Denver Journal of International Law & Policy Volume 6 Number 1 Spring Article 10 May 2020 Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation and Its Control Douglas Triggs Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp Recommended Citation Douglas Triggs, Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation and Its Control, 6 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 159 (1976). This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],dig- [email protected]. Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation and Its Control The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been with us now for seven years and has gained the adherence of a substantial number of nations. Yet one nation recently exploded its first nuclear device, and others may do so in the near future. Does nonproliferation remain a realistic goal? What problems exist with the Treaty and its implemen- tation? Under what circumstances is further nuclear weapons proliferation likely? What pressures promote it, and how can these pressures be mitigated? This comment assesses the cur- rent problem areas and identifies recent activity in, and pros- pects for, proliferation control. I. THE NPT AND THE IAEA The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,' which was the subject of lengthy U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations,2 was completed and opened for ratification in 1968. As of July 1976, 98 nations had ratified (or acceded to) the NPT, another 12 nations had signed but not ratified, and the remaining na- tions had neither signed nor ratified. As mandated by Article VIII of the Treaty,3 the first Review Conference met in May 1975 to make recommendations for the future operation of the Treaty. Impetus for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing such weapons derived from a con- cern that unchecked nuclear proliferation would seriously en- hance the possibility of nuclear war, and from a hope that an 1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968, 119701 1 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839 [hereinafter cited as NPT]. 2. The first nonproliferation proposals were part of a partial disarmament plan submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee in 1957; similar proposals became part of the draft agreements for a general disarmament considered by the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee in 1960 and later by the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, INTERNATIONAl. NEGOTIA- TIONS ON THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 3-6 (1969). 3. Article VIll: (3) Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. 160 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY VOL. 6:159 agreement on nonproliferation would reduce international ten- sions and thereby facilitate an end to the dangerous interna- tional arms race. These goals were to be accomplished by a number of mea- sures. First, the NPT forbids all parties from transferring nu- clear technology or nuclear source material (such as uranium or plutonium) to any non-nuclear-weapon nation' without in- ternational safeguards. ' These international safeguards are to insure that the transferred nuclear technology or material is not diverted from peaceful uses to use in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.' Second, the Treaty forbids nuclear- weapon nations from transferring nuclear weapons to non- nuclear-weapon nations.' Third, the NPT forbids acceptance of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear nations who are parties to the Treaty and prohibits these nations from manufacturing nu- clear weapons. 8 Fourth, the Treaty requires each non-nuclear 4. The NPT does not directly define either a nuclear-weapon nation or a non- nuclear-weapon nation. However, since the Treaty forbids nuclear-weapon nations from transferring-and non-nuclear weapon nations from receiving or manufactur- ing-nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a nuclear-weapon nation is one which possesses nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosion capability (or both), and a non-nuclear-weapon nation possesses neither. For convenience, this comment will use nuclear nation to mean nuclear-weapon nation and non-nuclear nation to mean non-nuclear-weapon nation. 5. Article III: (2) Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fis- sionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful pur- poses, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article. 6. As will be discussed infra, there is little difference in effect between a nation's possession of nuclear weapons and its possession of nuclear explosive devices. This comment will use the words "nuclear weapon" to include any destructive nuclear explosive device, unless a narrower definition is specifically stated. 7. Article I: Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to trans- fer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo- sive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly. or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non- nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weap- ons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. 8. Article II: Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or 1976 PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION nation which is a party to the Treaty to accept international safeguarding of all its peaceful nuclear facilities.' The Treaty also urges the free exchange of information and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,'" encourages nuclear na- tions to make peaceful nuclear explosives available to non- nuclear nations on a favored basis," and directs that "good explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 9. Article III: (1) Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguard system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safe- guards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear facilities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control any- where. 10. Article IV: (2) All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, mate- rials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or interna- tional organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non- nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. 11. Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate interna- tional observation and through appropriate international procedures. potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits pursuant to a special interna- tional agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Nego- tiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agree- ments. 162 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY VOL. 6:159 faith" measures be taken to end the arms race and achieve complete disarmament." In short, the NPT calls for rigorous control of nuclear weapon proliferation even as it encourages the unhampered proliferation of peaceful nuclear energy and its benefits. The NPT is implemented through the International At- omic Energy Agency (IAEA). 1" IAEA, acting under its basic statute, 4 and through bilateral agreements between itself and nations party to the NPT,1' applies the NPT-required safe- guards to peaceful nuclear reactors and source material, con- ducts research to improve safeguards, and provides informa- tion and assistance to its member nations.