ROMANIAN MILITARY THINKING THE SITUATION OF THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES BETWEEN JUNE AND OCTOBER 1918 ACCORDING TO DIVISION GENERAL CONSTANTIN CHRISTESCU Ion RÎŞNOVEANU, PhD Scientific Researcherrd 3 degree, “Regele Ferdinand I” National Military Museum Division General Constantin Christescu, Chief of the Great General Staff, stated, in the Report submitted to King Ferdinand I, that the Romanian Armed Forces were in a difficult situation following the Peace of București signed on 24 April/7 May 1918, and the demobilisation, despite the successful 1917 campaign. The political and, especially, military conditions in which the contingents were recruited between 1915-1919 caused serious problems as far as their training was concerned, especially given the difficult missions that were to come. Their training, organisation and equipment were inferior to those of the great powers of the First World War. Despite these problems, Division General Constantin Christescu pointed out that there were some positive aspects as well, which represented the basis of the victories in the summer of 1917. Keywords: First World War, contingents, Romanian Armed Forces, division, training. English version by Iulia SINGER. No. 3/2018 186 The Situation of the Romanian Armed Forces Between June and October 1918 According to Division General Constantin Christescu Introduction After the brilliant victories of Mărăști, Mărășești and Oituz, in the summer of 1917, following which the Romanian Armed Forces stopped the advance of the Central Powers troops in Moldova, the second half of the year brought political and military changes on the western front, but especially on the eastern front. On the night of 25-26 October/7-8 November 1917, detachments of workers and soldiers arrested, in the Petrograd Winter Palace, the members of the provisional government headed by Alexander Fyodorovich Kerensky, thus settling, in Russia, the power of the soviets led by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin1. Shortly, on 1/14 November 1917, the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets gathered in Petrograd adopted the Decree on Peace, a political document that stipulated Russia’s exit from the war by concluding a general peace2. This document was followed, as expected, by the start of negotiations between Russia, on the one hand, and the Central Powers, on the other hand, to conclude a separate armistice between the two sides. Thus, on 22 November/5 December 1917, in Brest-Litovsk, Soviet Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungarian delegations signed the armistice, putting an end to the military actions in this part of the front. Peace Treaty of București (24 April/7 May 1918) – military stipulations and harsh conditions imposed on Romania Simultaneously with the end of the Brest-Litovsk armistice, General Dmitry G. Shcherbachev, the deputy commander of the Romanian Front, announced King Ferdinand and Ion I.C. Brătianu that he had to contact Field Marshal August von Mackensen for officially ending the hostilities between the big Russian units and the enemy ones, as the authority over his own troops had almost disappeared3. 1 Istoria militară a poporului român, vol. V, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1988, p. 657. Mention should be made that Alexander Kerensky managed to flee Petrograd, taking refuge in France, then in the USA. 2 Ibid, p. 657. 3 Ibid, p. 668. 187 PAGES OF MILITARY HISTORY – THE GREAT UNION CENTENNIAL Ion RÎŞNOVEANU That is why the government led by Ion I.C. Brătianu decided to temporarily cease military actions by agreeing to participate in the negotiations regarding the signing of an armistice with the Central ROMANIAN Powers. It was signed in Focșani on 26 November/9 December 1917 MILITARY THINKING and stipulated that the Russian and German-Austro-Hungarian troops would temporarily cease hostilities and that the Romanian armed forces would also sign such a document that would last “for the duration of the armistice of the Russian armies on the Romanian front”4. Unfortunately, the evolution of the relations between the Central Powers, on the one hand, and Soviet Russia and Ukraine, on the other hand, led to the political and military isolation of Romania. Moreover, on 23 January/5 February 1918, the Central Powers sent a final note to the Romanian government, threatening to carry out The evolution major military actions if the Romanian authorities did not engage of the relations in diplomatic peace talks as soon as possible. In this respect, the between the Central Powers, attitude of Count Ottokar von Czernin, who, on 11/24 February, on the one warned Alexandru Marghiloman about the disastrous consequences hand, and Soviet that would follow a possible refusal on the Romanian part of the Russia and Ukraine, on the conditions imposed by the Central Powers, speaks for itself: “If most other hand, led of the demands are agreed upon, we will negotiate for 10 or 12 days; to the political if not, the armistice is over and we attack. We know the strengths and and military isolation of quantities of your ammunition. It will be a four-week campaign and Romania. then it will be something else; for the king, it will be the end”5. A first stage of the separated peace between Romania and the Central Powers ended on 20 February/5 March 1918, with the signing, in Buftea, of the Preliminary Treaty of Peace between Romania and the Central Powers. Although the Romanian side tried to delay the signing and the application of the final treaty, it had no chance to succeed, the Peace Treaty and its annexes being signed on 24 April/7 May 1918, in București, between Romania, on the one hand, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, on the other hand. Through the military provisions of this Treaty, the Central Powers imposed drastic conditions on Romania. Thus, the infantry divisions from 11 to 15 were to be demobilised, as stipulated in the Protocol 4 Arhivele Militare Naționale Române (Romanian National Military Archives, AMNR), Great General Headquarters Collection, 3rd Operations Section, file no. 34/1917, f. 321. 5 Alexandru Marghiloman, Note politice 1897/1924, vol. III, 1917/1918, Editura Scripta, București, 1927, p. 366. No. 3/2018 188 The Situation of the Romanian Armed Forces Between June and October 1918 According to Division General Constantin Christescu signed in Focşani on 20 February/5 March 1918, between Romania and the Central Powers, as well as in the Preliminary Peace Treaty signed at Buftea on 5/18 March of the same year. The 9th Infantry Division, the 10th Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 2nd Cavalry Division, which were operating in Basarabia, were maintained, with 2/3 of the war strength, until the crisis in Ukraine was settled. The “huntsmen battalions from the disbanded huntsmen divisions” 6 were added to these large units. Interestingly, according to thisTreaty , after completing their mission in Basarabia, the large units deployed to the east of Prut were to be demobilised and organised according to the peace establishment, just as the other 8 divisions mentioned in the 4th thesis. Divisions 1 to 8 remained deployed in Moldova on a reduced peace establishment. Thus, they were to be framed by “four infantry regiments of three battalions each, two cavalry regiments of four squadrons of each, two field artillery regiments of seven batteries each, a battalion of pioneers and troops and convoy technique, the number of which must be set out in a subsequent agreement; the total strength of these eight infantry divisions should not exceed 20,000 troops and the cavalry should not exceed 3,200 troops and the total artillery of the Romanian army, apart from the remaining divisions, should not exceed 9,000 troops”7. Moreover, through the Treaty, the Central Powers demanded that Romania should hand over the weapons and ammunition available after its application8. Thus, the surplus of weapons and ammunition left after the demobilisation and disbandment of some units and large units of the Romanian armed forces was to be handed over to the occupation troops. The Treaty also limited the amount of ammunition allocated to an infantry gun. Each of them had 250 cartridges, while the machine guns received 2,500 cartridges9. 6 Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (Central Historical National Archives, ANIC), General Directorate of Police Collection, file no. 3/1918, f. 1. 7 Ibid, ff. 2-4. 8 Ibid, f. 6. See also Istoria militară a poporului român, p. 679, and Constantin Kirițescu, Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României. 1916-1919, vol. III, Editura Casei Şcoalelor, Bucureşti, pp. 236-237. 9 Ibid, f. 8. 189 PAGES OF MILITARY HISTORY – THE GREAT UNION CENTENNIAL Ion RÎŞNOVEANU In this unfavourable context, the Romanian armed forces decision-makers sought to circumvent the provisions of the Peace Treaty through coordinated actions by storing large quantities of ROMANIAN MILITARY weapons and ammunition in the free territory. The artisan of this THINKING action was Division General Constantin Christescu, Chief of the Great General Staff starting from 1 April 191810, who, at the order of the Supreme Commander, secretly drafted, together with the Romanian staff officers, the campaign documents in the event of triggering new operations against the Central Powers, when the military situation on the western and southern fronts would have allowed for it. General Christescu’s Report to King Ferdinand I – objective analysis on the situation of Romanian troops On 20 June 1918, General Division Under these politico-military conditions, on 20 June 1918, Constantin General Division Constantin