State-Building and Nationalism in Croatia, 1990-196 0

State-Building and Nationalism in Croatia, 1990-196 0

TITLE : STATE-BUILDING AND NATIONALISM IN CROATIA, 1990-196 0 AUTHOR : JILL A. IRVINE, University of Oklahom a THE NATIONAL COUNCI L FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H TITLE VIII PROGRA M 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N .W . Washington, D.C . 20036 PROJECT INFORMATION : 1 CONTRACTOR : University of Oklahom a PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Jill A . Irvin e COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 810-2 1 DATE : August 19, 199 6 COPYRIGHT INFORMATION Individual researchers retain the copyright on work products derived from research funded b y Council Contract. The Council and the U.S. Government have the right to duplicate written report s and other materials submitted under Council Contract and to distribute such copies within th e Council and U.S. Government for their own use, and to draw upon such reports and materials fo r their own studies ; but the Council and U.S. Government do not have the right to distribute, o r make such reports and materials available, outside the Council or U .S. Government without the written consent of the authors, except as may be required under the provisions of the Freedom o f Information Act 5 U.S.C. 552, or other applicable law. 1 The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract funds provided by the National Counci l for Soviet and East European Research, made available by the U. S. Department of State under Title VIII (th e Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended). The analysis and interpretation s contained in the report are those of the author(s) . CONTENTS Executive Summary Introduction 1 Ideological Context of the Extreme Right 2 The Roots of Ultranationalism in Croatia 5 Organizational Forms of Extreme Nationalism 7 THe Ideology of Extreme Nationalism 1 3 Conclusion 2 5 Endnotes 26 STATE-BUILDING AND NATIONALIS M IN CROATIA, 1990-199 6 EXECUTIVE SUMMAR Y This paper examines the impact of nationalist and extreme right ideology on the process o f regime transition in Croatia . A significant portion of the ruling party, the Croatian Democrati c Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica . HDZ) as well as the radical right parties hav e appropriated the ideas and the symbols of the extremist strand of the Croatian national movement . The predominant role of this ideology in shaping the state-building process from 1990 to 199 5 will have a significant effect on Croatian political developments in the future . Several groups and political parties adhere to a state-building program based on extrem e nationalism . First, there are several pravasi (rightist) parties that take their inspiration from Ant e Starcevic, founder of the first Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska stranka prava . HSP) . Starcevic advocated the establishment of a Great Croatian state and espoused an integral Croatia n nationalism with a markedly anti-Serb tone . The main pravasi party today, also called the HSP . was formed in 1990 by Dobroslav Paraga . The HSP has become increasingly fractured since Ante Djapic replaced Paraga as head of the party in 1993, and increasingly co-opted by the HDZ . Consequently, there appears to be room on the right for a new political party . Several forme r HSP sympathizers and splinter groups announced their intention to form a new pravasi party i n May 1996 . The second and more influential group to adopt an ultranationalist state-building agenda i s within the HDZ . The HDZ has retained its initial character as a conglomerate party or a movement, unlike many other East European conglomerate parties which have gradually begun t o resemble their West European counterparts . The ruling party contains a wide range of view s within its ranks, including a powerful extremist wing . This faction increased in strength afte r several moderate leaders left the HDZ in 1994 to form their own political party . The HDZ' s relatively disappointing performance in the October 1995 parliamentary elections furthe r radicalized the hard-liners . (Despite Croatia's recent military victories, the HDZ receive d approximately the same percentage of the vote as in previous elections while its share of the urba n vote continued to drop) . Tudjman's key role in the Dayton Accord and his acceptance by th e West appear to have increased his own extremist proclivities and the position of the extremis t group within the HDZ . HSP sympathizers and extremists within the HDZ embrace a state-building ideology whic h consists of six main elements : (l) insistence upon the historical continuity of the Croatian state and the state-buildin g "accomplishments" of the Ustasha movement and the Independent State of Croatia from 1941 - 1945 . The regime's symbolic appropriation of the wartime fascist state and its emphasis on Ustasha themes in public discourse have strengthened the extreme right and helped mov e extremist positions into the political mainstream in Croatia . (2) achieving independence through military means . Ultranationalist emphasis on arme d conflict has caused them to pay close attention to military matters and to seek control over th e Croatian military . The activities of the HSP 's paramilitary force, the Croatian Defense Forc e (Hrvatske obrambene snage, HOS) were a crucial component in its initial political success . Although HOS has been neutralized as a political and military factor, there have been accusation s of an attempted pravasi "putsch" within the army . Nevertheless, the military appears to be unde r the firm control of the Defense Minister Gojko Susak, a powerful HDZ extremist . (3) establishing a strong authoritarian or semi-authoritarian state . While most extremists pledge their support for democracy they routinely operate in ways that undermine it . Extremists within the HDZ and President Tudjman himself display a hostility toward the opposition tha t ranges from denunciation of political opponents as "enemies of the Croatian state" to harassmen t of opposition leaders and parties, to outright physical intimidation and possibly assassination o f political opponents . Extremists outside the HDZ, with the notable exception of Dobroslav Paraga's new party, HSP-1861, have generally supported these repressive measures . (4) Territorial expansion into Croatia's "historical, natural and ethnic borders ." In it s minimal variant, this expansionism involves a Croatia reconstructed within the borders of th e Croatian Banovina of 1939 . It maximum variant involves extending Croatian control not onl y over all of Bosnia-Hercegovina but over significant portions of Serbia including Srijem . Backa and Sandzak and the Bay of Kotor in Montenegro . The main question concerning Croatia' s borders involves the status of Bosnia-Hercegonia, and on this issues ultranationalists have no t agreed . HSP sympathizers (including those in the HSP splinter parties) insist that Bosnia - Hercegonina should remain united and that Croatia should strengthen its alliance with the Bosnia n Muslims. Extremists with the HDZ, particularly from the "Hercegovinian lobby," hold a les s "positive" view of the Bosnian Muslims and a reluctance to include them in the Croatian state . They support the partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the creation of an ethnically pure Herce g Bosna . (5) the struggle with "natural enemies" for survival . Proponents of this ideology view Serbs as "natural enemies" and they believe that educational materials should clearly reflect thi s view . They oppose negotiating with Serbs about cultural or political autonomy and ar e determined to prevent large numbers of Serb refugees, who left in August 1995, from returning t o Croatia. Moreover, their public vilification of Serbs has created a hostile environment for Ser b participation in Croatian political life . (6) conservative social and isolationist foreign policies based on anti-liberal and anti-western views . Ultranationalists reject liberal emphasis on individual rights and benefits, advocating ii policies instead that promote the welfare of the nation and fulfill its state-building needs . This emphasis is evident in the area of family policy which is viewed primarily in terms o f "demographic renewal ." Ultranationalists' position on the economy have varied depending o n whether they are in or out of the ruling party. While extremist members of the HDZ have supported significant state ownership and intervention in the economy, other ultranationalists hav e championed the rights of the "little guy" and similar populist themes . There are several conclusions that can be drawn from examining the impact of thi s nationalist ideology on political developments in Croatia . First, the political doctrine adopted b y HSP sympathizers and a substantial portion of the HDZ (including president Tudjman ) subordinates democratization to state-building concerns . Their primary concern has been to "nationalize" the state and to secure its borders . Secondly, the need for a strong state has bee n used to justify the authoritarian practices of the ruling party . Political opponents who do no t agree with this ideology are accused of betraying the Croatian state . Third . although the HD Z claims to be a Christian Democratic Party, its powerful extremist wing is closer in its views to the ultranationalist HSP . Both groups' conception of the polity is profoundly anti-liberal . Fourth, despite the HSP's poor electoral performance, it continues to have an influential voice i n public discourse precisely because its views are close to those of the ruling party . Finally , extremists differ substantially in their approach toward the Bosnian Muslims and relations betwee n Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia . Pravasi sympathizers continue to oppose what they perceive a s HDZ attempts to partition Bosnia-Hercegovina and incorporate Hercegovina within Croatia . In conclusion, there are three policy implications that can be drawn from the materia l presented in this paper . First, the authoritarian practices of the HDZ must he understood not as tactical errors but as strategic aims . The United States and other democracies must appl y pressure when they can to force Tudjman and the HDZ to respect democratic norms an d institutions .

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