LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL THE BARCELONA PROCESS 175th EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 5-6 NOVEMBER MALLORCA, SPAIN Sponsored by With the support of the European Parliament With the support of the Dutch Foreign Office Table of Contents Background - Barcelona Process 2 - Economic and Financial Chapter 3 - Foreign Policy and Security Chapter 4 - Israel and Palestine 5 - Human Rights 6 Programme 7-9 Professional Profiles 10-14 Participants 14-16 The Barcelona Process The poor democratic record of Maghreb and Mashrek countries, com- bined with the demographic trends and the economic imbalances be- tween the southern and the northern shores of the Mediterranean, led to the launch of a new initiative in 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partner- ship (EMP), which became known as the Barcelona Process. It was launched to foster cooperation on political reform, economic liberalisation, and social issues between the European Union (EU) and the countries on the southern and eastern rim of the Mediterranean (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey). Members are commit- ted to implementing reforms and continuing dialogue. The agreement calls for reform in three areas, known as the political, economic, and social chapters. The first objective is the creation of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogues based on fundamental principles such as respect for human rights and democracy (Political and Security Chapter). The second objective calls for the construction of a zone of shared pros- perity through an economic and financial partnership that includes the gradual establishment of a free zone by 2010. It contains a pledge from EU members to increase aid to soften the impact of economic reform (Eco- nomic and Financial Chapter). The third objective envisions the development of human resources, the promotion of understanding and the rapprochement and exchange of peoples. Notably, the agreement also contains language, albeit vague, committing participants to political pluralism. The ultimate goal is to develop free and flourishing civil societies (Social, Cultural and Human Chapter). Despite its many achievements, various problems have postponed much of the implementation of the Barcelona Process. A certain lack of will on behalf of the southern countries, the competition between the EU and the US, ambivalence on behalf of the members of the European Union, and the revival of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have slowed down the initia- tive. At the Liberal International conference on the Barcelona Process, we will discuss the three above-mentioned objectives; as well as the Israel- Palestine conflict which has a large influence on the success of the Process. Session 1: Economic and Financial Chapter The heart of the Barcelona Process lies in its economic programme. The leading idea is to create an area of shared prosperity by promoting eco- nomic stability, followed by growth in Northern Africa and the Eastern Medi- terranean. It comprises two complementary bilateral and regional frame- works. At the bilateral level, the Union negotiates sets of Euro-Mediterra- nean Association Agreements (MEDA) with the Mediterranean partners in- dividually. Beyond this bilateral trade liberalisation with Europe, the Medi- terranean partners are committed to implementing free trade among them- selves. Dismantling trade barriers, particularly tariffs, requires substantial fiscal, economic and industrial reforms. To this end, the MEDA programme was established as the principle financing mechanism that supports eco- nomic reforms in the public and private sector. Two guiding principles seem to have been behind the economic programme: first, the economic situation in that region had to improve in such a way as to deter as much as possible desperate people from migrating north; and secondly, to improve the economic lot of the south through the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area to be completed by 2010 and a sub- stantial increase of the financial assistance given by the EU. However, to date, trade agreements have had little impact on growth and poverty alleviation in the Mediterranean region due to their lack of scope and ambition in their relationship with each other and the EU. Deepening liberalisation will require a bold commitment to reform and acceptance of the inevitable adjustment costs that will arise. Specifically, the trade in serv- ices and agricultural products remain restrictive and limited. Session 2: Political and Security Chapter The Barcelona Process in fact represents the beginning of a new security concept replacing the Cold War construct that had long dominated Medi- terranean policy. Moreover, the Barcelona Process serves as a critical piece of the European approach to fighting terrorism. After several years of talk about the need to reinvigorate the Barcelona Process, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership now seems to have risen to the top of the EU’s foreign policy agenda. The fight against terrorism and the recent terror attacks in Casablanca, Madrid, London, and Sharm-el- Sheik have once again accentuated the importance of the Mediterranean and the Middle East for European security, and with the enlargement to ten Central and Eastern European states the EU is increasingly focused on the need to enhance stability on its Southern periphery without holding out a promise of future membership. From the European perspective, stability and development in the Mediter- ranean is essential for security at home and abroad. Many Europeans feel that the roots of terrorism lie in the social, economic, and political inequali- ties that are rife on the southern littoral of the Mediterranean and as such can only be addressed through a comprehensive framework that strikes at the deepest causes of terrorism. The new transnational risks (particulary terrorism, illegal trafficking in arms, drugs and persons, and immigration) mean that the massive differential in wealth that characterise the two sides of the Mediterranean are no longer compatible with lasting stability and prosperity within the EU. European security has become less tied to military preparedness or non-proliferation, and more to the economic, social, and political development of the southern countries. The southern countries have themselves emphasised underdevelopment and South-South conflicts as the two primary destabilising factors. They have also denounced the European emphasis on soft security issues and the Fortress Europe mentality. The European initiatives have also been undermined by American ambiva- lence, or, at best, indifference. Specifically, the US has shown little interest in coordinating its Mediterranean policy within the Euro-Mediterranean proc- ess. As a result of this lack of coordination and of the Americans’ priority of security affairs, European and American programmes in the region often end up competing (or sometimes even conflicting) with each other for the participation of Arab nations. Arab nations are able to play their partners off against one another, and, as a result, neither the US nor the EU is able to impose difficult social or political conditions on the Arab states. Session 3: Israel-Palestine Conflicts form an obstacle to progress in any partnership. Although the Euro- Mediterranean partners have agreed not to let the Middle East Peace Proc- ess interfere with the Barcelona Process, it is clear that without progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process European regional stability building efforts in the Middle East and North Africa will continue to flounder. In addi- tion, the Barcelona Process represents one of the few forums for Israeli- Arab dialogue, even if it is not the forum in which settlement will eventually be reached. Over the decades, the European Union’s declaratory diplomacy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict crystallised in its support for a two-state solution and the respect for human rights and international law. However, the ability of the EU to use its leverage as a means of influencing the process of conflict resolution in the Middle East Peace Process is lim- ited. When it comes to the EU’s diplomatic role, ineffectiveness may be ex- plained partly by Israel’s reluctance to see a more active European role. Yet another, arguably more important, reason is the EU’s own perceptions of the need for US leadership in the conflict and its own limited ability to affect US policy in substance. At the same time, the Arab world certainly does view the EU as an honest broker in the Middle East and hence would like to see a stronger European involvement counter-balancing US dominance. The European Union sees its role, both because of its geographic proximity and also because of the historic role played by some European countries in the Middle East, as paramount. At a minimum, the Euro-Mediterranean part- nership should provide continued support for cooperation among the par- ties, particularly in the industrial and economic sectors, to complement the political process. Session 4: Human Rights The European Neighbourhood Policy has two objectives: strengthening sta- bility, security, and the well-being for EU member states and neighbouring countries; and preventing the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. The main difference between the strategy of democracy promotion in the framework of enlargement, and the strategy of democratisation in the frame- work of the Barcelona