United Nations S/2016/738/Rev.1 Security Council Distr.: General 24 August 2016 Original: English Letter dated 24 August 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council I have the honour to convey herewith the third report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. (Signed) BAN Ki-moon 16-14878 (E) 140916 *1614878* S/2016/738/Rev.1 Letter dated 24 August 2016 from the Leadership Panel of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons- United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism addressed to the Secretary-General The Leadership Panel of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism has the honour to transmit the Mechanism’s third report pursuant to Security Council resolution 2235 (2015). The report provides an update on the activities of the Mechanism up to 19 August 2016. It also outlines the concluding assessments of the Leadership Panel to date, on the basis of the results of the investigation into the nine selected cases of the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Leadership Panel wishes to thank the Secretary-General for the confidence placed in it. The Panel appreciates the indispensable support provided by the Secretariat, including the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Department for Political Affairs and the Office of Legal Affairs, and the United Nations officials who have assisted the Mechanism in New York, Geneva and Damascus. The Panel likewise appreciates the invaluable support provided by the leadership and staff of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The Panel wishes to recognize the outstanding staff of the Mechanism, who have tirelessly and professionally conducted and supported the investigation. The Leadership Panel is grateful to the members of the Security Council for their support for the Mechanism. The Panel also thanks them and the other States Members of the United Nations for providing essential information and financial resources to the Mechanism during its investigation. The Panel equally recognizes all other organizations, entities and individuals that have assisted the work of the Mechanism. The Leadership Panel wishes to emphasize that it has conducted its work objectively, independently, professionally and in accordance with the mandate given in Security Council resolution 2235 (2015). The Panel is solely accountable and responsible for its conclusions. (Signed) Virginia Gamba Head Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons- United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (Signed) Adrian Neritani Leadership Panel (Signed) Eberhard Schanze Leadership Panel 2/97 16-14878 S/2016/738/Rev.1 Third report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism Contents Page I. Introduction ................................................................... 4 II. Background ................................................................... 4 III. Activities of the Mechanism ...................................................... 5 IV. Methodological considerations .................................................... 7 V. Assessments, findings and conclusions ............................................. 8 A. Common elements of the cases investigated ..................................... 9 B. Specific findings ........................................................... 12 VI. Concluding remarks ............................................................ 18 Annexes I. Methods of work ............................................................... 20 II. Kafr Zita, 11 April 2014 ......................................................... 25 III. Kafr Zita, 18 April 2014 ......................................................... 36 IV. Talmenes, 21 April 2014 ......................................................... 43 V. Al-Tamanah, 29 and 30 April 2014 ................................................ 51 VI. Al-Tamanah, 25 and 26 May 2014 ................................................. 59 VII. Qmenas, 16 March 2015 ......................................................... 67 VIII. Sarmin, 16 March 2015 .......................................................... 75 IX. Binnish, 24 March 2015 ......................................................... 85 X. Marea, 21 August 2015 .......................................................... 92 16-14878 3/97 S/2016/738/Rev.1 I. Introduction 1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2235 (2015), by which the Council established the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism with a mandate to identify to the greatest extent feasible individuals, entities, groups or Governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic where the OPCW fact-finding mission determined or had determined that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic had involved or had likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons. 2. Two previous reports of the Mechanism (S/2016/142 and S/2016/530) provided information on its methodological approaches and its investigative activities from 24 September 2015, when the mandate began, to 10 June 2016. In addition, the Mechanism has briefed the Security Council on its progress on a monthly basis. 3. The present report provides an update on the activities up to 19 August 2016. It also outlines the concluding assessments of the Leadership Panel to date, on the basis of the results of the investigation into the nine selected cases of the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The report contains ten annexes: one on the methods of work and one for each of the cases under investigation, as follows: (a) Kafr Zita, Hama governorate, 11 April 2014; (b) Kafr Zita, Hama governorate, 18 April 2014; (c) Talmenes, Idlib governorate, 21 April 2014; (d) Al-Tamanah, Idlib governorate, 29 and 30 April 2014; (e) Al-Tamanah, Idlib governorate, 25 and 26 May 2014; (f) Qmenas, Idlib governorate, 16 March 2015; (g) Sarmin, Idlib governorate, 16 March 2015; (h) Binnish, Idlib governorate, 24 March 2015; 1 (i) Marea, Aleppo governorate, 21 August 2015. 4. The annexes contain narratives of the incidents and detail the findings, assessments and conclusions of the Leadership Panel to date. II. Background 5. The Mechanism is led by a three-member Leadership Panel, composed of the Head, Virginia Gamba (Argentina), and two deputies, Adrian Neritani (Albania) and Eberhard Schanze (Germany). The deputies are responsible for the Mechanism’s political and investigative components, respectively. __________________ 1 The fact-finding mission referred to the date of the incident as being 23 March 2015, but the Mechanism has established that the event occurred on 24 March 2015 at around 1900 hours. 4/97 16-14878 S/2016/738/Rev.1 6. The Mechanism consists of a political office based in New York providing political analysis, legal advice, media relations and information management; an investigative office based in The Hague focusing on chemical and medical analysis, forensics, military ordnance analysis and other relevant information analysis; and a planning and operations support office based in New York providing support to the Leadership Panel and the political and investigative components. 7. The Mechanism also established a liaison office in Damascus staffed by a political affairs officer, who acts as the main focal point with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and provides up-to-date information and recommendations to the Leadership Panel regarding substantive political matters. 8. To ensure that the Mechanism had appropriate and sufficient resources for the investigation, six specialists, including translators, were employed to strengthen its team in The Hague with the expertise necessary to conduct a professional investigation. The trust fund established to address the material and technical needs of the Mechanism has been used for this purpose. III. Activities of the Mechanism 9. The initial period of the Mechanism’s work from 24 September to 13 November 2015 was taken up by the setting up of the office, both in New York and in The Hague. As explained in the Mechanism’s first report (S/2016/142), during this time the Mechanism recruited staff with relevant skills and expertise; held planning meetings and consultations with Member States; adopted measures to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of its work, including protection of documents, evidence and witnesses; began the development and implementation of a records management system within a robust information security regime applicable to all information obtained or generated by the Mechanism; and began its extrabudgetary fundraising to support its activities and its material and technical needs. On 9 November 2015, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the Mechanism would begin its full operations on 13 November (see S/2015/854). 10. The period from 13 November 2015 to 29 February 2016 marked the first phase of the investigation, which comprised information collection and planning for case development. On 26 November, the Mechanism and OPCW concluded