SRI LANKA: TAMIL POLITICS AND THE QUEST FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION Asia Report N°239 – 20 November 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. TAMIL GRIEVANCES AND THE FAILURE OF POLITICAL RESPONSES ........ 2 A. CONTINUING GRIEVANCES ........................................................................................................... 2 B. NATION, HOMELAND, SEPARATISM ............................................................................................. 3 C. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AFTER ................................................................................ 4 D. LOWERING THE BAR .................................................................................................................... 5 III. POST-WAR TAMIL POLITICS UNDER TNA LEADERSHIP ................................. 6 A. RESURRECTING THE DEMOCRATIC TRADITION IN TAMIL POLITICS .............................................. 6 1. The TNA ..................................................................................................................................... 6 2. Pro-government Tamil parties ..................................................................................................... 8 B. TNA’S MODERATE APPROACH: YET TO BEAR FRUIT .................................................................. 8 1. Patience and compromise in negotiations ................................................................................... 9 2. Other positive gestures .............................................................................................................. 11 3. No progress for Tamils in the north and east ............................................................................ 12 C. TAMIL NATIONALIST CHALLENGES TO TNA AND THE SELF-DETERMINATION QUESTION .......... 13 1. The Tamil diaspora and Tamil Nadu ........................................................................................ 13 2. Domestic Tamil critics .............................................................................................................. 14 3. A shift in tone? Return to the language of self-determination .................................................. 15 IV. THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT: BUILDING BLOCK OR STUMBLING BLOCK? ........................................................................................................................... 18 A. THE PRO-DEVOLUTION CASE AGAINST THE AMENDMENT ......................................................... 18 B. FROM STUMBLING BLOCK TO BUILDING BLOCK? ...................................................................... 19 V. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO MEANINGFUL DEVOLUTION ...................... 22 A. ADDRESSING SINHALESE RESISTANCE ....................................................................................... 22 B. ENGAGING MUSLIMS POLITICALLY ............................................................................................ 24 1. Addressing Muslim concerns and crafting a new relationship .................................................. 24 2. Political realities: the case of the 2012 Eastern Provincial Council elections ........................... 25 C. THE FORGOTTEN COMMUNITY: UPCOUNTRY TAMILS ................................................................ 27 VI. PREVENTING THE WORST, BUILDING ALLIANCES, EXPANDING THE FOCUS .................................................................................................................... 28 A. IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES .............................................................................................................. 28 B. MEDIUM-TERM STRATEGY ......................................................................................................... 28 C. THE INTERNATIONAL FACTOR ................................................................................................... 29 D. LONGER-TERM PRIORITIES ......................................................................................................... 29 1. Strengthening the TNA ............................................................................................................. 30 2. Redefining the national question, engaging with a southern reform agenda ............................ 30 VII.CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 32 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SRI LANKA ......................................................................................................................... 33 B. PREVIOUS DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS ............................................................................................... 34 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 36 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2009 ......................................................... 37 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 40 Asia Report N°239 20 November 2012 SRI LANKA: TAMIL POLITICS AND THE QUEST FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Sri Lankan government’s refusal to negotiate seri- a-half years after the end of the war, President Rajapaksa ously with Tamil leaders or otherwise address legitimate continues to delay the long-promised election to the north- Tamil and Muslim grievances is increasing ethnic tensions ern provincial council – elections the TNA would be nearly and damaging prospects for lasting peace. The admini- certain to win. Despite repeated public promises, the stration, led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party of Mahinda president has refused to grant even the limited powers os- Rajapaksa, has refused to honour agreements with the Tamil tensibly given to provincial councils under the constitu- National Alliance (TNA), broken promises to world lead- tion’s thirteenth amendment. Instead, he and other senior ers and not implemented constitutional provisions for officials have begun to discuss the amendment’s possible minimal devolution of power to Tamil-speaking areas of repeal or replacement by even weaker forms of devolu- the north and east. Militarisation and discriminatory eco- tion. nomic development in Tamil and Muslim areas are breed- ing anger and increasing pressure on moderate Tamil Even as the government refuses to respond to longstand- leaders. Tamil political parties need to remain patient and ing demands for power sharing, Tamil political power and keep to their moderate course, while reaching out more identity are under sustained assault in the north and east. directly to Muslims, Upcountry Tamils and Sinhalese. In- While Tamil leaders and nationalist intellectuals base their ternational actors should press the government more ef- demands for political autonomy on the idea that these re- fectively for speedy establishment of an elected provin- gions are the traditional areas of Tamil habitation, govern- cial council and full restoration of civilian government in ment figures, including the president’s powerful brother the north, while insisting that it commence serious negotia- and defence secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, follow a long tions with elected Tamil representatives from the north line of Sinhala nationalist thinking and explicitly reject and east. that the north has any privileged Tamil character. Military and economic policies have been institutionalising this Many believed that the end of the war and elimination of ideological position with vigour. the separatist Tamil Tigers (LTTE) would open space for greater political debate and moderation among Tamils, The de facto military occupation of the northern province while encouraging the government to abandon the hard- and biased economic development policies appear designed line Sinhalese nationalism it had cultivated to support its to undermine Tamils’ ability to claim the north and east as war efforts and agree to devolve meaningful power to the their homeland. For many Tamils, this confirms their long- majority Tamil-speaking northern and eastern provinces. held belief that it was only the LTTE’s guns that placed While there has been an increase in democratic and mod- their concerns and need for power sharing on the political erate voices among Tamils, the government has failed to agenda. In the face of the government’s resistance to a fair respond in kind. and negotiated settlement, TNA leaders have come under increasing pressure from their constituencies to adopt more Instead, it has adopted a policy of promising negotiations confrontational language and tactics. Growing demands and expanded devolution in discussions with India, the for the right to self-determination for the Tamil nation and U.S., and the UN Secretary-General, while denying these hints that separatist goals have not been permanently aban- same things when addressing its Sinhala voting base. It has doned have, in turn, provoked harsh reactions and expres- refused to negotiate seriously with TNA representatives, sions of distrust from Sinhala leaders. repeatedly failing to honour promises and ultimately break- ing off talks in January 2012. Since then it has demanded The situation is likely to remain difficult, with major ne- that the TNA join the government’s preferred vehicle, a gotiating breakthroughs unlikely