View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Online Research @ Cardiff The Problem of Induction and the Problem of Other Minds: A Proposed Solution PhD thesis 2011 Laurence Peddle 2 Summary In chapter one I reject the thesis that a relation of partial entailment holds between probability evidence and conclusion, as also the claim that the propositions of applied geometry are synthetic a priori. By way of balance, I suggest that there may be a sense in which necessary conditions of discourse transcend the distinction between a priori and empirical. In chapter two I reject the claim that logical relations in the form of intrinsic probability enter into the no-miracles argument, which I suggest is frequency-connected in its more systematic applications, so that it belongs within a system. I begin chapter three with a critique of an attempted formal probability solution to Hume’s problem, and I now suggest that inductive inference has application only within a system in which its validity is pre-supposed in its premises, a concomitant of which is that the sceptic about induction cannot stop short of global scepticism. Since my aim is to show that global scepticism is self-refuting, given that intentionality may be analysed in terms of a system, I now develop that analysis by devoting chapter four to an examination of Wittgenstein on meaning and understanding. In chapter five I reject his thesis equating meaning and understanding with use, arguing instead that they are irreducible and subject to dispositionality conditions, and in furtherance of that argument I try to solve the problem of the authoritativeness of belief avowals by showing again that there are necessary conditions of discourse. These are such that self- ascribing belief, crediting oneself with understanding and with being suitably disposed, are inherent in reasoning. In chapter six I weave the threads of the previous discussion into a solution by arguing that the sceptic about induction, who is committed to global scepticism, necessarily refutes himself. In chapter seven, on the problem of other minds, I attempt a solution by modifying the arguments used against inductive scepticism. 3 Contents Page Acknowledgements.......................................................................... 5 Introduction..................................................................................... 6 Chapter 1: The Sceptical Problem and Logical Probability Theory..17 Outline of the problem.................................................... 17 Keynes’ probability theory..............................................19 Are there logical probability relations?.......................... 29 Is geometry synthetic a priori?.........................................34 First steps towards a solution......................................... 38 Chapter 2: Inverse Probability...........................................................42 Intrinsic probability relations and induction....................44 Direct evidence and frequency........................................ 51 Underdetermination and the notion of a system..............56 Chapter 3: Stove’s Attempts at a Solution........................................62 First attempt.....................................................................62 Second attempt................................................................ 69 Rejection of probability solutions to Hume’s problem....72 All-pervasiveness of inductive inference........................ 73 Inductive scepticism entails global scepticism................78 Intrinsic description..........................................................81 Chapter 4: Wittgenstein on Meaning and Understanding.................87 Reasoning as an occurrent, interior process.................... 89 Wittgenstein on reading...................................................90 Return to Wittgenstein on understanding....................... 97 Return to Wittgenstein on meaning.................................102 Irreducibility and the private language argument............106 Rejecting the private language argument........................111 Counter-example to the argument...................................113 4 Chapter 5: Meaning As Use..............................................................116 Rejection of meaning as use........................................... 119 Critique of Kripke on rule-following............................. 121 The irreducibility thesis.................................................. 124 Hattiangadi’s objections................................................. 127 Intentionality and avowals.............................................. 132 Observation versus introspection.................................... 135 Avowals and the particular case of belief....................... 137 Fundamentals in the context of a system........................ 141 Irreducibility again.......................................................... 147 Chapter 6: Recapitulation and Solution .......................................... 151 Solving the problem........................................................ 156 Objections....................................................................... 163 Further development of the solution............................... 166 Interdependence of past, present and future................... 167 Resolving the sceptical hypothesis problem................... 169 Wittgenstein’s On Certainty........................................... 173 Inductive inference reconsidered.................................... 174 Goodman’s paradox........................................................ 177 Relaxing effect of problem resolution.............................182 Chapter 7: The Problem of Other Minds..........................................184 The sceptical argument................................................... 184 Strawson’s attempt at a solution..................................... 187 An astounding fact about other minds........................... 191 Epistemic perception of others........................................ 193 A countryside stroll with a robot.................................... 196 Direct assault on scepticism............................................ 197 The mystery remains....................................................... 202 Bibliography: ................................................................................... 204 5 Acknowledgements My grateful thanks to my thesis supervisor, Professor Christopher Norris, for all his support and encouragement over so many years and in so many ways. These include his always having an open door whenever I wished to check on my progress or ask his advice. In every chapter of this work I have benefited from his detailed comments and helpful remarks; and, too, my thinking has been sharpened by the cut and thrust of debate in the reading group sessions he has led. I owe a great deal, also, to the discussions I have had at conferences, seminars and elsewhere with fellow students and others too numerous to mention by name. I would, however, like to mention my wife’s name and to thank Helen for all her sacrifice and support and for eventually accepting my claim to be working hard on my thesis even when I was not reading or writing and appeared to be neglecting my studies. She has come to understand the crucial role played by unconscious thinking, which my own research indicates to be at its most effective when study is combined with dancing, tennis and gardening. She has been kind enough, also, to draw up a long list of all the do-it-yourself jobs which over the years both of us have noticed needed to be done, and which she has now listed in order of priority with detailed instructions and a work schedule. 6 Introduction Since the title of this thesis announces a belief on my part that epistemological problems are soluble, I should perhaps begin with an account of what I hope to achieve. My declared aim is to refute the sceptic about induction and other minds, but to that end I need also to deliver our knowledge of the past from him, solve a puzzle about the authority with which we self- ascribe belief and other intentional states, and shed light on the epistemic status of experiential statements and observation reports. This programme can be carried through only if certain distinctions, between induction, other forms of factual inference, and physical description, are divested of the significance normally attributed to them; also, my over- arching aim is to exhibit our reasoning about the world as conducted within a system constrained by necessary conditions of discourse. In pursuing these aims, I hope to be able to discuss the various issues in the same arena as that occupied by contemporary debate on them, and thereby to contribute to it. In my critique of Wittgenstein on intentionality I take issue with his professed aim of dispelling misconceptions about meaning and understanding, for it seems to me that the proper task of philosophy in this arena is that of enquiry and analysis. Wittgenstein, however, seems to exhibit empiricist leanings in his private language argument and in his general approach to what it is to mean and to understand. In equating meaning with use, he maintains that semantic content does not consist in the mental phenomena associated with giving meaning to a sentence, a point of view which on one interpretation is tantamount to semantic non-factualism. This is radical scepticism about meaning, and I argue that it should be rejected,