plutonium Cities I For almost 50 years Russia’s so-called plutonium cities, Chelyabinsk-65, Tomsk-7, and Kras- noyarsk-26, played a central role in the Soviet /Russian nuclear weapons pro- gram.’ The end of the nuclear arms race has eliminated their original mission-the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. The cities are now in a critical economic and social situation due to the collapse of defense orders and dramatic changes in Russian society. Like the rest of Russia’s defense industries, the plutonium complex faces difficult decisions about its future. The plutonium complex, however, is different from other Russian industries in that its fate could have a direct and profound effect on international security. The complex will continue to supply limited-life components for Russia’s nuclear weapons and to provide for their reliability, although at a much re- duced level. It will have the principal responsibility for decontamination, decommissioning, and environmental cleanup of the plutonium production facilities. Most important, the plutonium complex, already managing very large amounts of weapons-usable fissile materials, will assume responsibility for approximately 100 tons of plutonium and over 500 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled weapons, by far the largest portion of Rus- sia’s weapon-grade fissile materials outside of nuclear warheads.2 An economic collapse of the plutonium complex would endanger Russia’s capability to secure and eventually dispose of these huge stocks of fissile materials, and undermine the effort to stop an exodus of nuclear weapons expertise and know-how from Russia to countries seeking nuclear weapons. Ole8 Bukharin is n Research Staff Member at Princeton University‘s Center for Energy and Environmental Studies. 1. The new names of the previously nameless cities are Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65), Seversk (Tomsk- 7), and Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26). 2. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) standards, HEU is defined as uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 to greater than 20 percent. Higher levels of enrichment are required to use HEU for fabrication of a practical nuclear explosive device. The critical mass (the bare mass of uncompressed material required to initiate a neutron chain reaction) of 50 percent enriched uranium is a factor of three greater than that of 93.5 percent enriched uranium. Plutonium of any isotopic composition (with the exception of Pu-238) can be used to manufacture a nuclear explosive device. However, weapon designers prefer to use plutonium with high contents of Pu-239. Plutonium containing more than 94 percent Pu-239 is termed “weapons-grade”.The IAEA uses 25 kg U-235 in HEU and 8 kg plutonium as its standards for ”significant quantities” required to make simple explosive devices of the implosive type. International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 126-158 0 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 126 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.21.4.126 by guest on 01 October 2021 The Future of Russia’s Plutonium Cities I 127 Security of weapons-usable plutonium and HEU in Russia remains a grave international security concern. Diversion of even a tiny fraction of Russia’s huge inventories would be a disaster of global proportions. In particular, there is a danger that Russia’s capability to safeguard its huge stocks of weapons- usable HEU and plutonium may be undermined by an economic collapse of its nuclear infrastructure. The complex of approximately 150 research institutes and production facilities, which is managed by the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), is oversized and is not sustainable. This is dangerous because the main threat to nuclear materials in Russia is their theft by impoverished and desperate nuclear workers. Stolen nuclear material would be relatively easy to hide or smuggle across the border. Conventional techniques for detection of fissile materials, based on a combination of non-destructive assay techniques (passive gamma-ray detec- tion and active neutron interrogation), X-ray radiography, and physical search, are likely to be unreliable under field conditions. For example, an HEU war- head component or comparable mass of HEU metal could be successfully shielded from detection inside a sufficiently thick metallic container hidden in a truck or on a merchant ~essel.~Smuggling of stolen nuclear materials through the permeable southern borders of Russia might be a particularly attractive option. Although not a trivial task, fabrication of fissile materials into Nagasaki-type first-generation nuclear explosives is within reach of most rogue states or even technologically advanced terrorist groups. Fabrication of a compact, reliable, and enormously destructive device would be greatly expedited if a bomb- maker succeeded in bribing or coercing a nuclear weapons expert to assist the effort. The making of a nuclear bomb would have no traceable signature. A small explosive device, capable of killing tens of thousands of people, could be mated to a ballistic missile or an aircraft, making it possible for a rogue state to terrorize its neighbors. A nuclear device would be suitable for a clandestine delivery to any place in the world. The results for international security and populations would be truly horrific. Because acquisition of nuclear materials and a bomb-making effort could be difficult, if not impossible, to detect, the 3. A 3-cm thick layer of tungsten shield surrounding an HEU weapon component would not be detectable by practical gamma-ray monitoring means; Steven Fetter et al., ”Detecting Nuclear Warheads,” Science niid Global Securiiy, Vol. 1, No. 34 (1990), pp. 22.5285. Effective shielding against active neutron interrogation would be provided by 20 cm of dense borated polyethylene with a thin cadmium layer between the polyethylene layer and HEU metal. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.21.4.126 by guest on 01 October 2021 International Security 21:4 I 128 international community might be confronted with a nuclear threat with vir- tually no warning. The Russian government and the international community are working cooperatively to strengthen security of fissile materials and to arrange for their disposal. Progress, however, has been slow. In part, the problem lies in the differences of approaches, lingering mistrust and secrecy, and bureaucratic inertia. Also, international cooperation plays a critical role in catalyzing the development of safeguards in Russia. It is, however, unrealistic to expect that it will be able to solve the nuclear security problem. Because of the size of Russia’s nuclear complex and its fissile material inventories, outside assistance alone is clearly insufficient, and nuclear security will remain inadequate with- out a massive internal investment. Indeed, modern nuclear safeguards are not inexpensive: the US. Department of Energy (DOE) presently spends approxi- mately $590 million per year on safeguards and security in its nuclear weapons ~omplex.~The cost of upgrading nuclear safeguards in Russia to a comparable level is likely to be billions of dollars. In its present state, the Russian nuclear industry is not capable of committing the required resources. The ultimate solution to the nuclear security problem lies in the reconfigu- ration of Russia’s giant nuclear infrastructure and its conversion to productive commercial activities. Such an effort is critical for assuring security of nuclear materials in the near term. It would help to stabilize the nuclear industry and would create a prospect for future economic development, thereby improving morale of the nuclear workers and reducing the temptation to steal nuclear materials. Reconfiguration of the complex would help to consolidate nuclear activities at fewer sites, thereby greatly reducing the scope of the problem. Integration of the Russian nuclear industry into the world economy would increase transparency of the Russian nuclear complex and speed up nuclear security cooperation with the West. Longer-term effects of the complex’s re- configuration and defense conversion would be even more significant, for they would create a basis for comprehensive improvements in nuclear safeguards and safe and secure management and disposition of fissile materials. 4. The DOE spends approximately $115 million each year on nuclear material protection, control, and accounting programs. Of this amount, approximately $58 million is spent on physical security and $55 million on material control and accounting. In addition, each year DOE spends approxi- mately $320 million on the guard force, $69 million on personnel security, $46 million on research and development, and $21 million on construction. Discussions with US. safeguards experts, February 1996. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.21.4.126 by guest on 01 October 2021 The Future of Russia‘s Plutonium Cities 1 129 In this article I review and evaluate a range of potential missions and strategies open to the plutonium cities and possible roles that the West could play. First I briefly review the history of and the present critical situation in the plutonium cities. I then examine the defense and non-military core missions of the complex, including stockpile stewardship activities, management and dis- position of excess fissile materials, and decommissioning and environmental cleanup. These tasks will require the