The Charm of Naturalism Author(s): Barry Stroud Source: Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Nov., 1996), pp. 43-55 Published by: American Philosophical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3131038 . Accessed: 31/03/2011 16:43 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=amphilosophical. 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American Philosophical Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. http://www.jstor.org THE CHARMOF NATURALISM BarryStroud, University of California,Berkeley PresidentialAddress delivered before the SeventiethAnnual Pacific Division Meetingof TheAmerican Philosophical Association in Seattle,Washington, April 5, 1996 Iwant to makesome verygeneral observations on whatmany see andapplaud as a broadly"naturalistic" turn in recentphilosophy. There seems littledoubt at firstglance that there is such a thing,at leastjudging from what many now call whatthey are doing. Somethingknown as "epistemologynaturalized" has been withus forsome time. Orat leasta recommendationto that effect was madesome time ago.1 Morerecently we have been encouragedin such enterprisesas "naturalizedsemantics," "naturalizingbelief," and even more generally, "intentionalitynaturalized." And now there is the even moregeneral project (why notgo allthe way?) of "naturalizingthe mind"(the title of a delightfulrecent book)2. I haveeven seen somethingcalled "naturalizing responsibility." And there are no doubtmany other efforts at "naturalization." Is theremore to allthis than just a trendylabel? What, if anything, is behindit? Is it somethingdistinctive, and new? Andif so, is ita goodthing? These questionsare not easy to answer. The idea of "nature,"or "natural" objectsor relations,or modes of investigationthat are "naturalistic,"has been appliedmore widely, at moredifferent times and places, and for moredifferent purposes,than probably any othernotion in the wholehistory of humanthought. The earliest turntowards naturalismthat I have heard of was in the fifthcentury B.C.. Andthey seem to have been happeningevery so oftenever since. Whenwe lookat this most recententhusiasm for what its proponentscall "naturalism,"I think we findthat, whatever they are excitedand optimistic about, itis notnaturalism as such. Withtwo exceptions that I willmention in a moment, I thinkthere is nothingin naturalismalone thatis sufficientlysubstantive to be philosophicallycontroversial. What is usuallyat issue is not whetherto be "naturalistic"or not, but ratherwhat is and whatis not to be includedin one's conceptionof "nature."That is the realquestion, and that is whatleads to deep disagreements.And as faras I can see, thosedisagreements are notthemselves to be settledby what can be recognizedas straightforwardly"naturalistic" means. So one thingthat seems notto have been "naturalized"is naturalism itself. Ifit were, the resulting naturalistic view of the world might be impressively comprehensiveand illuminating, and superior to viewsof otherkinds, but if it had those virtues it would have them on its own merits, not simply because it is an instance of something called "naturalism." "Naturalism"seems to me in this and other respects ratherlike "WorldPeace." Almosteveryone swears allegiance to it,and is willingto marchunder its banner. Butdisputes can stillbreak out about what it is appropriateor acceptableto do in the name of that slogan. And like world peace, once you start specifying concretelyexactly what it involvesand howto achieveit, it becomesincreasingly - PROCEEDINGSAND ADDRESSES OF THEAPA, 70:2 - 43 Presidential Address of the Pacific Division difficultto reachand to sustaina consistentand exclusive "naturalism." There is pressureon the one handto includemore and morewithin your conception of "nature,"so it loses its definitenessand restrictiveness.Or, if the conceptionis keptfixed and restrictive, there is pressureon the otherhand to distortor even to deny the veryphenomena that a naturalisticstudy-and especiallya naturalistic study of humanbeings-is supposed to explain. The source of these two conflictingmovements of thoughtis whatI wantto illustrate. Butthe firstthing to do withnaturalism, as withany philosophicaldoctrine or "ism,"is to ask whatit is against.What does the so-called"naturalistic turn" turn away from,or deny? Herewe have to distinguishtwo aspects of naturalism.There is naturalismas a view of what is so, or the way thingsare, or whatthere is in the world. Andthere is naturalismas a way of studying or investigatingwhat is so in the world. A naturalisticstudy of humanbeings wouldstudy and understoodthem in relationto the rest of nature. Obviously,what you thinkthe naturalworld is likewill have an effecton howyou investigatethe things in it, and what you think is the best wayto understandthem. Thetwo aspects of naturalismare connected. Underthe firstaspect, as a doctrineabout what is so, or what there is, naturalismsays thatthere is nothing,or thatnothing is so, exceptwhat holds in nature,in the naturalworld. That is notvery informative so far,but even without specifyingit moreprecisely it alreadyseems to excludesome thingsthat many people have apparentlybelieved in. Naturalismon any readingis opposedto supernaturalism.Here we havewhat looks like a substantiveissue, or at any rate somethingcontroversial. Not everyone regards exclusive naturalism as beyond questionor as an unqualifiedgood thing. Thisis the firstof thetwo exceptions I mentioned.By "supernaturalism" I mean the invocationof an agent or forcewhich somehow stands outside the familiar naturalworld and so whose doingscannot be understoodas partof it. Most metaphysical systems of the past included some such agent. A naturalistic conception of the worldwould be opposed to all of them. Supernaturalismas a doctrineabout what is so can have consequences for the study of humanbeings-in particular,how they believe and come to knowthings. In epistemology there have been many supernaturalists.Descartes thoughtthat humanknowledge cannot be accountedfor without a benevolent,omniscient, and omnipotentGod who guarantees the truthof what human beings clearly and distinctlyperceive to be true. For Berkeley,God's agency is the only active force there is in the worldof things we perceive and know about. Withouthim there would be nothingfor us to know. Even Lockerelied on a benevolent agent as the ultimatesource of those cognitivefaculties which are all that humanbeings need to get along in the worldthey findthemselves in. These are not fullynaturalistic accounts of human knowledge. They appeal to something beyond the natural world. Ingoing againstthis supernaturalconsensus, Humeis almostalone among the greats. His credentials as a fully naturalized-or at least as a non- supernaturalized-metaphysicianand epistemologistare impeccable. The same 44 - PROCEEDINGSAND ADDRESSES OF THEAPA, 70:2 Presidential Address of the Pacific Division is probablytrue of JohnStuart Mill, if he countsas one of the greats. Butthere have not been many. Inthe sense inwhich naturalism is opposedto supernaturalism,there has been no recent naturalisticturn in philosophy. Mostphilosophers for at least one hundredyears have been naturalistsin the non-supernaturalistsense. Theyhave taken it for grantedthat any satisfactoryaccount of how humanbelief and knowledgein generalare possiblewill involve only processes and events of the intelligiblenatural world, withoutthe interventionor reassurance of any supernaturalagent. Manypeople regard that as on the wholea good thing. But it is nothingnew. In fact, the long-standingnaturalistic consensus is beingchallenged more directlynow, when the virtuesof naturalismare beingso loudlyproclaimed, than itwas duringthe longperiod when they went more or less withoutsaying. Alvin Plantinga,for example, argues that no satisfactorygeneral explanation of human knowledgecan be given on a naturalisticbasis. He thinksthat justification or warrant,which is essentialto knowledge,can be understoodonly in termsof the properfunction of humancognitive capacities. And that in turn, he thinks,requires a divinedesigner of thosecapacities. Successful epistemology therefore "requires supernaturalism,"3in particular, what he calls"theism."4 He is apparentlynot alone inthat belief. IfPlantinga and his friendsconvince others, there will be a general turnaway from naturalism. That shows thatit is naturalismthat is nowold hat. It is notsomething