NO 18 IPCS ISSUE BRIEF JANUARY 2004 Bhutan’s “Operation All Clear”: Implications for insurgency and security cooperation Dipankar Banerjee & Bidhan S Laishram Director & Research Officer, IPCS Backdrop situation in his country, determine public opinion and develop consensus over a policy after due Druk Yul, the peaceful Dragon Kingdom of process of parliamentary deliberation. If it called for Bhutan, was drawn into the vortex of terrorism in military intervention, the RGB would require time to the early 1990’s when terrorists from across its prepare and train the necessary forces, as well as border to its south sought shelter in its southern need additional equipment. plains. This followed Operations Bajrang and Rhino launched by the Indian Army from end Subsequently RGB initiated a dialogue with the 1990. By 2003 there were about 30 camps inside terrorists. This was in accordance with the directions Bhutan, with the United Liberation Front of Assam of its National Assembly to ask the intruders to leave (ULFA) owning 13, the National Democratic Front peacefully. Five rounds of talks were held with the of Bodoland (NDFB) controlling 12 and the ULFA and three with the NDFB since 1998. The rebels Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO) having 5. did not take the talks seriously, postponed meetings Scattered across the dense jungles of southern and were often represented by low-level Bhutan, adjacent to Assam and West Bengal, functionaries. The KLO did not even respond to the these camps were estimated to lodge about invitation for talks. At the third round in June 2001, 3500 militants. The Indian Army put a lower the ULFA agreed to close down four of their camps estimate of about 1500. The geographical by year end, but instead merely relocated them. contiguity of the jungles allowed the terrorists Having played an “unwilling host” for 12 years, the easy access to and from India, where their Royal Government’s patience reached its end by depredations continued. The continued mid 2003. Following exhaustive debates in the presence of these groups had the potential to National Assembly, on 14 July military action was destabilize Bhutan and pose major threats to approved. Operation All Clear was launched on 15 India’s northeast. December 2003. The Indian Army remained concerned with their Operation All Clear presence in these sanctuaries. As early as 1996, it Absence of information on the progress of sought active intervention from the Royal operations characterized the first phase of the Government of Bhutan (RGB). While His Majesty military offensive. This led to speculations about the accepted the seriousness of the situation, he was nature of the operation and of Indian support. This clear on actions to be taken. Reiterating that was cleared soon after. The military operations were friendship with India was the cornerstone of entirely an “all Bhutan affair” without any Bhutan’s foreign as well as domestic policy, he “manpower or artillery support” from the Indian made it clear that any direct intervention by the Army, as some had earlier claimed. The Indian Indian Army in Bhutan would be considered an support was limited to “logistic and medical cover” act of aggression. He said that his Government to the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) and at no time would prefer to address this issue peacefully involved an intrusion in to Bhutan. This was clarified through dialogue and persuasion. He also by the Indian External Affairs Minister, Yashwant needed more time to personally assess the Sinha on 16 December. The Indian Army did lay a BHUTAN’S “OPERATION ALL CLEAR”: IMPLICATIONS FOR INSURGENCY PAGE 2 AND SECURITY COOPERATION dragnet within Indian territory to nab the fleeing expressed resolutions in the National Assembly. militants and used helicopters with night vision Indian stand on refugees has consistently been devices. that it is a matter entirely for Nepal and Bhutan to resolve. It soon became clear that Operation All Clear was a resounding success. By day one, the RBA had Sound strategic considerations determined inflicted heavy casualties on the militants including Bhutan’s policies and this is to be admired. There the life of an ULFA commander, Rahul Datta. were a number of strands in determining this Attacks were launched on all camps in turn. By 5 policy. First, was Bhutan’s determination to seek January, 2004, the RBA declared that the last of every opportunity for a peaceful resolution. the 30 camps was burnt down. The Kuensel Second, the RBA with a strength of only 6000 reported that more than 500 AK 47/56 assault rifles, soldiers and no operational experience, either of an anti aircraft gun, 328 other assorted weapons war or counter insurgency needed time for including rocket launchers and mortars as well as preparation. Third, the fear of retaliation from the 100,000 rounds of ammunition were confiscated. militants and the effects of a possible blowback played a part. There was a fear that military The military success could be gauged from the action “would bring about unimaginable suffering fact that about 650 militants were to the people” and it would affect the lives of “neutralized” (either killed or apprehended or 66,464 people at stake in 304 villages. Fourth was a made to surrender), as informed by the Chief of concern over disruption of its national Indian Army, Gen N C Viz on 2 January. Out of communication lines between eastern and these at least 160 had been killed. Among the western Bhutan, which passes through terrorist persons arrested were the ULFA ideologue and infested areas in India just south of the border. political advisor, Bhimkanta Buragohain, the Finally, economic considerations such as loss of publicity property and impediments to development secretary, While His Majesty accepted weighed in to support a policy of tolerance. It is Mithinga Daimari, significant that Bhutan heavily relies on India for the seriousness of the and the NDFB food supplies, trade and exports. situation, he was clear on commander in actions to be taken. chief, Milton Domestic political developments were other Burman and its critical elements in this decision. A Bhutan Gorkha Reiterating that friendship action squad Liberation Front (BGLF) had suddenly come in to with India was the commander, existence among the refugees in Nepal and in Tom Adhikary. southern Bhutan, which were supported by these cornerstone of Bhutan’s terrorist outfits. The other was the birth of the Strategic foreign as well as domestic Bhutan Communist Party (M-L-M) in April 2003, with Compulsions policy, he made it clear that the abolition of the Monarchy as its principal A feeling objective. any direct intervention by apparently Finally, Bhutan could have hardly tolerated a the Indian Army in Bhutan developed in projection of its image as a terrorist harboring certain, mainly would be considered an act nation. Hence, a statement released by its foreign non-official, ministry on 15 December said, “Of particular of aggression quarters in New concern were misperceptions surrounding their Delhi that the presence and the implications on the excellent King was deliberately procrastinating military bilateral relations with India which is of the highest action. A suspicion even arose that the RGB saw in importance to the Royal Government and the it a bargaining chip to discourage India’s support Bhutanese people.” The worst possibility of to pro-democracy movement in the Kingdom and unilateral action against these camps by India to maintain its neutral stand on the issue of could also not have been missed by its policy Bhutanese refugees in Nepal. In the event these elite. were demonstrated to be utterly false. It is the King himself who is the principal agent in ushering in democracy in his country, at times against NO 18 PAGE 3 Security Fallout in the Region discrimination. Herein lies the foremost reason for enhanced security cooperation among nations. • Season of Surrenders Areas of conflict in bilateral relations should not be The operation has struck a mortal blow to the allowed to turn into causes for promoting terrorism insurgents in Northeast India. Two days into the in other territories. South Asia has been a hot bed offensive witnessed 89 rebels belonging to the of terrorist activities although it remained largely ULFA, NDFB, NSCN and ATTF surrender in Assam. Of unnoticed for a long time. The region does not these 63 belonged to the ULFA and 23 to the need another September 11 to garner NDFB. The process continued in tens and twenties international support. It has the capability to fight and crossed 500 by 5 January. Appeals were terrorism specific to the region on its own, given made to the King for cessation of strikes political will. This immediately after the start of the operations. The is where the South Asia has been a hot ULFA maintained that they were “taking Bhutan temporary refuge” in Bhutan and it was not operations bed of terrorist activities “tantamount to defying the sovereignty of Bhutan assume special although it remained or any international law.” The militants did not put significance. largely unnoticed for a long up a resistance as was expected and rather saw The most the lower cadres airing disenchantment with the time. The region does not important movement. outcome of the need another September 11 • Echoes operation may to garner international be said to lie in support. It has the Insurgency in India thrives on a network of the pressure solidarity. North east India witnessed bandhs that it has capability to fight terrorism called by various insurgent outfits in solidarity with applied on specific to the region on its the ULFA, NDFB, and KLO. Press releases by these Bangladesh, own, given political will. organizations all called for a cessation of military Pakistan and operations in Bhutan.