Judgement on JCO Criticality Accident — Missing Links still Remain The Mito District Court (15km from JCO in Tokaimura) where the ruling on JCO was deliverd. On the morning of March 3, the Mito District on the former head of the Tokaimura plant. In its court delivered a ruling on JCO Co. (JCO), a judgments that the Court also ordered suspended nuclear fuel-processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibara- prison sentences in the case of the former head of ki Prefecture, including a judgment on former and the JCO plant and five other officials who served current officials of the company. It has been three-and-a-half years since the CONTENTS criticality accident at JCO’s Tokai facility and just Ruling on JCO Accident 1-4 thirty days since a court ruling on the Monju FBR All 17 of TEPCO’s units shut down 5 (see NIT 93). Japan’s electricity liberalization policy 6-7 Data: The trial sought to determine responsibility - Japan’s Nuclear Development Plan 8 for JCO’s illegal operations that led to the acci- - Recent Trends of Nuclear Industry 9 dent, including the death of two workers. In its Anti-Nuke Who’s who: Kiyoshi Yoshimura 10 ruling, the Court imposed fines on JCO and also News Watch 11-12 March/April 003 No.94 Nuke Info Tokyo in management positions or as field supervisors at operation of reprocessing plants and development the time of the accident. of fast breeder reactors. Japan-United States The ruling adopted the prosecution’s claim that negotiations on reprocessing policy subsequently the cause of the accident could not be extend to took place. As a result of talks, Japan was pro- include the responsibilities of other related orga- hibited from extracting plutonium powder on its nizations. On the other hand, the Court meted out own. Due to restrictions imposed by negotiations, sentences that were lighter than penalties demand- the manufacturer, which was making mixed plu- ed by the prosecution on the grounds that respon- tonium and uranium oxide fuels (MOX) for Joyo sibility for the accident could not be restricted to and other plants was required to mix a plutonium the defendants being accused at the trial (follow- solution and a uranyl nitrate solution. A method ing the claims of the defendants). developed by the PNC, called the “Microwave Now that the Court has determined that there Heating Denitration” was used to de-nitrate the were additional causes of the criticality accident, solution. In short, the need for manufacturing a -- beyond the roles played by the defendants -- it uranyl nitrate solution (rather than a powder ) was should clearly spell them out. Although the rul- created under such political pressure. ing stated that JCO should receive “the maximum The Joyo initially adopted the “Mark-I” reac- penalty under the relevant law,” the penalty was tor core design, adopting the same breeder reac- only a one million yen fine. It included 500,000 tor core used in Monju. The Mark-I reactor yen fine for violation of the Law for the Regula- core ceased operations in December 1981, after tion of Nuclear Source, Material, Nuclear Fuel it reached a thermal output of 50MW in July Material and Reactors (Nuclear Reactor Regula- 1978 and 75MW in July 1979. Subsequently, tion Law) and 500,000 yen fine for violation of modifications to Mark-II reactor core (thermal the Law on Labor Sanita ry. Since output 100MW) was made. But, the modifica- both prosecutors and defendants did not make an tion was made only to the irradiation reactor appeal to the higher courts within two weeks fol- core. With further modification to the Mark-II lowing the Court decision, the results of the ruling reactor core, it boosted the maximum fuel bur- case were confirmed on March 18. nup from 50,000MWd/t to 75,000MWd/t, and it also extended operation days per one cycle PNC’s Joyo and JCO from 45 days to 70 days. It was necessary by the JCO manufactured uranyl nitrate solution in re-designed Mark-II reactor core to manufacture the Conversion Test Building at the Tokai facility, 18.8% enriched uranium. which was used to produce fuels for the experi- It was in these circumstances that PNC asked mental fast reactor Joyo, owned and operated by JCO to produce 18.8% enriched uranium. (In ret- Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute rospect, the increased enrichment of uranium for (JNC). JNC was formerly the Power Reactor and Joyo resulted in a cause of the criticality accident Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC). in the Conversion Test Building.) In order to treat Therefore, uranium -- which caused the criticality such high enriched uranium, modifications to the accident -- was supposed to be loaded at Joyo’s Conversion Test Building were made and a gen- reactor, otherwise nothing would have happened. eral safety review undertaken. The JCO had been manufacturing a highly One of the important points revealed in the enriched uranyl nitrate solution since the 1980s. court trial was an officer at the PNC who had The criticality accident occurred when workers at been sent to the Science and Technology Agency JCO attempted to homogenize the density of the (STA, currently the Ministry of Education, Cul- solution by pouring it into the Precipitation Tank ture, Sports, Science and Technology, MEXT) as not used during normal manufacturing process. a safety review officer who conducted the safety Joyo reached its criticality on April 24, 1977. review necessary for modification of the Conver- However, just before criticality at Joyo, the Carter sion Test Building. For detailed analysis of prob- administration in the United States announced a lems associated with safety inspections, please non-proliferation policy that sought to freeze the refer to previous articles in No. 86 and No. 91. Nuke Info Tokyo March/April 003 No.94 3 Figure: Transition of Manufacturing Process in the Conversion Test Building at JCO On January 27, the Court ruled “nullification” for each batch (considered as one unit) it would of construction approval that had been given in require significant inspection time for testing. 1983 to the PNC’s fast breeder reactor Monju Normally ti takes several days for one safety anal- when it was discovered that there were various ysis. Therefore, homogenizing the solution in a frauds in the safety review (ref. No. 93). In the uniform way to one lot of 40 liters would require same way, review of JCO should be subject to only one test, reducing time and effort substan- the similar safety standards, both with respect to tially. inspection procedures and also in terms of human During the 1980s, JCO used the “cross- ties with government agencies. blending” method as described above to make the density of the solution consisted and started to Homogenization of the Solution fabricate the solution by using the storage column and PNC in the facility during 1990s. Seen in this way, it After the plant had passed a safety review, can be said that the transformation of manufactur- PNC requested JCO to homogenize uranyl nitrate ing process (from “cross-blending” to the storage solution up to one lot (40 liters). In such circum- column, and then to the precipitation tank) made stances, JCO invented the so-called “cross-blend- criticality more likely to happen. Among the three ing” method to homogenize the entire solution by methods, only the precipitation tank had a struc- using multiple stainless cans, and began manufac- tural design likely to trigger criticality. turing the solution in 1986. PNC requested blend- It is also known that workers at the JCO facil- ing the solution to a uniform density, due to the ity carried out “re-dissolution” work by using approved conditions established for transporting stainless containers (bucket). But, the direct cause the solution from the facility to the PNC’s Tokai of the accident was in the process used to make plant. If PNC had manufactured the solution on the density of the solution consistent. To sum- its own, it would have avoided such licensing marize these points, neither the blending methods procedures. Thus, the product quality data -- one performed at the precipitation tank and storage unit to be considered as 10 cans, each containing column nor the cross-blending was checked dur- 4 liters -- had to be submitted to authorities for ing the safety inspection of the stainless-steel inspection prior to shipping. maker (Conversion Test Building in 1984. Yet, if the quality of the solution was different 4 March/April 003 No.94 Nuke Info Tokyo Moreover, the Conversion Test Building was officers; the PNC’s officer responsible for request- originally designed to handle uranium powder ing JCO to create a manufacturing method to and only later, as a result of Japan-United States assure the solution’s consistent density, and the agreements, was it used to manufacture uralyl STA official responsible for administering JCO. solution. In short, JCO was forced to develop There were many uncertainties and inconsis- many different manufacturing processes in order tencies in the testimony of accused -- for example, to make use of the facility’s equipment originally the claim that “nobody has any knowledge of intended to produce power products. criticality,” or again “it was believed that solution In principle, the manufacturer should have was less likely to cause criticality than a pow- designed a different way for manufacturing the dered form”. (Actually, criticality is more likely solution, separate from processes used for power to occur in a solution form.) Crucial questions products. However, the safety review of the regarding why the precipitation tank was invented Conversion Test Building approved adapting the were not to answered and detailed discussion on equipment so that it could be used for making the how it was used did not take place.