K. Aiko Rice shortage and transportation In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Japan, Indonesia and the WarMyths and realities 152 (1996), no: 4, Leiden, 633-655 This PDF-file was downloaded from http://www.kitlv-journals.nl Downloaded from Brill.com10/04/2021 11:42:07PM via free access KURASAWA-INOMATA AIKO Rice shortage and transportation In retrospect, people in Java almost unanimously state that during the Japanese period they suffered from terrible shortages of rice, and urban people often give testimony of seeing many people dying on the street. Indeed, remaining Japanese archives show that in 1944 and 1945 socio- economic conditions deteriorated to such an extent that the death rate was much higher compared with the Dutch period (see Tables 1 and 2). It is difficult to establish exactly what were the main causes of death, but it is probable that malnutrition directly and indirectly increased the death rate. Japanese statistics from Semarang Central Hospital show that during the six months between February 1943 and September 1943, 832 persons were treated for starvation and 366 died in the hospital.1 All these data tempt me to draw the conclusion that there must indeed have been terrible shortages of foodstuff during the Japanese occupation, as the informants indicate. Then, how and why did this miserable situation come about? To solve this question, let me first examine Japanese food policy during the occupation of Java. Forced delivery of paddy under Japanese rule By the end of the Dutch period, Java had managed to become self- sufficient in rice. In 1939 the production of rice (paddy) was about 8.4 million tons (about 4.5 tons of milled rice) (Indisch Verslag 1940:282). Between 1936 and 1941 Java was annually exporting 319,000 tons (average) of milled rice,2 but this did not necessarily mean that the Javanese were eating well. The average annual consumption of rice per person (1929-38) was 84 kilograms, in other words 230 grams per day,3 although 1 Report of Soebardjo on the living conditions of the population with regard to the requisition of paddy by the government, 21 January 1944. Waseda University Tokyo, Nishijima Collection, doc. JV 48. 2 Nanpo Gunseisokanbu 'Gunseika ni okeru Jawa to Madura no shokuryo jijo to sono taisaku' [The food situation and recommended measures in Java and Madura during the Japanese occupation]. Boeicho Senshishitsu Gunseishiryo, no. 117. 3 Report of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, Enemy Branch, on the economic situation of the Netherlands Indies prior to World War II, 12 January 1944, p. 51. Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis, The Hague, Collection Warners, no. 068-108. Accord- ing to research on estate labourers in 1937-38, their average rice consumption was 228 grams a day, so the figures almost coincide. See report of the Gunseikanbu Choshashitsu on estate labourers and their average consumption 'Noen rodosha no seikatsu jotai' (translation of an unpublished Dutch research report), November 1943, p. 60. BK1 152-IV (1996) 111 Downloaded from Brill.com10/04/2021 11:42:07PM via free access 634 Kurasawa-Inomata Aiko it is said that people wanted to eat 400 grams a day if only they could afford to (Kiyohiko 1944:147).4 Therefore, in this case 'self-sufficiency' simply means that Java did not have to import any extra rice, but it did not necessarily mean that people actually had enough rice. When the Japanese occupied Java, one of their most important motives was to acquire the resources and commodities needed to enable them to pursue the war and at the same time to make each occupied area self- sufficient which was formulated as: 'The main "resources" expected from Java were foodstuffs and manpower (labour). Therefore, pressure was put on the Javanese population to surrender as much foodstuff as possible to the Japanese military authorities'. To assure the acquisition of rice, the Japanese introduced a new policy called the forced delivery of paddy.5 This was implemented to compel the peasants to sell a certain quantity of their production to the military government at the official price, which was much lower than the market price. The quota assigned to each area differed depending on the production capacity, calculated from Dutch statistics. The quota was allocated by the Food Control Agency of the military government (originally named the Shokuryo Kanri Jimusho, then the Juyo Busshi Kodan and later the Shokuryo Kanrikyoku) in the first place to each residency (shu) from where it was divided among the lower local administrative units: from residency to regency, from regency to district, from district to subdistrict, and finally from subdistrict to village. Thus the quotas were allocated collectively to each village as the basic unit, and not personally to each peasant. Therefore, how and how much rice was to be taken away from each peasant depended on the village head. But in most cases, a fixed percentage of the product was taken away from all peasants without exception, regardless of the size of their landholdings, and it was to be surrendered directly from their rice field to the village authority. The harvest was scrutinized by the village officials, and special organizations such as the nogyo kumiai (agricultural co- operation) were set up in each village to administer the collection of rice. The heads of each local administrative unit were very keen to fulfil their individual quotas, because it was they who were responsible for the collection of the allocated quantity of rice and they who were blamed if the target was not reached. Attaining the target was very difficult, because the peasants were unwilling to sell, and tried to conceal their harvest as much as possible. Therefore, very often when the administrative head passed the order on to the lower units, they increased the quota. Since this 4 According to this research well-to-do peasants were eating 400 grams daily, while less well-to-do peasants were forced to substitute other cereals as part of their diet. In Japan the average per capita consumption was 158 kilograms a year, or 433 grams a day. See also Johnson 1953:74. 5 This policy reflected the contemporary situation in Japan. The information on this policy in Java is contained in Kurasawa 1988:Chapter 2. This Chapter was based on the writer's interviews in villages in Java, as well as on Japanese archives. 112 Downloaded from Brill.com10/04/2021 11:42:07PM via free access Rice shortage and transportation 635 procedure was carried out at each level, the quantity the peasants were finally ordered to produce was usually much higher than that the Japanese intended to collect. Despite such subterfuges, according to Japanese statistics the Japanese military government was never able to obtain the required quantity (see Tables 3, 4, and 5). Be that as it may, peasants actually claim that a considerable quantity of their rice was taken away, stating there was a big difference between official statistics and reality. Two of the factors which may account for this gap are either the disappearance or the spoilation of the rice which had been collected as it was being transported to the military administration. At this point let me demonstrate how rice circulated during the Japanese occupation. The first point to bear in mind is that under the Japanese rule the local economic autarchy of each residency was strictly imposed and rice trade between residencies was forbidden unless carried out under a special order from the central government. Though the decree prohibiting this was issued locally by the residency governor, the basic policy in this direction was set by the Gunseikanbu (Japanese military administration), on the basis of a principle previously formulated in Tokyo. By prohibiting direct contact between the residencies, the central government expected to maintain a grip on the flow of commodities throughout Java. To serve this purpose, rice was collected by the central agency following the hierarchy shown in the Chart. After the rice had been surrendered to the village authority, it passed through many hands before it reached its final destina- tion. It is now impossible to trace the quantity received at each stage, but some sporadic information shows that very often the quantity actually received and the quantity reported to the upper unit were at variance with each other. For example, in Pemalang Regency it was reported that 10,842 tons were actually delivered to a rice mill by village authorities in one month, but the rice miller reported a quantity of only 7,856 tons. In another regency 160,000 quintals6 were delivered, but according to the report from the rice miller to the Shokuryo Kanri Jimusho (Office for Food Manage- ment), the quantity received was only 110,000 quintals (Anderson 1966a:99). This is an apt place to quote from a report which records in- justices committed by local officials and rice millers in Indramayu: 'Upon receipt of a bribe local government officials help Chinese rice merchants and rice millers [to take away rice illegally] and therefore extraordinarily high quotas had to be requested of the peasants'.7 Blackmarketing was rampant among people engaged in every stage of production and distribution. Among the farmers there were also those who specialized in smuggling. Peasants in Anjatan, Indramayu, one of the 6 One quintal is 100 kilogrammes. 7 Report of Prawoto Soemodilogo 'Menindjaoe keadaan di Indramajoe' [Inspection of the situation in Indramajoe]. ARA, Algemene Secretarie Batavia I, XX 11-2. 113 Downloaded from Brill.com10/04/2021 11:42:07PM via free access 636 Kurasawa-Inomata Aiko richest rice-producing areas, had three main routes for smuggling out rice.