1 110TH CONGRESS "!S. PRT. 2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT 110–34 CHAIN REACTION: AVOIDING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST R E P O R T TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION FEBRUARY 2008 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations Available via World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/ index.html U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 39–674 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:16 Feb 27, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5012 Sfmt 5012 NUCRPT.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DEMINT, South Carolina ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director (II) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:16 Feb 27, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 NUCRPT.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1 CONTENTS Page Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v Executive Summary ................................................................................................. vii Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 Chapter 2: Historical Lessons on Nuclear ‘‘Roll Forward’’ and ‘‘Rollback’’ ......... 4 Chapter 3: Saudi Arabia ......................................................................................... 9 The Worst Case Scenario ................................................................................. 9 Saudi Perceptions of Iran and the Iranian Nuclear Program ...................... 10 The Saudi Nuclear Energy Program ............................................................... 15 Will the Saudi Seek a Nuclear Weapon? ........................................................ 16 Policy Considerations ....................................................................................... 21 Chapter 4: Egypt ...................................................................................................... 25 Egypt’s Nuclear Power Program: Past and Present ...................................... 25 Egypt and Iran ................................................................................................. 27 Egypt and Nuclear Weapons ........................................................................... 28 The Two Wild Cards ......................................................................................... 30 Policy Considerations ....................................................................................... 32 Chapter 5: Turkey ................................................................................................... 35 Major Irritants in the United States-Turkey Relationship ........................... 36 Turkey and NATO ............................................................................................ 39 Turkey and Nuclear Weapons ......................................................................... 40 Policy Considerations ....................................................................................... 41 Appendix 1: Status of Relevant Nuclear Agreements ........................................... 45 Appendix 2: U.S. Non-Immigrant Visas Issued in Saudi Arabia ......................... 46 Appendix 3: U.S. Non-Immigrant Visas Issued to Egyptian, Saudi, and Turk- ish Nationals ........................................................................................................ 47 Appendix 4: Map of the Middle East ..................................................................... 48 Appendix 5: Map of Arabian Peninsula and Vicinity ........................................... 49 (III) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:16 Feb 27, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 NUCRPT.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:16 Feb 27, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 NUCRPT.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1 LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL FEBRUARY 27, 2008. DEAR COLLEAGUES: In July of 2007, I directed my Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member for the Middle East, Bradley Bowman, to undertake an examination of the factors that could motivate states of the Middle East to acquire nuclear weapons. Between July and December 2007, Mr. Bowman conducted re- search and interviewed hundreds of individuals in Washington DC, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. In addition to pursuing the question regard- ing ‘‘nuclear drivers’’ in the Middle East, he also focused specifi- cally on the regional ramifications if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons. The resulting staff report contains policy considerations that rep- resent the independent judgments of the author and do not nec- essarily reflect the views of members of the committee. However, in the wake of the December 2007 NIE and in light of recent an- nouncements by Arab states regarding nuclear energy, the observa- tions and analyses presented here are timely. They are offered as one contribution in the effort to understand Middle East politics and the challenges the U.S. will confront going forward. Sincerely, RICHARD G. LUGAR, Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations. (V) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:16 Feb 27, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 NUCRPT.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:16 Feb 27, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 NUCRPT.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Iran’s nuclear program remains one of the most serious threats to U.S. interests and Middle East peace, despite the December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) conclusion that ‘‘Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003.’’ Iran continues to enrich uranium-the most difficult component of a nuclear weap- ons program-and continues to conduct work that could contribute to nuclear weapons development. As the NIE states, Iran now pos- sesses the ‘‘scientific, technical, and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.’’ Consequently, the NIE judges ‘‘with moderate confidence’’ that Iran will have enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to produce a nuclear weap- on by 2010–2015. Furthermore, because the motivations inspiring the Iranian drive for nuclear weapons remain unaddressed, Iran remains unlikely to fully abandon its long-term drive to obtain a nuclear weapon capability. If in fact Iran halted the other aspects of its nuclear weapons program in 2003, this action almost cer- tainly represents a tactical pause rather than a strategic change of course. In short, Iran now possesses the means as well as the moti- vation to develop nuclear weapons. Consequently, it is entirely pos- sible that the United States could confront a nuclear-armed or nu- clear weapons capable Iran in the next decade. If such an undesirable scenario were to occur in the next decade, despite the international community’s best efforts, the U.S. must not be caught unprepared. U.S. decision-makers must seek to un- derstand the regional dynamics that would accompany an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and be ready to implement policies to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse. An Iranian acqui- sition of a nuclear weapon or a nuclear weapons capability would dramatically shift the balance of power among Iran and its three most powerful neighbors-Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. This shift in the balance of power could spark a regional nuclear arms race as Iran’s neighbors seek to redress the new power imbalance. This raises important questions: How are these three countries cur- rently responding to the Iranian nuclear program? How would Ri- yadh, Cairo, and Ankara respond if Tehran were to cross the nu- clear threshold and acquire nuclear weapons? Would they pursue nuclear weapons of their own? What factors would influence their decisions? What can the U.S. do now and over the coming years to discourage these countries from pursuing a nuclear weapon of their own? Chapters 3, 4, and 5 contain staff’s findings related to these questions. Each chapter touches on the respective country’s rela- tionship with Iran and the United States, identifies the incentives and disincentives that would influence the state’s response to a nu- (vii) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:16 Feb 27, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 NUCRPT.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1 viii clear-armed Iran, and provides policy considerations that would re- duce the chances the state would respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Based on 5 months of research and interviews with hun- dreds of officials and scholars in the United States and seven Mid- dle Eastern countries, this report comes to the following conclu- sions for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey: SAUDI ARABIA (CHAPTER 3) The development of a Saudi nuclear