University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1977 Soldiers, sportsmen, and politicians. : Military sport in Germany, 1924-1935. Michael B. Barrett University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Barrett, Michael B., "Soldiers, sportsmen, and politicians. : Military sport in Germany, 1924-1935." (1977). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1359. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1359 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SOLDIERS, SPORTSMEN, AND POLITICIANS. MILITARY SPORT IN GERMANY, 19 24-1935. A Dissertation Presented By Michael Baker Barrett Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY May 1977 History SOLDIERS, SPORTSMEN , AND POLITICIANS MILITARY SPORT IN GERMANY, 19 24-1935 A Dissertation Presented By Michael Baker Barrett Approved as to style and content by: (Harold J. Gordory Jr.) , Chairperson (Peter Fliess) , Member (Robert H. McNeal) , Member (Marvin Schwarz) / Member (herald McFarland) History iv ABSTRACT SOLDIERS, SPORTSMEN, AND POLITICIANS. MILITARY SPORT IN GERMANY, 19 24-193 5. May 1977 Michael B. Barrett, B.A., The Citadel M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Directed by: Professor Harold J. Gordon, Jr. This dissertation focuses on the subject of military sport training in Germany from 1924 to 1935. Through this type of instruction, which paralleled basic military re- cruit training, the Arm}/ attempted to circumvent the Ver- sailles Treaty restrictions which prohibited a military reserve force. The Army Command hoped that military sport graduates would form a reservoir of semi-trained manpower available for military emergencies. Military officials did not openly sponsor military sport training; instead, they provided indirect subsidies through other government agencies for sport organizations, youth groups, and veterans associa- tions which conducted military sport instruction. Military sport training proved popular, and numerous political organizations formed their own military sport or- ganizations at the urging of their members. This development presented Defense Ministry officials with an awkward problem. vast They wanted to offer military sport instruction to the could mobil- number of men which the political organizations did not want any ize, but at the same time, Army officers political ideology to creep into this training, lest their reservoir of semi-trained manpower become politicized and unreliable. Moreover, the Army insisted that its leaders rather than those of the political parties would control these putative reserves in the event of mobilization. On the other hand, although the political leaders welcomed the discipline and experience which their political armies would acquire through military sport training, they feared, with justification, that the Army intended to undermine the loyalty of their followers. These fears prevented the Gov- ernment from implementing, on a nation-wide basis, its mili- tary sport training program until 1932. From its origins in 1924 to its termination in 1935, the military sport training program provides an excellent case study of the attitude of the Army Command and the De- fense Ministry toward the major political parties in Germany The Army, convinced of the value of military sport instruc- tion, predicated its expansion and mobilization plans on the existence of a large military sport program. On becoming Chancellor, Hitler not only continued the military sport training program, but transferred it to the SA and increased military sport activities almost a hundredfold. The Army Command nonetheless continued its efforts to minimize any instruc political indoctrination attendant to military sport politicized. tion, fearing that the Army would become disserta- Based on unpublished archival sources, this tion concludes that the policy of the Army Command prior to 1 933 aimed at undermining the loyalty of a major source of Hitler's support, the young men in his SA. After 1933, leading Defense Ministry officials continued the broad outlines of this policy by attempting to separate and iso- late the extreme radicals in order to eliminate their in- fluence on the new government. vii PREFACE This dissertation focuses on the subject of military sport in Germany from 1924 to 1935. While at first glance such a subject might appear to be of interest only to specialists, the topic was the one area in which the Army, the political parties, sport associations, and paramilitary organizations all had a common interest. Although the policies of the Army Command have been examined in numerous works for both the Weimar Republic and National Socialist periods, very few historians, whose work is now dated, have examined both eras to determine if any continuity exists. Military sport, of vital interest to the Army Command dur- ing the Weimar Republic and the early years of the Hitler Regime, and heretofore unstudied by historians, provides us with an excellent vehicle for a case study in the atti- tude of the Army Command toward political movements and in particular, toward National Socialism. At the risk of subjecting myself to the accusation consider exces- of pedantry, I have provided what some may course of sive documentation. Two reasons dictated this material action. First, with well over one-half of the source obligated coming from unpublished archival sources, I feel Second, the con- to expose this material to other scholars. me to troversial nature of several of my theses requires other histori- point out exactly where and why I differ with viii ans . Writers contemporary with the Nazi regime and those who wrote in the immediate post-war period argued that the German Army materially aided Hitler in his quest for politi- cal power. In contrast, recent scholars have claimed, for the most part, that while the Army may have not actively aided the Nazis, it certainly did nothing to hinder them, and once they were in power, collaborated with the new order. My research concludes that the Army opposed the Nazis prior to 1933 by trying to undermine their sources of political support, and once the Nazis were in power, leading Army officers attempted to separate and isolate the extreme radicals in order to eliminate their influence on the course of the new government. Folk knowledge holds that a drowning person reviews his life before taking the final plunge. The analogy be- tween a drowning person and the writer of a dissertation is perhaps apt, for there have been numerous occasions during the preparation of this work when I felt myself sink- dissertation, the ing in a sea of material. As I submit the "review" final plunge, so to speak, it seems appropriate to with pleasure my life during its preparation, acknowledging improved it. those who assisted me and through their efforts Gordon, An immeasurable debt is owed Prof. Harold J. and dissertation Jr., who was not only my faculty advisor of the word, the director but who was also, in every sense endured with exemplary Doktorvater. He and his family have ix patience late-night phone calls and visits. Prof. Marvin Schwarz helped to tranform several rough draft chapters into reasonable products, and he and Profs. R. H. McNeal and Peter Fliess, the other members of my dissertation committee, merit my gratitude. The staffs of the various archives, institutes, and libraries where I conducted my research were all very help- ful and unfailingly courteous. Several colleagues and friends contributed greatly to this undertaking, offering criticism, encouragement, and friendship. Among these were Mr. Gilbert E. Southern, Jr. and Dr. Philip N. Cronenwett. Professors Henry Smith and Joseph Gundel helped render my awkward translations into literate English without sacri- ficing precision or subtelty. My typist, Mrs. Frances Rosier, performed yeoman service in her first attempt at typing the German language. Without financial assistance the dissertation would have proven impossible. I deeply appreciate the support provided by the History Department of the University of Massachusetts, the Germanistic Society of America, and the Fulbright-Hays Commission. The greatest debt, however, is due my family. The confidence expressed by my parents and parents-in-law was all my most encouraging. To my wife, Sara, who supported to her that this endeavors, I owe everything, and it is work is dedicated. M.B.B. The Citadelj i TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. THE END OF THE FREIKORPS ERA, 1924 1 . II. THE PEOPLES' SPORT PROGRAM, 1924-1927. A RESERVE FOR THE REICHSWEHR 19. III. A CONSCIOUS GERMAN SPIRIT: THE MILITARY SPORT MOVEMENT, 1927-1932 46. IV. THE SA AND THE MILITARY SPORT MOVEMENT, 1924-1932 77. V. GROENER, MILITARY SPORT, AND THE SA BAN 102. VI. TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE. THE REICHS- KURATORIUM FUR JUGENDERTUCHIGUNG 139. VII. RELUCTANT SURRENDER: THE TRANSFER OF PRE -MILITARY TRAINING TO THE SA 170. VIII. THE CHEF AW ORGANIZATION: KRUGER'S EMPIRE 205. IX. BETWEEN THE SA AND THE REICHSWEHR: JULY 1933-JUNE 1 93 4 237. X. THE END OF THE KRUGER ORGANIZATION: JULY 1 934 TO JANUARY 19 35 277. XI. EPILOGUE AND