? NO. 617 SQUADRON RAF 1943-45 ROBERT MALCOLM OWEN A thesis submitted to the University of Huddersfield in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Huddersfield (in collaboration with the Royal Air Force Museum) OCTOBER 2014 2 Copyright statement i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns any copyright in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Huddersfield the right to use such copyright for any administrative, promotional, educational and/or teaching purposes. ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts, may be made only in accordance with the regulations of the University Library. Details of these regulations may be obtained from the Librarian. This page must form part of any such copies made. iii. The ownership of any patents, designs, trademarks and any and all other intellectual property rights except for the Copyright (the “Intellectual Property Rights”) and any reproductions of copyright works, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property Rights and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property Rights and/or Reproductions 3 4 ABSTRACT Following their breaching of German dams in May 1943, No. 617 Squadron, Royal Air Force, was maintained as a specialist precision bombing unit. For the remainder of the Second World War the Squadron carried out precision attacks using new and unconventional weapons, culminating with Barnes Wallis’s deep penetration bombs, TALLBOY and GRAND SLAM. This thesis will show that the numerous accounts of the Squadron’s history have failed to take account of many factors that determined its role. By concentrating on the operational record and weapons, both popular historians and scholars have given a distorted and interpretatively incomplete description of the Squadron’s development. This in turn has led to an incomplete perception of the Squadron’s Development and a misconception of its full contribution to the bomber offensive. This thesis identifies policy and decision making bodies and examines their role in selecting weapons and targets for the Squadron. It explores the issues which determined the role played by the Squadron: changes in Air Staff policy for Bomber Command, choice of targets, the development and production of weapons, and tactical requirements. Comparison is made between the planners’ original intentions and the final operational record. Many of the Squadron’s operations emerged from an inability to follow through from initial planning. Such failure resulted from factors that included unrealistic expectations of weapon performance, delays in the development of new weapons, and political intervention. Alternative targets were selected not only to take advantage of the Squadron’s existing capabilities but also to address specific issues that were often imposed on the planners by outside agencies which would have otherwise diverted Bomber Command from the main offensive. In other instances the Squadron was used to supplement existing operations carried out by main force. The gestation time for new weapons was such that when a weapon emerged its originally intended targets were no often longer relevant. Accordingly, new targets had to be found. The Squadron’s role in the development and assessment of weapons, equipment and new techniques for the Command is revealed to be greater than previously recognised. This new approach to the Squadron’s wartime role examines the policy and planning backstory to the Squadron’s operations. It reveals a hitherto unrecognised complexity in the evolution of the Squadron’s role, and demonstrates how haphazard delays and set- backs were transformed into new policy to meet ever changing requirements. 5 6 Acknowledgements The origins of this thesis lie in informal discussions with Sebastian Cox, Head of Air Historical Branch, RAF Northolt. Not only has he been a sounding board for the development of ideas, but asked many thought provoking questions stimulating new avenues of research. His advice, encouragement and assistance over the years have been beyond compare. Thank you too, all those members of the Branch who have contributed in no small measure to my research over the years. Peter Elliott and the staff of the Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon, have been unstinting in their assistance, answering numerous questions and making available a range of material, often at short notice. I acknowledge the help given by staff providing a vital and usually anonymous service, both front of house and in the archives at the following institutions: National Archives, Kew; the Science Museum Library, Swindon; The Archive Centre, Leonard Cheshire Disability, Netherseal; Imperial War Museum, London; Churchill College, Cambridge. My thanks go to the University of Huddersfield, the Royal Air Force Museum and to the Royal Air Force Historical Society for their generous financial support for my research. The Committee and Members of the No. 617 Squadron Association and members of Sir Barnes Wallis’s family have provided a personal link to personalities and events featured in this research. For your fellowship over the years, thank you. Friends and fellow researchers have been generous with their support: Clive Richards, who inspired me to embark on this project, Dr John Sweetman, James Holland and Patrick Bishop. Finally, my greatest debt is to my supervisors, Professor Richard Morris and Reverend Paul Wilcock of the University of Huddersfield Arms and Armour Research Institute. Their guidance, encouragement and advice have been invaluable, and without them this would be a lesser work. 7 8 Glossary 12,000lb HC bomb High Capacity blast bomb used primarily for attacks on industrial targets ABC AIRBORNE CIGAR: Transmissions to interfere with German fighter control instructions ANVIL Use of radio controlled war weary bombers for attacks against large V-weapon sites ANVIL (Operation) Original codename for Allied amphibious landings in the South of France (later Operation DRAGOON) APRHRODITE Use of radio controlled war weary bombers for attacks against large V-weapon sites Base The parent administrative unit of a group of (usually) three bomber airfields Battle of the Ruhr Bomber Command’s attacks on German industry March-July 1943 BLACKMAIL Operation to persuade French factory management to co- operate with SOE sabotage BODYLINE Operations against German secret weapon (renamed CROSSBOW from 15 November 1943) CASABLANCA Directive issued to British and American Air Force commanders, February 1943 – April 1944 CATECHISM Attack on Tirpitz 12 November 1944 CIU Central Interpretation Unit CROSSBOW Operations against the V-weapon launching sites (formerly BODYLINE) D-Day Allied invasion of Europe, 6 June 1944 E-boat High speed German motor torpedo boat FLASHLAMP Attack on coastal gun batteries 5/6 June 1944 FORTITUDE Pre-D-Day deception plan to mislead the Germans as to the location of the Allied landings in north-west Europe GEE Radar aid to navigation GRAND SLAM 22,000 lb Medium Capacity Deep Penetration bomb - See TALLBOY (L) H2S Ground mapping airborne radar used for navigation H2X American version of H2S 9 High Capacity (HC) Thin cased blast bombs with a high (80%) charge/weight ratio for blast effect HIGHBALL A smaller version of Wallis's ‘bouncing bomb’ carried by Mosquitos (see UPKEEP) INFATUATE Allied Landings on Walcheren October 1944 ‘J’ Bomb Liquid filled incendiary bomb (first used 22 April 1944) JOCKEY Committee analysing the German aircraft industry to recommend targets for POINTBLANK JOHNNY WALKER 400-500lb anti-ship bomb Kriegsmarine Germany Navy LULU Tail warning radar trialled by Squadron's Lancasters Medium Capacity (MC) Thicker cased bombs than HC, with approx. 40% charge/weight ratio MANDREL Airborne radar jamming device MONICA Tail warning radar carried by Lancasters OBOE Blind bombing aid and marking device used by PFF Mosquitos OBVIATE Attack on Tirpitz 29 October 1944 Ordensburg National Socialist Party educational training camps OVERLORD

View Full Text

Details

  • File Type
    pdf
  • Upload Time
    -
  • Content Languages
    English
  • Upload User
    Anonymous/Not logged-in
  • File Pages
    257 Page
  • File Size
    -

Download

Channel Download Status
Express Download Enable

Copyright

We respect the copyrights and intellectual property rights of all users. All uploaded documents are either original works of the uploader or authorized works of the rightful owners.

  • Not to be reproduced or distributed without explicit permission.
  • Not used for commercial purposes outside of approved use cases.
  • Not used to infringe on the rights of the original creators.
  • If you believe any content infringes your copyright, please contact us immediately.

Support

For help with questions, suggestions, or problems, please contact us