a 7.90 D 14974 E D European & Security ES & Defence 8/2018 International Security and Defence Journal ISSN 1617-7983 • Royal Norwegian Air Force www.euro-sd.com • December 2018 Russia’s VOSTOK-2018 Exercise Torpedo Developments Politics · Armed Forces · Procurement · Technology NO TIME? NO LAB? NO PROBLEM. EASILY IDENTIFY CHEMICAL HAZARDS WITH THE FLIR GRIFFIN™ G510 PORTABLE GC-MS. The FLIR Griffin G510 is a completely self-contained GC-MS, including batteries, carrier gas, vacuum system, injector, touchscreen, and heated sample probe. It analyzes all phases of matter and confirms vapor-based threats in seconds, so that responders can take immediate action. FLIR Griffin™ G510 Portable GC-MS www.FLIR.eu/G510 Chemical Identifier Editorial Doubting the Future of the INF Treaty The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), signed in Washington at the end of 1987 and effective from 1 June 1988, is regarded as one of the milestones in bringing about the end of the Cold War. Under the Treaty, the USA and the then Soviet Union undertook to remove all ground-based nuclear and conventional missiles, rockets and their launchers in the short range (500 to 1,000 kilometres) and intermediate range (1,000 to 5,500 kilometres) cat- egories. In the event of a war, it would have been the Europeans in particular who would have borne the brunt of these systems, and they accordingly welcomed the Treaty with considerable relief. At the same time, this put the lie to all the rumours that had been doing the rounds just a few years before, suggesting that the NATO double-track decision of 1979 was simply a cun- ning ruse to step up the threat: it had promised nothing less than stationing US medium-range rockets in Europe while simultaneously negotiating for their complete elimination - a pledge which was redeemed with the INF treaty. Today, a good 30 years later, willingness to cooperate with regard to arms limitation (and be- yond) appears to have evaporated. Russia, as the successor to the Soviet Union, with its ongo- ing intervention in the Ukraine is in contravention of international law, and presents a strategic challenge to NATO and the EU. Moscow also appears to have reneged on the INF Treaty: NATO has evidence that the range of new Russian cruise missiles is far greater than officially declared, so great in fact that they should never have been produced and deployed at all. If Moscow does observe it, Washington also will shortly be shelving the INF Treaty. But, more generally, the question arises as to whether a bilateral treaty of this kind still has a place in this day and age. For a long time other states have mastered the technological know-how to produce medium- range weapons with which Europe or the USA (or, indeed, Russia) could be threatened. To envi- sion a multilateral agreement which would have to include states such as China, or, in the final analysis, even Iran and North Korea, is an illusion. It should come as no surprise to anyone that the new East-West antagonism, which has been brewing since 2007 and came to the boil with the crisis in Ukraine in 2013/14, now also has a nuclear component. The situation in Ukraine cannot be resolved in such a way that neither Rus- sia nor the West will lose face. Supreme in all these machinations is Ukraine's sovereignty and integrity. Thus this crisis has become another "frozen conflict", which is attracting greater at- tention than those in South Ossetia/Abkhasia, Berg-Karabakh and Transnistria, and which, like these, also has the threat of escalating militarily at any time. Ukraine has drawn the conclusion, from the courtship NATO has made, that it does have certain security guarantees from the West. This was a delusion, and possibly not simply self- deluding. NATO cannot protect Ukraine, just as it is not able to offer support to Georgia with anything more than empty diplomatic initiatives and chest-slapping symbolic naval exercises. For the Alliance, it would already be very nearly impossible to fulfil its obligations to support the exposed Baltic States, should they ever be the target of hostile military “intervention”. True, one should not belittle what the Alliance has achieved since the Wales Summit – the Member States are investing more in their armed forces, and, after more than 15 years, in which the focus has been on stabilisation engagements in Afghanistan and elsewhere, they have found their way back to their real core commitment of defence of the homelands and of the Alliance. Nevertheless, NATO's military capabilities are somewhat limited, even in compari- son to the West’s diplomatic armoury, and cannot be compared with the resources and capa- bilities to which it could make recourse in the days of the Cold War. It must be said that in the final analysis we do not know how important the conventional strength of NATO actually was in staving off any military adventures by our Cold War opponent: perhaps at that time it was indeed the nuclear weapons arsenal which provided a decisive, credible deterrent. This form of deterrent is still necessary today, and, as in the Cold War era, we have to take care that the transatlantic solidarity does not become undermined by a strategic opponent deploy- ing medium-range weapons which threaten only the Europeans and not the Americans. The logic of the NATO double-track decision of 1979 still holds good, unchanged. Thus the conse- quence of rearmament has to be accepted, if there is indeed no other choice. Peter Bossdorf 8/2018 · European Security & Defence 1 Contents War in Syria Hellenic Armed Forces Photo:NATO AMC/DVIDS Photo: SPC Zoe Garbarino/DVIDS Chess Game of the World Powers Page 17 Missions – Roles – Structures – Perspectives Page 31 SECURITY POLICY ARMAMENT & TECHNOLOGY 12 Russia’s Vostok-2018 Exercise: 54 Thermal Sights for Infantry Weapons What Does it Mean? Tamir Eshel Stephen Blank 59 New Developments in Lightweight 17 Syria: A Chess Game of the World Powers and Heavy Torpedoes Andreea Stoian Karadeli Luca Peruzzi 23 India Votes: Is Narendra Modi Still 64 Railgun Programmes – a Status Report the Front-Runner for 2019? Jack Richardson Bindiya Carmeline Thomas 67 TF-X – Turkey's indigenous Stealth Fighter 27 EU CBRN Action Plan: A Mixed Verdict Georg Mader Dan Kaszeta 72 Japan’s Next Attack Helicopter Shinichi Kiyotani ARMED FORCES 76 Russian Drones on the Rise Eugene Kogan 31 Missions, Roles, Structures and Future Perspectives of the Hellenic Armed Forces Admiral Evangelos Apostolakis HN, Chief of the Hellenic Defence General Staff INDUSTRY & MARKETS 34 “We are going to face many challenges” 79 Spain’s Defence Industry Interview with Vice Admiral Nikolaos Tsounis, Esteban Villarejo Chief of the Hellenic Navy General Staff 85 Belgium Goes for the F-35 LIGHTNING II 36 Northern Night Watch – Joris Verbeurgt The Royal Norwegian Air Force Georg Mader THE BRUSSELS BACKDROP 42 Tragedy at Dawn: Norwegian Frigate Collides with Tanker 46 Macedonia One Step Closer to NATO and EU Guy Toremans Membership 44 NATO’s Centre of Excellence Joris Verbeurgt for Cold Weather Operations Author Team: NATO CoE – CWO VIEWPOINT FROM … 48 The Swiss Army Peter Jenni 22 Jerusalem 52 Casualty Treatment in the War in Eastern Ukraine Tamir Eshel Alex Horobets 2 European Security & Defence · 8/2018 TF-X Index of Advertisers Photo: TAI AFCEA EUROPE 89 ASDA 51 COLLINS AEROSPACE 4-5 ENFORCE TAC 3 FLIR 2nd cover GENERAL DYNAMICS EUROPEAN LAND SYSTEMS 81 GPEC DIGITAL 29 IDEX 11 Turkey's Indigenous Stealth Fighter Page 67 INTERNATIONAL ARMOURED VEHICLES 2019 19 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME MUSEUM HAMBURG 84 I/ITSEC 2019 75 COLUMNS IQPC 15 1 Editorial LAAD 21 6 Periscope QIOPTIQ 4th cover 82 Masthead SENSONOR 41 Firms & Faces 88 YUGOIMPORT 3rd cover 92 Preview Issue 1/2019 6 – 7.3.2019 | NUREMBERG, GERMANY ONE LOCATION, TWO EXHIBITIONS BOOK YOUR TICKET TODAY! 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It Photo: MyDefence of LRSAM Air & Missile Defence (AMD) Sys- is expected to receive approval for GEHEIM tems, the marine version of the BARAK 8 (SECRET) classification from the German AMD system, for seven ships of the Indian Federal Office of Information Security (BSI) navy. The contract made with the main soon. Compromised network cards remain contractor, Indian state-owned company a real issue from a cybersecurity perspective tempted to execute a coordinated drone at- Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), is valued as a critical hardware component, but also tack. The coordinated attack was effectively at US$777M. The LRSAM system, part of because a compromised device can be used neutralised using the PITBULL Counter UAS to compromise an Operating System (OS) jammer, and all drone operators lost control via surrounding peripherals on a computer. of their drones. 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