doi 10.4436/JASS.91003 JASs Invited Reviews e-pub ahead of print Journal of Anthropological Sciences Vol. 92 (2014), pp. 7-41 Epistemological problems in Cognitive Archaeology: an anti-relativistic proposal towards methodological uniformity Duilio Garofoli1 & Miriam Noël Haidle1,2 1) Zentrum für Naturwissenschaftliche Archäologie, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Rümelinstr. 23, 72070 Tübingen, Germany e-mail: [email protected] 2) Heidelberg Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Research Group “The Role of Culture in Early Expansions of Humans,” Research Institute Senckenberg, Senckenberganlage 25, D-60325 Frankfurt/ Main, Germany Summary - Cognitive archaeology (CA) has an inherent and major problem. The coupling between extinct minds, brains and behaviors cannot be investigated in a laboratory. Without direct testability, there is a risk that theories in CA will remain merely subjective opinions in which “anything goes”. To counter this risk, opponents of relativism originally argued that CA should adopt a method of validation based on “indirectly” testing inferences from the archaeological record. In this paper, we will offer a two-part analysis. In the first part, we will discuss problems with the original anti-relativistic agenda. While we agree with the necessity of developing a rational methodology for this discipline, in our view previous analyses have significant weak points that need to be strengthened. In particular, we will propose that “indirect testability” should be superseded by a methodology based upon deductive mappings from networks of theories, followed by a plausibility-selection stage. This methodology will be implemented by adopting an extension of Barnard´s (2010b) proposals for mapping hierarchical systems. In the second part, we will compare our methods with those currently adopted in the CA debate. From this analysis, it will emerge that some proposals in CA are inconsistent with our methodology and are incommensurable with those that are consistent with it. Furthermore, we will show that theories in CA can advance contradictory conclusions precisely because they have been developed using different methods. We conclude that a universal methodology, like that proposed here, is needed for CA to become more objective. It is also crucial for creating conditions for coherent and productive debate among different schools of thought in the field of cognitive evolution. Keywords - Cognitive archaeology, Epistemology, Incommensurability, Theoretical Mapping. Introduction could not be evaluated for how well they account for the target phenomenon on any objective cri- Twenty years ago cognitive archaeology (CA) teria. Indeed, analyses were limited to ad homi- emerged out of the Processual school and sought nem and “inside” methods. In order to be able to distance itself from the subjective/interpreta- to interpret the archaeological record, investi- tive approach adopted by the post-processualists. gators typically relied on their own subjective Interpretations were considered to be explana- experience to situate themselves within the envi- tions open to manipulation that would have sioned physical or social contexts of distant pasts, served to align an analysis of the archaeological (Hodder, 1984, 1986, 1987; Johnson, 1999, record to the authors´ views. The interpretations Chapter 7; Trigger, 2007, Chapter 9-10; Shanks the JASs is published by the Istituto Italiano di Antropologia www.isita-org.com 8 Cognitive Archaeology & Tilley, 1987a,b; see also Binford, 1987). The implicitly and less evident than in the past. This pioneers of cognitive archaeology criticized this threatens to impede progress towards the emer- approach as a form of opinion, based only on gence of a rigorous discipline of CA with a uni- personal likes – it was “as wished for” archaeol- fied and coherent community of practice. ogy (Renfrew, 1989, 1994; Bell, 1987, 1991, In this paper we propose a revision to the 1994a). The shared aim of these pioneers was to original anti-relativistic agenda, updating it to produce a methodology, with a clearly defined address the new epistemological challenges that set of rules, to enable assertions about prehistoric have emerged over the twenty-year lifespan of cognition to be systematically tested. CA. Over this lifespan the intellectual landscape The original epistemological objectives grad- has benefited substantially from rich and varied ually faded into the background as new theories, contributions from many disciplines. As we show deeply different in form and content, were devel- later, arguments often navigate a specific course oped to provide explanations about the evolu- through intricate networks of related but quali- tion of mind and the emergence of behavioral tatively different theories. practices considered unique to modern humans. As a fundamental assumption, we shall take Several frameworks, ranging from evolutionary for granted familiarity with the original anti- psychology (Mithen, 1996) through cognitive relativistic agenda (Bell, 1987, 1991, 1994a,b; neuroscience (Coolidge & Wynn, 2005; Wynn Binford, 1987; Renfrew, 1994). Our focus will be et al., 2009; Wynn & Coolidge, 2011) to com- upon selecting points in the context of presenting putational theory (Barnard et al., 2007; Barnard, a novel, comprehensive methodology and space 2010a), were proposed to account for the proper- precludes an extensive discussion of the full range ties of human mind and behavior (see Davidson, of issues associated with subjective interpretations. 2010 for review). These approaches, while Moreover, in the meta-epistemological debate, grounded in different specific conceptions of the a radical argument against emotionally driven mind, nonetheless shared a common concern approaches has been championed by proponents with providing cognitive/biological mechanisms of the objectivist movement (Rand, 1964, 1967; underlying behavioral enhancements. A quite Peikoff, 1981). In particular, these authors claimed distinct tradition, rooted in the archaeological that emotions arise as by-products of the process domain, sought to explain the same enhance- of value-formation. In consequence, they cannot ments purely on the basis of socio-cultural inter- be used to assess the validity of those same val- actions between individuals, without reference to ues. Objectivists reached the conclusion that emo- biological constructs (d´Errico & Stringer, 2011; tions are irrelevant for establishing whether judg- d´Errico, 2003; Hovers & Belfer-Cohen, 2006; ments are true or false. Clearly, if we accept that Zilhao et al., 2010). This archaeological tradition the only means of validation are individual likes uses as evidence for its position the presence of and tastes, then the whole idea of “convincing” behavioral practices commonly associated with people of the validity of one theory over another Upper Paleolithic populations in the artifactual loses any meaningful foundation. Acceptance of record of early modern humans in Africa, as well theories would be reduced to, for example, just as non-modern populations in Europe. counting how many people supported a particu- It is clear that these different theoreti- lar theory´s contents. In contrast, we agree with cal proposals are not simply variations within objectivists’ view that there is simply no need a single school of thought. They range across to surrender to this pessimistic position: reason, many specific strands of argument using dis- indeed, can deliver a reliable method for validat- tinct approaches and methods that emanate ing theories and this represents the general goal of from different communities of practice. Within epistemological research. Our revision of the anti- this broader intellectual landscape, new sources relativistic agenda will be grounded, therefore, on of relativism continue to flourish, perhaps the assumption that, contra the post-processualist D. GarofoliJ. Hawks & M. N. Haidle 9 Fig. 1 - Network of inductive, deductive and explanatory inferences (E.I.) among neural, mental and behavioral systems. school, rational criteria can be provided to vali- of alternative theories. This framework has to use date theories about extinct minds, brains and a theoretical vocabulary of considerable range behaviors. Against this background, we will start and precision and this terminology is compre- by exploring the logical foundations required to hensively specified in the Glossary at the end of establish a methodologically coherent CA. In the paper. particular, we will demonstrate the limitations of approaches that aim to provide explanations for the properties of the mind by drawing direct and How to get from artifacts to a theory unidirectional inferences from the archaeological of mind? record. Instead, we will discuss the need for CA to embrace a deductive perspective, which can allow The formulation of a universal method for CA networks of theories, constructed and mapped is an ambitious and intricate problem to address. between multidisciplinary domains, to provide It implies a fundamental premise about the logi- explanations of extinct minds´ properties. Since cal operations that need to be adopted to estab- we cannot bring extinct minds into a laboratory, lish coherent connections between extinct brains, we will suggest that the concept of empirical test- minds and artifacts in the record. An approach ability introduced by Bell (1994a) is insufficient. that aims to account for this problem must nec- For example, we will later show that