-- Neptune Papers No. 7 -- Aircraft Carriers The Limits Of Nuclear Power Hans M. Kristensen William M. Arkin Joshua Handler June 1994 Table of Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 Summary and Main Findings ......................................................................................... 4 Part I: The Nuclear Carrier Mystique............................................................................... 7 The History of Nuclear Carriers ........................................................................... 7 Admiral Rickover and the Nuclear Lobby ............................................................... 9 Letters of Performance............................................................................ 11 "Fish Don't Vote" ................................................................................. 12 The End of an Era ................................................................................. 13 Studying the Justifications.................................................................................. 14 The Rise and Fall of the All-Nuclear Force ............................................................ 15 Supply: The Deception of Independence ...................................................... 17 Always Available -- Always Better? ........................................................... 21 Part II: Crises Response .............................................................................................. 24 Nuclear Carriers Preferred?................................................................................ 24 Nuclear Carriers Held Hostage............................................................................ 24 Part III: Wartime Use ................................................................................................. 29 A: The Nuclear Carrier Enterprise in the Vietnam War ............................................. 29 Initial Deployment ................................................................................. 29 Additional Aircraft Space ........................................................................ 30 Increased Speed .................................................................................... 30 Time on-station..................................................................................... 31 War Performance .................................................................................. 32 B: Nuclear Carriers in the Gulf War ..................................................................... 33 Response to the Iraqi Invasion................................................................... 34 Carrier Placement.................................................................................. 35 Air Operations...................................................................................... 36 Strike Operations................................................................................... 38 Ship Operations .................................................................................... 40 Part IV: The Penalties of Nuclear Propulsion .................................................................... 43 The Financial Burden ....................................................................................... 43 The Burden of Radioactive Waste ........................................................................ 45 No Waste To Go ............................................................................................. 47 Operational Constraints ..................................................................................... 48 Reactors in the Line of Fire................................................................................ 49 Endnotes ................................................................................................................. 51 Tables . 73 i Abbreviations AAW Anti-Air Warfare AE Ammunition Ship AEW Airborne Electronic Warfare AO Fleet Oiler AOE Fast Combat Support Ship AOR Replenishment Oiler AP Associated Press ARG Amphibious Ready Group ASUW Anti-Surface Warfare ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare CAP Combat Air Patrol CASREP Casualty Summary Report CG Conventionally Powered Guided Missile Cruiser CGN Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile Cruiser CINCUSNAVEUR U.S. Commander In Chief, Naval Forces Europe CLF Carrier Logistic Force CNA Center for Naval Analysis CNO U.S. Chief of Naval Operations COMUSNAVCENT Commander, U.S. Naval Central Command CV Conventionally Powered Aircraft Carrier CVBG Aircraft Carrier Battle Group CVN Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier CV-41 USS Midway, conventionally powered aircraft carrier CV-60 USS Saratoga, conventionally powered aircraft carrier CV-61 USS Ranger, conventionally powered aircraft carrier CV-66 USS America, conventionally powered aircraft carrier CV-67 USS John F. Kennedy, conventionally powered aircraft carrier CVN-71 USS Theodore Roosevelt, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier CVS Anti-submarine Aircraft Carrier DCNO U.S. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations DDG Guided Missile Destroyer DOD Department of Defense DOE Department of Energy EIS Environmental Impact Statement FY U.S. federal Fiscal Year (1 October to 30 September) GAO General Accounting Office HAC U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee HASC U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee INREP Inport Replenishment JCAE Joint Committee on Atomic Energy LPH Amphibious Assault Ship ii MARG Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group MLF Mobile Logistic Force N.D. No Date OASD Office of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense PACOM Pacific Command PGBF Persian Gulf Battle Force RSBF Red Sea Battle Force RRF Ready Reserve Fleet SAC U.S. Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee SASC U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee UNREP Underway Replenishment (U) Unclassified USS United States Ship V/STOL Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing iii About the Authors Hans M. Kristensen is a research associate with Greenpeace International's disarmament campaign. Formerly regional coordinator of the Nuclear Free Seas campaign in Scandinavia, he is a co-author of the Neptune Papers monograph series and has published numerous reports and articles on naval issues. William M. Arkin is an independent expert on military affairs and nuclear weapons issues. A consultant to Greenpeace and the Federation of American Scientists and a former U.S. Army intelligence analyst, Arkin is author of many books and monographs on national security and nuclear weapons. Joshua Handler is research coordinator for the Greenpeace International disarmament campaign. He is a co-author of the Neptune Papers monograph series, and has published numerous reports and articles on naval nuclear issues. He has an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Chicago. The authors are grateful to John Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, for valuable comments and suggestions to the report. We also acknowledge the help of James Burrus and Giselle Foss at Greenpeace in editing and proofreading. iv Introduction The U.S. Navy is asking Congress to fund admission that military justifications are no its tenth nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, longer paramount; the desire to retain a nuclear designated CVN-76, the ninth of the USS reactor and shipbuilding infrastructure is now Nimitz (CVN-68) class. With a price tag of the primary reason for building more nuclear $4.5 billion, the CVN-76 is the most expensive carriers. "Neither the carrier [CVN-76] nor the single weapons system in the FY 1995 defense SSN [nuclear-powered attack submarine] work budget.1 The new carrier is scheduled to join is being justified on the basis of force levels," the fleet in the year 2003, with funding for Nuclear Propulsion Director Admiral Bruce another (projected at over $6.1 billion)2 to DeMars bluntly admitted before Congress in follow at the turn of the century. April 1992. Rather, he explained, "The issue is how to sustain essential capabilities which, if Can the United States afford to build more lost, cannot practically be reconstituted."3 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers? And more Building nuclear ships to keep an industry alive importantly, is nuclear propulsion needed for which has no utility in the civilian economy is aircraft carrier operations at all? incompatible with U.S. national security policy and interests. The Navy claims nuclear aircraft carriers are necessary and that additional construction and The United States would gain more from support costs are justified because of significant pursuing a global ban on the use of nuclear military advantages gained from nuclear power for naval warships than struggling to propulsion. Neither is true. Not only are sustain a too expensive and shrinking nuclear nuclear carriers more expensive in every facet industry for scenarios and conflicts that are of their life cycles, but the promises and unlikely ever to happen. Whether it be a expectations of significant military advantages Russian Navy returning to blue water from nuclear propulsion are not evident from ambitions, or a hypothetical scenario of a past and current naval operations. In fact, the hostile country suddenly surging dozens of yet Navy itself does not make use of the advantages to be built nuclear warships into the world's it highlights as justifying nuclear propulsion. oceans, no credible threat can justify continuing to build nuclear warships. A ban on nuclear The United States is cutting