Radical Monotheism and the Trinity Prof. Dr. Christoph Schwöbel , Plankengasse 1, 69117 Heidelberg I. Criticising monotheism Monotheism has in recent years come under increasing dispute. Apart from its purely descriptive use the term cannot be mentioned with- out immediately evoking a number of negative connotations. The criti- cism of monotheism comes from various quarters, ranging from philoso- phy, political science and history to more specifically theological reflec- tion.1 Although motivated by very diverse considerations and offered with the aim of promoting often incompatible interests, one can neverthe- less perceive a certain convergence of respects in which the justifiability of monotheism is called into question. Before considering the implications of this criticism for the theological analysis and evaluation of the concept of monotheism, I shall present some of the aspects of the current critique of monotheism which seem to require special attention. In 1979, the German philosopher Odo Marquard published a paper with the title ‘In Praise of Polytheism’ (‘Lob des Polytheismus’) which draws together some of the characteristic aspects of the philosophical criticism of monotheism and indicates a number of elements that seem to underlie the current love affair of much of contemporary philosophy with polytheism.2 Marquard starts Ϫ inadvertently developing a parallel to the lecture David Lodge’s notorious Professor Maurice Zapp hawks around the small world of the international conference circuit3 Ϫ by raising doubts concerning striptease.4 He means, of course, the myth that myths have to be demythologised in order to reveal the naked truth. Myths, life-structuring stories that adapt the truth to the reality and prac- tice of our lives, are for Marquard anthropologically indispensable: nar- rare necesse est.5 Human beings are story-telling beings. The anthropological necessity to structure our lives by telling stories does not mean that any myth is as good as any other. There are healthy myths and myths that can seriously damage our well being. Marquard’s thesis is that monomythism is dangerous, whereas polymythism is good for you.6 Our present situation is, in his view, dominated by the most 1 For an overview cf. Claude Geffre´/Jean Pierre Jossua (eds.) Concilium (D) 1985. H. 1. 2 Odo Marquard, ‘Lob des Polytheismus. Über Monomythie und Polymythie’, in: Abschied vom Prinzipiellen. Philosophische Studien (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1981) 91Ϫ116. 3 David Lodge, Small World. An Academic Romance (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985) 24 ff. 4 Marquard, ‘Lob des Polytheismus’, 92Ϫ97. 5 Ibid., 95. 6 Cf. Ibid 98. NZSTh, 43. Bd., S. 54Ϫ74 Ą Walter de Gruyter 2001 Radical Monotheism and the Trinity 55 successful monomyth of the modern era: the myth of the inevitable world-historical progress towards freedom, represented by major strands of modern philosophy of history as a progress of revolutionary emancipa- tion. This modern monomyth, which is characterised by centralisation and depluralisation of the many stories in the one history, represents for Marquard the second eclipse of polymythism which was made possible by the first eclipse of polymythism, the dissolution of polytheism through Christian monotheism. Christian monotheism is in Marquard’s view the transcendental (which means here: historical) condition for the possibility of modern monomythism. The one God of Christian salvation history by his very singularity denies the plurality of the gods. He eliminates the many stories of the many gods and replaces them by the one history of the one true God, and by this the world is effectively demythologized.7 When the intellectual developments from Nominalism to the Enlighten- ment undermined the plausibility of Christian monotheism, this vacancy is soon filled by the secular monomyth of history as an inevitably pro- gressive process of emancipation. In Marquard’s view, the end of monotheism also opens up the possi- bility for a demystified polytheism; this has three characteristics: the dis- tribution of power in the political realm, which is celebrated by Marquard as the secular return of the many gods8; the affirmation of the individual that results from the protest against the God of monotheism or the rule of the modern monomyth, which are both interpreted as a radical threat to the possibility of human freedom9; and a new enlight- ened and demystified plurality of life-structuring stories. The second significant form of the criticism of monotheism is the one that was first introduced by Erik Peterson in his treatise Der Mono- 7 ‘Das Ende des Polytheismus ist der Monotheismus; er ist das erste Ende der Polymythie: er ist eine ganz besonders transzendentale Ϫ nämlich historische Ϫ Bedingung der Möglich- keit der Monomythie. Im Monotheismus negiert der eine Gott Ϫ eben durch seine Einzig- keit die vielen Götter. Damit liquidiert er zugleich die vielen Geschichten dieser vielen Götter zugunsten der einzigen Geschichte, die nottut: der Heilsgeschichte; er entmythologi- siert die Welt.’ Ibid., 100. 8 ‘Der moderne- profane, innerweltliche Ϫ Aggregatszustand des Polytheismus ist die poli- tische Gewaltenteilung: sie ist aufgeklärter Ϫ säkularisierter Ϫ Polytheismus.’ Ibid., 107. 9 ‘Das Individuum entsteht gegen den Monotheismus. Solange Ϫ im Polytheismus Ϫ viele Götter mächtig waren, hatte der Einzelne Ϫ wo er nicht durch politische Monopolgewalt bedroht war Ϫ ohne viel Aufhebens seinen Spielraum dadurch, daß er jedem Gott gegen- über immer gerade durch den Dienst für einen anderen entschuldigt und somit temporär unerreichbar sein konnte … Sobald aber Ϫ im Monotheismus Ϫ nur mehr ein einziger Gott regiert mit einem einzigen Heilsplan, muß der Mensch in dessen totalen Dienst treten und total parieren; da muß er sich ausdrücklich als Einzelner konstituieren und sich die Innerlichkeit erschaffen, um hier standzuhalten … Darum hat nicht der Polytheismus den Einzelnen erfunden: er brauchte es nicht, weil noch kein Monotheismus da war, der den Einzelnen extrem bedrohte … Darum konnte erst nachmonotheistisch der Einzelne offen hervortreten und Ϫ unter der Bedingung des säkularisierten Polytheismus der Gewaltentei- lung Ϫ erst modern die wirkliche Freiheit haben, ein Individuum zu sein.’ Ibid., 108. 56 Christoph Schwöbel theismus als politisches Problem in 1935 which has since then become a classic of the critique of political theology.10 In his book, Peterson investi- gated the connection between the development of a cosmological and theological theory of monotheism and the emergence of a political theol- ogy which justified the imperial rule in the Roman empire by exploiting the analogy with the divine monarchia. From its historical sources in Aristotle11 and Philo12, Peterson carefully traces the steps that, in his view, led to the interpretation of monotheism as the basic principle of a political theology. For Peterson it is the doubtful achievement of Eusebius to have developed a political theology that rests on the assumption of a correspondence between theological monotheism and political monar- chy.13 This monotheistic political theology which in Peterson’s view lies at the heart of the Arian controversy comes to an end in the formulation of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity by the Cappadocians.14 Peterson refers to a passage from the Third Theolological Oration by Gregory Nazianzen as the locus classicus of trinitarian critique of a montheistic political theology. Nazianzen writes: ‘The three most ancient opinions concerning God are Anarchia, Polyarchia, and Mon- archia. The first two are the sport of the children of Hellas, and may they continue to be so. For Anarchy is a thing without order; and the Rule of the Many is factious, and thus anar- chical, and thus disorderly. For both these tend to the same thing, namely disorder; and this to dissolution, for disorder is the first step to dissolution. But Monarchy is that which we hold in honour. It is, however, a Monarchy that is not limited to one Person, for it is possible for Unity if at Variance with itself to come into a condition of plurality; but one which made of an equality of Nature and a Union of mind, and an identity of motion, and a convergence of its elements to unity Ϫ a thing which is impossible to the created nature Ϫ so that though numerically distinct there is no severance of essence. Therefore Unity having from all eternity arrived by motion at Duality, found its rest in Trinity. This is what we mean by Father and Son and Holy Ghost.’15 10 Erik Peterson, Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem (Leipzig: Hegner 1935) auch in: Ders. Theologische Traktate (München: Kösel, 1951), now published as Vol. 1 of E. Petersen, Ausgewählte Schriften, ed. by Barabara Nichtweiß (Würzburg: Echter, 1994) 23Ϫ83. 11 The main evidence in Aristotle is the conclusion of Metaphysics book XII with its criticism of the rule of the many (polykoirania): ‘One shall be Lord!’ which expresses Aristotle’s criticism of the pluralism of Speusippos and of Plato’s dualism. Peterson calls that with Werner Jaeger the ‘strict monarchism’ of Aristotle (ibid., 25), although Aristotle does not employ the word monarchia. 12 Philo who explicitly employs the word monarchia extends it from the monarchia of God in Israel to the whole kosmos (cf. De spec. leg.I12Ϫ31). 13 Peterson summarises Eusebius’ teaching in the following way: ‘Die drei Begriffe: Imperium Romanum, Friede und Montheismus, sind also unauflöslich miteinander verknüpft. Aber ein viertes Moment tritt dann noch hinzu: die Monarchie des Römischen Kaisers. Der eine Monarch auf Erden Ϫ und das ist für Euseb nur Konstantin Ϫ korrespondiert dem einen göttlichen Moanarchen im Himmel.’ (Ibid., 51) 14 Ibid., 57. 15 Or. III, 2, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed, by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace 2nd series, Vol. VII, 301. Radical Monotheism and the Trinity 57 The insistence that the divine monarchy as the monarchy of the tri- une God has no analogy in the realm of creation destroyed the theological foundation of the political theology of the Arian court theologians.16 In its original context at the beginning of the NS-regime, Peterson’s treatise was far more than a historical study.