Policy Briefing Africa Briefing N°90 Dakar/Brussels, 24 September 2012. Translation from French Mali: The Need for Determined and Coordinated International Action indulge in terrorism, jihadism and drug and arms traffick- I. OVERVIEW ing. But the use of force must be preceded by a political and diplomatic effort aiming at separating two different sets In the absence of rapid, firm and coherent decisions at the of issues: those related to communal antagonisms within regional (Economic Community of West African States, Malian society, political and economic governance of the ECOWAS), continental (African Union, AU) and interna- north and religious diversity management; and those re- tional (UN) levels by the end of September, the political, lated to collective security in the Sahel-Sahara region. security, economic and social situation in Mali will dete- Forces of the Malian army and ECOWAS are not capable riorate. All scenarios are still possible, including another of tackling the influx of arms and combatants between military coup and further social unrest in the capital, Libya and northern Mali through southern Algeria and/or which threaten to undermine the transitional institutions northern Niger. Minimal and sustainable security in and create a power vacuum that could allow religious ex- northern Mali cannot be reestablished without the clear tremism and terrorist violence to spread in Mali and be- involvement of Algerian political and military authorities. yond. None of the three actors sharing power – namely interim President Dioncounda Traoré, Prime Minister Following the 26 September high-level meeting on the Cheick Modibo Diarra, and the ex-junta leader, Captain Sahel, expected to take place on the margins of the UN Amadou Sanogo – has sufficient popular legitimacy or General Assembly in New York, Malian actors, their the ability to prevent the aggravation of the crisis. The African and non-African partners and the UN will have to country urgently needs to mobilise the best Malian exper- specify their course of action and clarify minimal objec- tise irrespective of political allegiance rather than engag- tives to be attained by March 2013. ing in power plays that will lead the country to the verge of collapse. The president and the prime minister should: Almost six months after President Amadou Toumani Touré form immediately a small informal group aimed at help- (ATT) was overthrown by a coup and the Malian army ing the government define a global strategy to resolve relinquished control of the three northern administrative the crisis and including Malian personalities who are regions to armed groups – including the Tuareg sepa- preferably retired from the political scene and have ratists of the National Movement for the Liberation of specific skills and significant experience in the areas Azawad (MNLA) and the Islamist fighters of Ansar Dine of internal security, governance and public administra- (Ançar Eddine), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in tion, organisation of elections, decentralisation, inter- West Africa (MUJAO) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Ma- communal mediation and international relations, and ghreb (AQIM) – none of the pillars of the Malian state more specifically in the area of regional diplomacy. has been able to give a clear direction to the political tran- ECOWAS leaders should: sition and formulate a precise and coherent demand for assistance to the international community to regain control recognise the limitations of the organisation in mediat- of the north, which makes up more than two thirds of the ing the crisis and planning a military mission in Mali, territory. The next six months are crucial for the stability and thus work closely with the AU and the UN, which of Mali, the Sahel and the entire West African region, with are better equipped to respond to challenges posed by risks running high and decision-making at all levels lacking a crisis threatening international peace and security. leadership. The UN Security Council and member states represented The messages from Crisis Group’s July 2012 report on at the high-level meeting on the Sahel should provide Mali are still relevant. The principle of a military action support to the Secretary-General to: in the north is not to be ruled out. Indeed, the use of force will most likely be necessary to restore Mali’s territorial appoint a special representative of the Secretary-General integrity and neutralise transnational armed groups that for the Sahel and provide him with the necessary means Mali: The Need for Determined and Coordinated International Action Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°90, 24 September 2012 Page 2 to achieve his mission, which must focus on reconcil- spiring speech on 29 July 2012 have completely disap- ing the positions of ECOWAS member states, regional peared. He has lost ground to the prime minister, Cheick players (Algeria, Mauritania, Niger and Mali) and Modibo Diarra, whose position however seemed very weak Western countries; at the end of July.2 Appointed under the 6 April frame- work agreement, the prime minister held tight to his post boost the UN presence in Mali to help the transitional and to some extent escaped from the control of those who government withstand the economic and social crisis, pushed through his appointment, particularly Burkina Faso, produce a credible roadmap for the restoration of terri- the mediating country chosen by ECOWAS. Despite the torial integrity and the organisation of transparent elec- regional organisation’s wish to see him leave office at the tions as soon as possible, and uphold the rule of law by end of July, Modibo Diarra retained his post and exerted gathering detailed information on human rights viola- considerable influence in the formation of the second tions committed in the south (in particular in Bamako transitional government, a 31-member national unity gov- and Kati) as well as in the north; ernment which is not very different from the previous one. implement, together with the AU and ECOWAS, a mis- Announced on 20 August, it included eighteen ministers 3 sion to facilitate reconciliation within the Malian army in addition to representatives of the main political blocs. to prevent another military coup with unpredictable consequences. The prime minister firmly indicated that he did not intend to resign and that he owed his position to the ECOWAS- Mali’s foreign partners, in particular the European Union negotiated agreement rather than to the interim president. and the U.S., should: He also made clear his intention to impose himself as a key new actor on the political scene.4 The fierce rejection of support efforts to reestablish Malian defence and secu- politicians of the past twenty years by Malian citizens rity forces by enhancing their unity, discipline and ef- disillusioned by the scale of state corruption enables him ficiency so that they can ensure security in the south, to appear as a “new” man in politics after a brilliant inter- represent a credible threat to armed groups in the north national career as a scientist. He also draws support from and participate in operations against terrorist groups; family networks, particularly from his father-in-law, for- mer President General Moussa Traoré.5 Finally, he has an help stabilise the Malian economy and employment alliance of convenience with Islamic associations part of through a rapid resumption of foreign aid so as to pre- the High Islamic Council (Haut Conseil islamique, HCI) vent social unrest, which would only deepen the polit- and prominent religious figures.6 This has generated some ical and humanitarian crisis; unease in Bamako, where many people believe that religious respond favourably to the request for urgent humani- figures are increasingly interfering in politics, as reflected tarian assistance to civilian populations affected by the by the creation of a new religious affairs ministry.7 crisis in Mali and the entire Sahel region, in accordance with what the UN has been advocating for several Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo no longer has an official months without generating the adequate response the title. However, he still represents the army factions that situation requires. are in control of the security apparatus, thus having the capacity for repression. Located approximately 15km from II. A TENUOUS ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN POLITICIANS AND 2 Crisis Group interviews, political actors, diplomats, researchers, SOLDIERS Bamako, 9-15 September 2012. 3 Ibid. 4 Crisis Group interviews, political actors, diplomats, Bamako, 10, 12, 13, 14 September 2012. The interim president Dioncounda Traoré is highly unpop- 5 ular. He merely owes his tenuous position to ECOWAS Crisis Group interviews, diplomats and senior Malian officer, Bamako, 10, 11, 12 September 2012. and his title of constitutional replacement for the deposed 6 1 In addition to the HCI, presided over by Mahmoud Dicko, who president. The hopes generated by his return to the country organised a mass rally in a large stadium in Bamako on 12 August, after prolonged medical treatment in France and his in- where speakers praised the prime minister, the latter has good relations with Cheick Sharif Mohamed Ould Cheicknè Hamala Hamaoula, better known as the “Cherif de Nioro” and a scholar 1 This briefing provides an update to the International Crisis with spiritual authority. Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, 10 Group’s last report on Mali. For a description of political, military and 12 September 2012, Bamako. Also see “Mali: grand mee- and security developments in Mali since the beginning of the re- ting du Haut conseil islamique pour discuter de la crise poli- bellion in the north in January 2012 and a detailed analysis of the tique”, RFI, 12 August 2012. multi-faceted crisis in the country, see Crisis Group Africa Report 7 Crisis Group interviews, Malian political actors, diplomats, N°189, Mali: Avoiding Escalation, 18 July 2012. researchers, Bamako, 10-13 September 2012.