Official Conference Proceedings ISSN: 2187-4 735 ) iafor iafor The Asian Conference on Asian Studies 2011 Official Conference Proceedings 2011 Contents Alternative Futures for Governance in Burma: 2040 Wylma Samaranayake-Robinson p. 1 Finding the Path for the Deltaic Eco-city: Orchard Settlement in Bangkok and its Vicinity Terdsak Tachakitkachorn p. 13 Understanding Institutional Change and Persistence to Anticipate Future Livelihoods Tanya Jakimow p. 24 Survival of the Fittest: An Eclectic Approach to Exploring the Motif of Globality in Pankaj Mishra's Selected Works Mohsen Masoomi p. 35 Fabricating the Past through Folklore in Ming Cher’s Spider Boys Angela Frattarola p. 47 Where Everyone was Other: Jews in the Yokohama Treaty Port, 1859-1899 Chester Proshan p. 60 The Whereabouts of Conducting Research in Malaysian Setting in Exploring Malay Mothers' Experiences of Having a Child With Cancer: Learning the Cultural Variation from the Past for the Practicality of the Future Nurhafizah Mohd Sukor p. 76 Communal Political Paradigm after the 2008 Election in Malaysia Noriyuki Segawa p. 83 Thailand's Responses to CEDAW: 26 years of Women's Human Rights Kanyanattha Ittinitiwut p. 95 Between Original and Host Societies: the Reconstructed Past of Picture Brides Enyu Lin p. 108 Future Korean Urban Transformation as the Result of Integration of Urban Administrative District Hyeongkyu Cho p. 116 Demographic Studies in Hong Kong: How Cross-border irth Influences Hong Kong's Fertility and Demographic Structure Nancy Ling Sze Leung p. 132 Perceptions and Measurement of Family Welfare In Indonesia: A Qualitative Systematic Review Rina Herartri p. 145 A Study of the Parallel Passages of Hanshi Waizhuan Found in Alfred Forke’s Translation of Lunheng Pak-ka Chan p. 162 Iran Studies: Lack of Comprehensive Approach Mahdi Faraz Raziyeh Keivan Ara p. 176 Effects of Cognitive Styles on a Virtual Learning Companion System as an Adjunct to Classroom Instructions Sheng-Wen Hsieh Min-Ping Wu p. 182 The Development of Fisher-folk's Livelihood Strategies: A Case Study of the Makassarese of Sulawesi in Indonesia Go Iwata p. 192 “Imagined Innocence Lost: The Performance of Post-Indigeneity in Hosoe Eikoh and Hijikata Tatsumi’s Kamaitachi” Michael Sakamoto p. 205 Where is My Bamboo Shoot? A Silent Question from Native People in Northern Lao PDR Werapong Mesathan p. 217 Welfare Effects of Access to Water Services in Cambodia Theara Horn p. 221 Regional Security Complex in the Persian Gulf in the post-Saddam Era: Case of anti-Americanism Fatemeh Shayan p. 234 The Asian Conference on Asian Studies 2011 Conference Proceedings Alternative Futures for Governance in Burma: 2040 Wylma C. Samaranayake-Robinson, Ph.D. University of Hawaii-Manoa 1 The Asian Conference on Asian Studies 2011 Conference Proceedings Alternative Futures for Governance in Burma: 2040 Wylma C. Samaranayake-Robinson, Ph.D. University of Hawaii-Manoa This paper explores my vision of some alternative futures for governance in Burma, specifically what Burma could become by 2040. The scenarios envisioned could serve as a passage for continued dialogue about Burma which could then encourage creative thinking about future governance in Burma, creative insofar as being able to lay aside the insistence of some that a Burma that does not turn into democracy is a Burma that is doomed. J. N. Pieterse (2001) provides a smorgasbord when it comes to the term democracy, to include participatory democracy, direct democracy, social democracy, associational democracy, substantive democracy, and deliberative democracy (pp. 410-413). Aung San Su Kyi (1995) projects her own ideal when she writes that “the people of Burma view democracy not merely as a form of government, but as an integrated social and ideological system based on respect for the individual,” adding that they just want to be able to go about their own business “freely and peacefully, not doing anybody any harm, just earning a decent living without anxiety and fear” and they just want “basic human rights which would guarantee a tranquil, dignified existence free from want and fear” (p. 173). M. A. Aung Thwin (2002) contends that ideologies related to democracy and human rights are laden with a consolidated western vision that do not always take into account that the most destructive aspect of such democratization is that it invariably means decentralization which, in a non-western context, could encourage social and political anarchy. He reminds that, in Burma, anarchy is feared far more than tyranny, noting that any genuine desire to promote freedom from fear must address issues relevant to Burmese society before assuming the applicability of western value-laden concepts (p. 1). Thant Myint-U (2006), referring to the fear of many in Burma of anarchy that could follow a political revolt by disaffected students, says that anarchy would be the worst possible scenario for Burma’s future. But, first, what is futures studies? Briefly, futures studies refers to the study of the future with the use of the plural “futures” stressing the element of choice concerning what the future will be like. The term “alternative futures” denotes that the future is not fixed and various possibilities should be explored and one should seek to realize those that seem the most desirable. This characterization by H. Didsbury (1979) about futures studies lends credence to Futurist J. A. Dator’s (2002) emphasis that one’s values are central to and do become a clear consideration at every stage of any futures studies research. What follows is not an attempt to look into crystal balls, to predict, or to forecast what alternative futures for governance in Burma by 2040 could occur. I primarily explore Dator’s “Four Futures” (1993, 2002) to envision whether Burma, by 2040, will be a nation that (a) is in a state of governance that has shown progress, measured perhaps by market principles, and shown continued, usually “economic,” growth; (b) has folded or collapsed for one or more of a variety of reasons; (c) is disciplined (maintained), in which a future society is seen as organized around some set of overarching values, be it ancient or traditional, or (d) has transformed itself, usually “high-tech” or “high spirit” (become completely different from what is expected or assumed). Dator says all images in all cultures can be lumped into one of these four major generic images of the futures. He discourages favoring one image over any of the others and assuming that one 2 The Asian Conference on Asian Studies 2011 Conference Proceedings or more is good, or most likely, or best, or worst case scenario. He adds that the four futures are “generic” and may not work fully for all situations or countries and may require some tweaking or even fusing. I recognize that Burma’s futures cannot be known with absolute certainty and that my engagement of futuristic analytical tools is merely an academic exercise. By 2040, futures completely different from what I present could unfold, depending on what decisions Burma’s stakeholders and outside actors make in the coming decades. Continuation Scenario: Economic growth has been achieved and sustained. The year is 2040 and Burma is in a state of governance that has shown continued economic growth. A new generation of military elite afforded more education has emerged to govern Burma. For these up-and-coming leaders, it was a no-brainer to position Burma to follow in the wake of other Asian “tigers” that have progressed, such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Burma’s military government, in the wake of its reelection in 2010, had begun laying the groundwork for this to happen by adopting policies that enabled the nation to “take off” economically. These leaders succeeded in doing this without having to relinquish political control of their nation because of their willingness to permit some Burmese civilians (many of whom had strong business and economic credentials since the early 2000s) to become extremely wealthy and to consider themselves part of the “ruling class.” Their decision to pursue this path to economic development also resulted in the rise of a very comfortable and contented Burmese middle class. At this point, the government does not view as irresolvable the slow emergence of a rich/poor gap in Burmese society. What it considers important is its continuing ties to regional neighbors China and India and its overall better business and investment climates. Today Burma has transitioned from being a leading rice-producing nation to being demonized for being a large producer of illicit opium. But this scenario for Burma bears in mind that an alternative future does not have to be an extension of the present, but can grow from present possibilities, while illustrating a future that is substantially different from the present. Other economically thriving Asian nations, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, were once impoverished and abysmally conflict-ridden countries. A. Booth and P. Moseley (2003) write that, all over Asia, “military-led governments, displaying scant regard for democratic niceties, have achieved rapid rates of economic growth and structural transformation” (p. 14). So why should not Burma? Why should not Burma too be able to experience an extreme economic makeover in its own time and at its own pace? The premises for this scenario to unfold are as follow: First, military governance in Burma has remained in place through 2040. Second, Burma’s military government, since early 2000s, began setting the stage for economic growth by consulting with other Asian nations, accepting assistance from regional counterparts, and welcoming multinational corporations in to help achieve a sustainable economic standing. Third, a new breed of military leaders, adamantly committed to Burma attaining higher levels of economic prosperity, has emerged to hold the reins of political and economic power.