RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA AND JAPAN IN THE ELTSIN ERA, 1991-1997. PhD THESIS NATASHA CLARA KUHRT SCHOOL OF SLAVONIC AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON ProQuest Number: U137781 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest. ProQuest U137781 Published by ProQuest LLC(2015). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. I would first like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council for funding three years of the research for this thesis (award no. R00429534186). It would not have been possible to study for the doctorate without their financial assistance. I would particularly like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Peter J.S. Duncan, for his advice and support over the course of the PhD. My thanks must also go my deputy supervisor. Dr. Martin McCauley for guiding me fnrough the first year of research. In Moscow, I would like to thank Vladimir Matveev of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations for helping me to obtain a visa, but also for his kindness during my stay. My thanks go to Evgenii Bazhanov, deputy director of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for his help in making contacts. Finally, I would like to thank James Everard for his unswerving support, and for ‘keeping the faith’, and also my mother, Amelie Kuhrt, for all her help. ABSTRACT. Taking as its starting point the changes effected under Gorbachev and the impact on Soviet foreign policy of the ‘New Thinking’, this thesis goes on to examine the debates surrounding the direction of Russian foreign policy both within the political elite and in Russian society from 1991 to 1997. Within the context of these debates, the implications are drawn out for Russian relations with China and Japan. The thesis argues that institution-building has had a major impact on Russian policy towards China and Japan, as elites have jostled for influence. Regarding China, it is argued that Beijing was an object of Moscow’s attention much earlier than many analysts have claimed. The orientation towards China was the culmination of a process begun under Gorbachev, but the radical pro-Western orientation of the Russian Foreign Ministry tended to mask this trend. Arms sales have been an important instrument for Russia to maintain its profile in the Asia-Pacific, albeit not helpful to economic integration here. Border demarcation has been a difficult area of relations, but the determination of the two sides not to let it harm wider areas of cooperation has paid off. Areas of tension remain however, and Russia’s future role in the Asia-Pacific could suffer if these are not resolved. Regarding Japan, it is argued that here the initial high expectations of relations were largely due to the influence of a handful of academics and diplomats who favoured the pro-Western geo-economic line. Finally, Russo-Japanese interaction at the global level has been severely handicapped by the territorial dispute. Russia is economically weak but with a politically high profile, while Japan is economically strong, but politically impotent. Both have been trying to gain advantages to make up their deficits in different spheres, but until the global system changes, this situation will persist. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. APR Asia-Pacific Region ARE ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BlOst Bundesinstitut fuer ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien CBM Confidence-Building Measure CDPSP Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press CIS Commonwealth of Independent States DPR Democratic Party of Russia DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service Gaimusho Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs G-7/G-8 Group of Seven/Eight IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency lEWS Institute of East-West Studies IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) IMEMO Institute of World Economy and International Relations JV Joint Venture KEDO Korean Energy Development Organisation KGB Committee for State Security KPRF Communist Party of the Russian Federation LDPR Liberal Democratic Party (Russia) MEiMO Journal of World Economy and International Relations LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. MFEA Ministry of Foreign Economic Affairs (Russia) MITI Ministry for International Trade and Industry (Japan) MGIMO Moscow State Institute of International Relations MID Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation NDR Our Home is Russia ODA Official Development Assistance (Japan) OMRI Open Media Research Institute OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe PEP Partnership for Peace PL A People’s Liberation Army REE Russian Far East REE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty RIIA Royal Institute of International Affairs SVR Foreign Intelligence Service *Note on Transliteration from Russian: I have used the Library of Congress Transliteration System throughout. Thus, El’tsin rather than Yeltsin, Zhirinovskii rather than Zhirinovsky, Ziuganov rather than Zyuganov. CONTENTS Acknowledgements p.2 Abstract p.3 List of Abbreviations p.4 Introduction p.7 Chapter 1 : The Gorbachev Legacy p.19 Chapter 2: Conceptualising Russian Foreign Policy p.35 Under El tsin: Implications for Relations with China And Japan Chapter 3.1 : Russian Policy Towards China. p.71 Bilateral Political, Military and Economic Relations. Chapter 3.2: Russian Policy Towards China. p.104 Redefining the Joint Border. Chapter 3.3: Russian Policy Towards China. p.134 The Broader Context of Russo-Chinese Relations. Chapter 4.1 : Russian Policy Towards Japan. p.161 Bilateral Relations: Hostage to the Territorial Dispute. Chapter 4.2: Russia and Japan: problems of p.231 international cooperation. Conclusion p.250 Map showing the South Kurils p.264 Map showing the Russo-Chinese border p.265 Bibliography. p.266 Introduction, 7 RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA AND JAPAN IN THE ELTSIN ERA, 1991-1997. Introduction. identity crisis. Russia’s relations with China and Japan are important for a range of reasons. Firstly, in geographical terms, these two countries abut Russia’s Far East, which has increased in significance in the 1990s. Secondly, since Gorbachev’s famous speech at Vladivostok in i986, the Asia-Pacific was widely expected to become a new opportunity for the Soviet Union in both economic and political terms. Thirdly, these relations can tell us much about the new Russia’s foreign policy as a whole, as the debates over Russian national identity have tended to crystallise around relations with on the one hand, ‘the East’, and on the other, ‘the West’. What is particularly interesting about relations with China and Japan in terms of the East/West debate is that there are in effect two different ‘Easts’ in operation in the minds of the Russian elite, or at least they have been used to mean different things in different contexts. For some in Russia the East implies the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific - with Japan as the main player. For others it means a chance to reassert Russia’s claim to be a great power, based mainly on its geopolitical position as an Eurasian power: for these China is the power to engage with. Looking at the two powers from the traditional geopolitical perspective, China and Russia together can control both ‘Heartland’ and ‘Rim’’ - both Eurasia and Asia-Pacific, while Japan and the Russian Far East sit on the periphery. When Russian foreign policy players spoke of turning to the East, what was really meant was turning to China and away from Japan. The fact that the intensification of relations with China came when Russia was attempting to define its relationship with the new independent states on its borders provided a unique opportunity to present this as a coherent strategy borne of discontent with Western policies and with Japan in particular, as the Introduction, 8 West’s ‘representative’ in the East. The rimland idea (open regionalism) implies acceptance of shared sovereignty and possibly of Russia as a raw materials supplier, which is not a palatable scenario for most Russians to accept. Chinese notions of a ‘Northeast Asian coprosperity sphere’ or the Japanese idea of a ‘Sea of Japan economic zone’^ have not come to fruition, in part because of latent suspicion among the powers here, but also because of Russian fears of losing control of key resource areas. (This is reflected in the approach to security in the region, which has often continued to rely on bilateral dialogues rather than multilateral security mechanisms. As William F. Tow has pointed out this tends to encourage American unilateralism^, which is resented by Russia and China. Russian proposals for multilateral security mechanisms are not welcomed by any party in the region.) Thus engagement with the Asia-Pacific and therefore with China and Japan has been constrained by internal disputes regarding Russian national identity. As one Russian political scientist has put it: We understand that we are no longer the Soviet Union. We understand that we are not the Russian empire. We understand that we are not western Europe. But who then are we? Until we have developed a new identity we cannot conduct serious, reasonable, logical, consistent policies."^ This thesis is not a history of Russian relations with China and Japan, but an examination of changing Russian perceptions of Northeast Asia in the context of Russia’s changing political landscape. The focus is therefore on political and security issues, rather than economics, although economic aspects are touched upon where relevant.