Existential Laughter JOHN LIPPITT The fact of the matter is that we must acknowledge that in the last resort there is no theory. (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, entry 2509) Each of the previous three articles in this series has examined one of the three main traditions of humour theory; those based around incongruity, superiority and the release of energy. We have seen that each of these theoretical traditions sheds some light upon humour and laughter, but also that all fail in their overly ambitious task of offering a fully comprehensive theory. This has not deterred some scholars from wanting to develop such a theory; perhaps by incorporating the best features of each of the main three theoretical traditions into one 'super-theory'. But while it is true that such a synthesis of theories might be superior, as a theory, to each by itself, such a technique would still not give us an adequate general theory. Why? Because we have seen that the inadequacies of the theoretical traditions are not merely those of omission; inadequacies which could be resolved by supplementing any given theory with insights from alternative perspectives. Rather, some of the most important problems are intrinsic to the theories themselves; most notably, the need to stretch terminology, to a sometimes ludicrous degree, which we observed in both the incongruity and superiority traditions. So rather than attempting, in this final article, the construction of such a super-theory, I shall approach our subject from a very different angle. Most philosophers who have written about humour and laughter have done so in passing; their comments usually being digressions from, or a subsection of, some topic perceived as being more important. It therefore seems surprising that two thinkers-Nietzsche and Kierkegaard-who attach to humour and laughter profound significance, have not attracted more attention in this field. 1 This final article, therefore, will shift our attention away from 'theories of humour', and aim to show that both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard have something of interest to say about laughter and humour, but that this something relates, not to their relation to the theoretical traditions examined previously, but to the profound existential significance of laughter and humour. Nietzsche's laughter Let us start with Nietzsche. Possibly the best known Nietzschean soundbite on laughter is from his Nachlass: Perhaps I know best why man is the only animal that laughs: he alone suffers so excruciatingly that he was compelled to invent laughter. The unhappiest and most melancholy animal is, as might have been expected, the most cheerful. 2 This clearly shows that for Nietzsche, the comic and the tragic are closely interlinked. Yet at the beginning of The Gay Science, he seems to favour the comic. Here Nietzsche expresses regret that 'the comedy of existence has not yet "become conscious" of itself'; that we thereby 'still live in the age of tragedy, the age of moralities and religions'.3 Nietzsche describes founders of moralities and religions as 'teachers of the purpose of existence',4 who try to offer reasons why life is worth living. Included in such an outlook seems to be the assumption that oneself, the other and life itself are matters which should be treated with great solemnity. The 'teacher of the purpose of existence...wants to make sure that we do not laugh at existence, or at ourselves-or at him...again and again the human race will decree from time to time: "There is something at which it is absolutely forbidden henceforth to laugh".'5 (Such an attitude is akin to what in Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche calls the 'Spirit of Gravity'; 'gravity' (Schwere) meaning both 'heavy' and 'serious'.) But this proscription of laughter can only be temporary: 'There is no denying that in the long run every one of these great teachers of a purpose was vanquished by laughter, reason and nature: the short tragedy always gave way again and returned into the eternal comedy of existence'.6 Nietzsche's reasons for this favourable view of laughter and 'the comic' are clearly demonstrated in his other writings on laughter. He views it as having the potential to redeem us from the suffering of the human condition. It is the redemptive potential of laughter as an attitude towards ourselves and our world that leads Nietzsche to condemn those who forbid us to laugh at ourselves, them, and human existence. Note, therefore, that laughter is assigned a quasi-religious role. This notion of laughter as redemptive is already hinted at in Nietzsche's earliest book, The Birth of Tragedy. Moreover, Nietzsche here offers an attitude of laughter as a direct alternative to one particular type of redemption; that promised by versions of Christianity which concentrate on an after-life, thereby according to Nietzsche-downgrading this life for the sake of a destructive false hope. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche discusses 'Dionysian' man's insight into 'the horror or absurdity of existence'; and how a confrontation with the abyss; a looking 'truly into the essence of things', provides him with 'tragic knowledge'. When we confront the idea that nothing we do could 'change anything in the eternal nature of things', this 'insight into the horrible truth outweighs any motive for action, 7. Yet here art can act as a 'saving sorceress'; turning 'these nauseous thoughts about the horror or absurdity of existence into notions with which one can live: these are the sublime as the artistic taming of the horrible, and the comic as the artistic discharge of the nausea of absurdity'.8 This brief hint of the importance of laughter or 'the comic' to Nietzsche is fleshed out in the much later 'Attempt at a self-criticism' of The Birth of Tragedy. Here Nietzsche criticizes his former self for succumbing to romanticism, in suggesting the need for tragedy as an 'art of metaphysical comfort'.9 The idea here is that 'romantics' can all too easily end up as similar to Christians, in that for them, art plays the same role as Christianity's after life in providing a solace which is, in Nietzsche's eyes, merely a way of trying to escape reality. Here Nietzsche warns against any such form of 'metaphysical comfort' and offers his alternative: 'No! You ought to learn the art of this worldly comfort first; you ought to learn to laugh, my young friends, if you are hell-bent on remaining pessimists. Then perhaps, as laughers, you may some day dispatch all metaphysical comforts to the devil-metaphysics in front. Or, to say it in the language of that Dionysian monster who bears the name of Zarathustra: "Raise up your hearts, my brothers, high, higher! And don't forget your legs! Raise up your legs, too, good dancers; and still better: stand on your heads! "This crown of the laugher, the rosewreath crown: I crown myself with this crown; I myself pronounced holy my laughter. I did not find anyone else today strong enough for that. "Zarathustra, the dancer; Zarathustra, the light one who beckons with his wings, preparing for a flight, beckoning to all birds, ready and heady, blissfully light-headed; "Zarathustra, the soothsayer; Zarathustra, the sooth-laugher; not impatient; not unconditional; one who loves leaps and side-leaps: I crown myself with this crown. "This crown of the laugher, the rosewreath crown: to you, my brothers, I throw this crown. Laughter have I pronounced holy: you higher men, learn to laugh!'10 And it is on this ecstatic hymn of praise to laughter that Nietzsche's 'Attempt at a selfcriticism' ends. Zarathustra's 'laugher's crown, this rosewreath crown' is clearly offered as an alternative to Jesus's crown of thorns. And the context within which Jesus acquired this crown is significant. According to the accounts of both Mark and Matthew, the acquisition of this headwear is as part of the Roman soldiers' mocking humiliation of Jesus immediately prior to his crueifixion.11 Jesus seems here to be a victim of the cruel, mocking 'laughter of the herd' to which Zarathustra himself falls victim in the Prologue of Thus Spake Zarathustra, when his attempt to teach the crowd in the market-place his doctrine of the Übermensch results in his being ridiculed and laughed at. Both Zarathustra and Jesus are mockingly laughed at for preaching radical and unconventional doctrines. Nietzsche's main points here, I suggest, are these. If the Christian gospel-reader comes to associate laughter with the cruel mockery of the soldiers in Jesus's final humiliation prior to the crucifixion, it is not difficult to see how he or she might come to give laughter negative connotations. (Recall the point commonly made that the majority of Biblical references to laughter are negative.) 1t is also easy to see how he or she might seize with relish Jesus's words about laughter's being available to the saved after death. (These words 'Blessed are you who weep now, for you will laugh'12-are accompanied by another saying-'Woe to you who laugh now, for you will mourn and weep'13-which Nietzsche describes as 'the greatest sin here on earth'.) But this idea, Nietzsche thinks, contains within it connotations of ressentiment and revenge. This is the feature of Christianity for which Nietzsche takes it to task in On the Genealogy o[ Morals ,where he argues that central to Christianity is the idea of the revenge of the 'weak' or 'slavish' over the 'strong' or 'noble'. The upshot of all this is that Zarathustra is stressing that there can be kinds of laughter other than that of mockery and revenge; he is claiming that laughter can be redeeming.