NOVEMBER 2012 PHILIPP STRACK – CURRICULUM VITAE Address: University of Bonn, Hausdorff Center for Mathematics, Lennestraße 43, 53113 Bonn, Germany Cell-Phone: +49 176 24797880 • Email: [email protected] • URL: http://www.uni-bonn.de/~pstrack/ Born in Bonn, Germany on March 19th, 1985 • German and Greek citizen • marital status: single CURRENT POSITION Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn, Germany 2008 – present Ph.D. student in Economics supervised by Professor Paul Heidhues Dissertation Title: Five Essays in Economic Theory (submitted July 2012) EDUCATION University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany 2011 – present Ph.D student in Mathematics supervised by Professor Stefan Ankirchner Yale University, New Haven, USA 2010 – 2011 Visiting Assistant in Research Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn, Germany 2008 – present Ph.D. student in Economics supervised by Professor Paul Heidhues Takushoku University, Tokio, Japan Sep. 2008 – 0ct. 2008 Visiting student University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany 2004-2010 Diplom in Mathematics University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany 2004-2009 Diplom in Economics PRIMARY RESEARCH INTERESTS Stochastic and Dynamic Games, Social Learning, Dynamic Mechanism Design, Behavioral Models of Dynamic Decision Making REFERENCES Professor Paul Heidhues Professor Dirk Bergemann European School of Management and Technology Yale University Schlossplatz 1, 10178 Berlin, Germany PO Box 208268, New Haven, CT 06520, USA Phone: +49 30 212 31 1536 Phone: +1 203 432 3592 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Professor Benny Moldovanu Professor Sven Rady University of Bonn University of Bonn Lennéstr. 37, 53113 Bonn, Germany Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany Phone: +49 228 73 63 95 Phone:+49 228 73 62080 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] I/IV NOVEMBER 2012 RESEARCH Dynamic Mechanism Design & Dynamic Revenue Managment 1. „Optimal Stopping with Private Information ” with Thomas Kruse (1. Job Market Paper) (old title: „Inverse Optimal Stopping“) 2. „Efficient Dynamic Allocation with Strategic Arrivals“ with Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu 3. „Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach“ with Dirk Bergemann Game Theory and Dynamic Games 4. „Gambling in Contests“ with Christian Seel in revise and resubmit in the Journal of Economic Theory 5. „Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs“ with Paul Heidhues and Sven Rady 6. „Continuous Time Contests“ with Christian Seel 7. „Equivalence of Stochastic Contests with Poisson Arrivals and All-Pay Auctions“ with Christian Seel and Matthias Lang Behavioral Economics 8. „Until the Bitter End: On Prospect Theory in the Dynamic Context“ with Sebastian Ebert (2. Job Market Paper) Probability Theory with Applications in Game Theory 9. „Skorokhod Embeddings in Bounded Time“ with Stefan Ankirchner published in Stochastics And Dynamics, Volume 11, Issues 2 &3 (2011) pp. 215-226 10. „Skorokhod Embeddings for Diffusions“ with Stefan Ankirchner and David Hobson TEACHING University of Bonn, Department of Economics Oct. 2005– present Teaching Assistant PhD Course Microeconomics Winter 2012 Undergraduate Seminar “Repeated Games” (with Ludwig Straub) Summer 2012 Teaching Assistant Ph.D. Course Microeconomics Winter 2011 Teaching Assistant Undergraduate Gametheory Winter 2009 Research Assistant for Professor Frank Riedel Winter 2006 – Summer 2007 Teaching Assistant Undergraduate Mathematics 1 Winter 2006 Teaching Assistant Undergraduate Mathematics 2 Summer 2006 Teaching Assistant Undergraduate Mathematics 1 Winter 2005 Teaching Assistant Undergraduate Mathematics 2 Summer 2005 MISCELLANEA Languages German (native), English, Greek and Latin Referee Review of Economic Studies, Journal of the European Economic Association, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Economic Inquiry, Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations Honors Scholarship of the German Federal Bank (Stipendiat der Dt. Bundesbank) 2012 Recipient of the first JEEA Excellence in Refereeing Award 2012 Invited to the European Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society 2012 Scholarship of the Bonn Graduate School of Economics PhD Scholarship of the Foundation of German Business (Stiftung der Deutschen Wirtschaft) Scholarship of the Nippon Carl Duisberg Foundation financing a stay at the Takushoku University Scholarship of the Foundation of German Business (Stiftung der Deutschen Wirtschaft) FFF (FördernFordernForschen) scholarship for highly gifted scholars from the University of Bonn II/IV NOVEMBER 2012 INVITED SEMINAR AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS European Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society 2012 Nov.2012 Dynamic Implementability for Optimal Stopping University of Cologne, Dynamic Implementability for Optimal Stopping Oct.2012 INFORMS Annual Meeting 2012, Phoenix, Oct. 2012 Dynamic Revenue Maximization a Continuous Time Approach Yale University, Dynamic Implementability for Optimal Stopping Oct.2012 University of Maastricht, Dynamic Implementability for Optimal Stopping Oct.2012 27th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, Aug.2012 Until the Bitter End: On Prospect Theory in the Dynamic Context Fourth Congress of the Game Theory Society 2012 Istanbul, Continuous Time Contests Jun.2012 Mannheim University, Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs Apr.2012 Berlin Behavioral Economics Workshop, Until the Bitter End: On Prospect Theory in the Dynamic ContextFeb.2012 Microworkshop University of Bonn, How to Sell an Option Jan.2012 International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook University New York, Continuous Time Contests Jul.2011 Yale University, Continuous Time Contests Apr.2011 Yale University, Gambling in Contests Feb.2011 World Congress of the Econometric Society 2010, Shanghai, Gambling in Dynamic Contests Aug.2010 ABSTRACTS OF THREE PAPERS Dynamic Implementability for Optimal Stopping (with Thomas Kruse) Many economic situations are modeled as stopping problems. Examples are optimal market entry, search, and irreversible investment. It is usually assumed that the decision maker observes the relevant information directly. We study which stopping policies are implementable if the decision maker has to elicit the information from a privately informed agent who strategically tries to manipulate his actions. Formally, let X be a time inhomogeneous Markov process and g a function that depends on time and the value of X. We characterize the set of stopping times such that there exists a posted price transfer π that only depends on time and X and makes the stopping time the solution of the optimal stopping problem max τ E [ g ( τ,X τ) +π ( τ ) ] . We derive a monotonicity condition on g such that all cut-off stopping times τ of the form τ =inf {t⩾0: X t⩾b(t)} can be implemented. This generalizes the Spence-Mirrlees (single-crossing) condition from static mechanism design to optimal stopping problems. We give conditions under which the payment π is unique and derive a closed form representation for π based on reflected processes. This representation coincides with the representation of payments derived by Mirrlees in the special case of constant processes. We prove that every socially optimal stopping time is a cut-off stopping time and thus the socially efficient stopping time can always be implemented using posted price mechanisms. We use our results to derive a new purely stochastic representation formula for the value function in optimal stopping problems based on reflected processes. Finally, we apply the model to characterize the set of implementable policies in the context of job search and irreversible investment. Dynamic Allocation and Learning with Waiting and Strategic Arrivals (with Benny Moldovanu and Alex Gershkov) We analyze a trading model where a designer allocates an indivisible object to a stream of randomly arriving, privately informed agents. Agents are long lived, and each agent is privately informed about her value for an object and about her arrival time to the market. The designer learns about future arrivals from past arrivals, while agents strategically choose when to make themselves available for trade. III/IV NOVEMBER 2012 We inquire whether the complete information, efficient policy is implementable via individually rational monetary transfers. This usually requires a non-negative subsidy that is paid irrespective of physical trading. We also identify large and important classes of arrival processes - Markov processes that include learning about a Poisson rate and renewals with a known distribution of inter–arrival times – where the efficient policy can be implemented via winner-pays mechanism. Finally, we also study revenue maximization in this framework Gambling in Contests (with Christian Seel) This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner- take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the highest stopping point wins. Contrary to the explicit cost for a higher stopping time in a war of attrition, here, higher stopping times are riskier, because players can go bankrupt. We derive a closed-form solution of a Nash equilibrium outcome and show uniqueness for the two player case. In equilibrium, the trade-off between risk and reward causes a non-monotonicity: highest expected losses occur if the process decreases only slightly in expectation. IV/IV.