Electoral Competition in Hybrid Regimes: Examining Incumbent and Opposition Behavior in Post-Soviet States Item Type text; Electronic Dissertation Authors Hauser, Megan Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 30/09/2021 10:43:02 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/581276 ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN HYBRID REGIMES: EXAMINING INCUMBENT AND OPPOSITION BEHAVIOR IN POST-SOVIET STATES By Megan Hauser _______________________________ A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY WITH A MAJOR IN POLITCAL SCIENCE In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 2015 Hauser 2 THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Megan Hauser, titled Electoral Competition in Hybrid Regimes: Examining Incumbent and Opposition Behavior in Post-Soviet States, and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. _______________________________________________ Date: August 4, 2015 John P. Willerton _______________________________________________ Date: August 4, 2015 Jennifer Cyr _______________________________________________ Date: August 4, 2015 Paulette Kurzer _______________________________________________ Date: August 4, 2015 William Mishler Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate’s submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College. I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement. _______________________________________________ Date: August 4, 2015 Chair of Dissertation: John P. Willerton Hauser 3 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that an accurate acknowledgement of the source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his or her judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author. SIGNED: Megan Hauser Hauser 4 Table of Contents List of Tables………………………………….……………………………………………...…..5 List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………...……..7 Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………...……8 Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………………………………9 Chapter 2: Theory and Hypotheses……………………………………………………......….18 Chapter 3: Research Design and Case Selection…………………………………...…………60 Chapter 4: Quantitative Investigation of Voter Persuasion Strategies of Incumbents and Opposition Parties……………………………………………………………………………....76 Chapter 5: Quantitative Analysis of Incumbent Strategies at Electoral Interference…..…98 Chapter 6: Low and High Incumbent Dominance Amid Low Electoral Contestation: Case Study Comparison of Russia’s 2004 and 2008 Presidential Elections…………….....119 Chapter 7: Medium and High Contestation Amid Low Incumbent Dominance: Case Study Comparison of Ukraine’s 2004 and 2010 Presidential Elections……….…….161 Chapter 8: Conclusion………..…………………………..………………………………...…199 References……………………………………………………………..……………………….215 Hauser 5 List of Tables Table 2.1: High Electoral Contestation………………………………………………………,….38 Table 2.2: Low Electoral Contestation and Low Incumbent Dominance………………….…….42 Table 2.3 Low Electoral Contestation and High Incumbent Dominance………………….....….46 Table 2.4: Complete Theoretical Expectations…………………………………………….....….50 Table 3.1: Case Selection of all post-Soviet States from 1992-present…………………...…..…63 Table 3.2 Electoral Contestation…………………………………………………………........…67 Table 3.3 Incumbent Dominance and Electoral Contestation…………………………….......…72 Table 4.1: Hypotheses Tested…………………………………...…………………………...…..78 Table 4.2: Indicators of Economic Issues…………………………………………………….….78 Table 4.3: Value and Identity Issue Indicators……………………………………………….….82 Table 4.4: Appeals for Democracy, Valence Appeals and Strong State Appeals Indicators…....86 Table 4.5: Interest-Based Appeals ………………………………………………………………87 Table 4.6: Values/ Identity-Based Appeals………………………………………………….…..90 Table 4.7 Valence Issue Appeals…………………………………………………………….…..91 Table 4.8: Democratic Issue Appeals……………………………………………………………93 Table 4.9: Strong State Appeals…………………………………………………………………95 Table 5.1: Hypotheses on Electoral Interference………………………………………………..99 Table 5.2: Coding of Electoral Interference Variables………………………………………….99 Table 5.3: Distribution of Types of State Resource Abuse…………………………………….105 Table 5.4: Abuse of Institutional State Resources……………………………………………...108 Table 5.5: Abuse of Financial Resources………………………………………………………109 Table 5.6: Abuse of Enforcement State Resources…………………………………………….110 Hauser 6 Table 5.7: Abuse of Regulatory State Resources……………………………………………….111 Table 5.8: Abuse of Financial and Regulatory State Resources………………………………..113 Table 5.9: Abuse of Financial, Regulatory, and Enforcement State Resources………………..114 Table 5.10: Abuse of all State Resources…………………………………………..…………..115 Table 6.1: Survey Results on Perceptions of Economy Prior to 2004 Presidential Election…..125 Table 6.2: Survey Results on Perceptions of Putin and the 2004 Election………………….…126 Table 6.3: Economic Perceptions in Russia Prior to 2008 Election……………………………145 Hauser 7 List of Figures Figure 2.1: Relative Importance of Theoretical Factors…………………………………………47 Figure 4.1: Economic Interests Variable Over Time by State……………..…………………….79 Figure 4.2: Value/ Identity Issues Over Time by State………………………………………….83 Figure 5.1: Total Abuse of State Resources……………………………………………………101 Figure 5.2: State Resource Abuse by Type…………………………………………………….102 Figure 5.3: Incumbent Dominance and Total Electoral Interference…………………………..104 Figure 5.4: Electoral Contestation and Total Electoral Interference…………………………...104 Figure 6.1: Percentage of Natural Resource Exports of Russia’s Total GDP 1998-2003…...…123 Figure 6.2: Russian Energy Exports as a Percentage of Total GDP 2003-2007…………..……143 Figure 7.1 Ukrainian Energy Exports as a Percentage of GDP 1998-2004……………….……164 Figure 7.2 Percentage of Ukraine’s GDP from Natural Resource Exports 2003-2010…….…..181 Hauser 8 Abstract This dissertation asks how electoral factors shape incumbent and opposition strategies in non-democratic post-Soviet hybrid regimes. The study of hybrid regimes recognizes that the basic presence of elections does not represent the existence of democracy, and that elected leaders can and do engage in an authoritarian behavior. Given that as many as a third of states worldwide fall into this category, elections in these states are routinely unfair and imbalanced. Incumbent and regime candidates interfere in the electoral process and can attempt to suppress opposition behavior. Yet incumbents also ask for genuine voter support, while opposition parties and candidates also continue to participate in this unfair process. This dissertation seeks to understand the various strategies used by both opposition and incumbent actors given these conditions. While some of these elections are rather predictable, others are highly contested and offer the opposition an opportunity for victory. Incumbent dominance within the state can vary from election to election as well. I analyze the relationship between these two factors, electoral contestation and incumbent dominance, on the electoral strategies of incumbent and opposition actors. These strategies include attempts at overt and legal voter persuasion as well as electoral interference. To do this, in this dissertation I develop a theory that recognizes that the primary goal for any actor during an election may not always be victory. Instead, these goals can vary for opposition and incumbent actors depending on the electoral conditions present. This dissertation examines these relationships in the post-Soviet region using both quantitative statistical analyses as well as case study comparisons. It finds that both incumbent and opposition actors vary their electoral strategies depending on the conditions present during the election, which I argue demonstrates the existence of different goals for elections. Hauser 9 Chapter 1: Introduction In 2013, the city of Moscow, Russia held its first mayoral election in ten years following a decade of filling the position through executive appointment. The return to popular elections was widely seen as a conciliatory move by the Russian government. Massive public outcry and demonstrations followed the 2011 parliamentary elections, which highlighted electoral fraud and popular discontent with the political situation. The 2013 mayoral campaign was primarily a contest between two candidates, the incumbent Sergei Sobyanin and Aleksei Navalny. Sobyanin,