Sadat and the Road to Jerusalem Sadat and the Road to Shahin Berenji Jerusalem Bold Gestures and Risk Acceptance in the Search for Peace On November 9, 1977, President Anwar el-Sadat announced before Egypt’s People’s Assembly that he was prepared to go “to the end of the Earth” for peace, adding extempora- neously that he was even willing to visit Israel and speak before its parliament, the Knesset.1 Sadat’s pronouncement was shocking given that Egypt had not only repeatedly threatened Israel’s existence and denounced its legitimacy, but had fought against Israel ªve times since its founding in 1948. For the ªrst time in its history, an Arab head of state was now publicly offering to negotiate di- rectly with Israel.2 Ten days later, Sadat landed at Ben-Gurion Airport, where he was welcomed with warm applause from a crowd of Israeli dignitaries. In a historic scene broadcast to millions around the world, a smiling Sadat deplaned and shook hands with Prime Minister Menachem Begin, kissed former Prime Minister Golda Meir on the cheek, and laughed and joked with Israel’s military heroes Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharon (both of whom were part of Begin’s cabinet).3 The next day Sadat toured Yad Vashem, Israel’s memorial to the victims of the Holocaust, and laid a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, a monu- Shahin Berenji is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. The author thanks Deborah Welch Larson, Barry O’Neill, Kenneth Rogerson, and the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of the article. He also wishes to thank Jack Levy, Marc Trachtenberg, Robert Trager, and members of the IR Reading Group at the Univer- sity of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He is grateful to Roey Reichert and to Sima Ghaddar and Anas Mahafzah for their translations of sources written in Hebrew and Arabic, respectively. Finally, he thanks librarian David Hirsch for helping him identify and locate many of the primary and secondary sources used in this article. The archival research for this article was supported by grants from UCLA’s Graduate Division, Department of Political Science, and from the Younes and Soraya Nazarian Center for Israel Studies. 1. Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conºict, 1881–2001 (New York: Vintage, 2001), p. 449; and Yoram Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967– 1977 (Miami: University Press of Florida, 1997), p. 167. 2. Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, “Sadat’s November 9 Speech: Geneva or Bust,” November 10, 1977, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1977–1980, Vol. 8: Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Ofªce [GPO], 2013), pp. 751–752. 3. Dayan was Minister of Foreign Affairs and Sharon was Minister of Agriculture. Lawrence Wright, Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), pp. 21–23; and Kenneth W. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 226–228. International Security, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Summer 2020), pp. 127–163, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00381 © 2020 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 127 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec_a_00381 by guest on 01 October 2021 International Security 45:1 128 ment honoring Israel’s soldiers killed or missing in war.4 Sadat then addressed the Knesset in a special session, stating that “in all sincerity, I tell you, we wel- come you among us, with full security and safety.”5 In one dramatic stroke, Sadat conferred de facto recognition on Israel, honored its fallen warriors, ac- knowledged its security needs, and ªnally, promised “no more war.”6 Sadat overturned Egypt’s long-stated position that the commencement of face-to-face negotiations would occur only if Israel withdrew, or agreed to withdraw, from all the territories it had occupied since the 1967 war.7 Aban- doning this precondition, Sadat suddenly made concessions without any quid pro quo, giving away bargaining chips that could have been used in future rounds of negotiations. Meeting publicly with the Israelis also entailed great personal and political risks, exposing Sadat to physical threats and condemna- tions from around the Arab world.8 Domestically, Sadat was rebuked by some Egyptian ofªcers, and members of his inner circle such as Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy and his deputy, Mohammed Riad, both of whom resigned in protest.9 If traveling to Jerusalem exposed Sadat to myriad risks, then why did he take such a gamble? Why did he make a “bold” or “grand” gesture when smaller, less radical avenues existed to accommodate Israel?10 Answering these questions allows scholars to better understand a decision that not only helped change the course of the Arab-Israeli conºict, but that has since trans- formed the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. My study thus consti- tutes an interpretive or disciplined-conªgurative case study, as I attempt to explain an event of fundamental historical importance.11 4. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel and the Peace Process, 1977–1982: In Search of Legitimacy for Peace (Al- bany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 58–59. 5. “Speech of President Anwar el-Sadat to the Israeli Knesset, November 20, 1977,” Speeches and Interviews of President Anwar El Sadat, July–December 1977, Vol. 7, part 2 (Cairo: Arab Republic of Egypt, State Information Service, 1979), p. 468. 6. H.D.S. Greenway and Washington Post Foreign Service, “Sadat, Begin Pledge ‘No War,’” Wash- ington Post, November 22, 1977, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/11/ 22/sadat-begin-pledge-no-war/9e7226d1-90dc-45cc-a436-3796ef7bb707/. 7. Morris, Righteous Victims, pp. 446–448; Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Negotiations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), pp. 44–53; and Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel and the Peace Process, pp. 26–38. 8. Jehan Sadat, A Woman of Egypt (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 373–375; and U.S. Embassy Cairo to Secretary of State, “Thinking the Unthinkable: Egyptians’ Reaction to Sadat Visit to Israel,” November 16, 1977, record group [RG] 59, doc. 19100 (Washington, D.C.: National Ar- chives [NA], 2009), https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?ridϭ265753&dtϭ2532&dlϭ1629. 9. Ismail Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East (London: American University in Cairo Press, 1983), pp. 277–278. 10. Wright, Stein, and Morris describe it as a “bold gesture,” “grand gesture,” and “bombshell,” respectively. Wright, Thirteen Days, p. 26; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, pp. 228–229, 264–265; and Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 449. 11. The terms “interpretive” and “disciplined-conªgurative” draw from the typology of case stud- ies proposed by Lijphart and Eckstein, respectively. Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec_a_00381 by guest on 01 October 2021 Sadat and the Road to Jerusalem 129 In this article, I also draw attention to a meaningful but understudied type of costly signal, the bold gesture.12 It is a positive sanction that is unprece- dented, irreversible, and noncontingent. Decisionmakers employing such sig- nals initiate conciliation through a single, dramatic act, rather than through repeated overtures, relying less on iteration than on a “leap in the dark” to en- gage rivals.13 Although sending any costly signal involves risks for the initia- tor, or signaler, leaders perceive those with the aforementioned characteristics to be the riskiest. Bold moves can not only lead to favorable outcomes, but can also produce the most undesirable, adverse consequences, resulting in outcomes that may be far worse than the status quo. The severity of the risks associated with bold gestures distinguishes this subset of costly signals from all others. The lack of scholarly interest in this type of signal is puzzling given the fre- quency with which it has been either used or invoked by policymakers. Third parties often call on disputants to “take bold initiatives for peace.”14 States locked in a conºict sometimes appeal to their opponents to undertake such moves as proof of their benign intentions. Despite their use by policymakers, the existent scholarship generally as- sumes that such signals are too risky and, as a result, either are not employed or are rare. The signaling and trust-building literature posits that if decision- makers accommodate their enemies, then they do so through an incremental, or step-by-step, process to reduce their vulnerability.15 Offensive realists cau- Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3 (September 1971), pp. 682– 693, doi.org/10.2307/1955513; and Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 79–137. See also Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 74–76; and Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni- versity Press, 1997), pp. 74–75. 12. Andrew Kydd depicts Sadat’s move as a costly signal but not as constituting an extreme type. Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other,” Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 145–146, doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429336. 13. On a “leap in the dark,” see Nicholas J.