Louvain Studies 36 (2012) 3-21 doi: 10.2143/LS.36.1.2162447 © 2012 by Louvain Studies, all rights reserved Mirroring Truth A Theological Appropriation of Imagination along with Speculation Joris Geldhof Abstract. — Historically, both philosophers and theologians have mistrusted imag- ination. This article calls this mistrust into question. It is argued that theology – in its constant effort to illuminate truth through understanding – can be served very adequately by utilising the imaginative powers of speculation and the speculative powers of the imagination. In order to support this argument, this article first pre- sents a brief overview of the historical understanding of imagination and specula- tion. Then, the article presents several justifications of theology’s use of speculation and imagination. Next, the theologians Franz Xaver von Baader and Johannes Evangelist von Kuhn are examined in order to support the claim that speculative theology is important in the search for theological truth. Finally, the article explains why and how the imagination can be understood as a speculative faculty and how relying on imagination ‘as’ speculation can be beneficial for theology. And all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord, the Spirit.1 Wie aber können unsere Philosophen und Theologen uns einen klaren Begriff des Bildes Gottes geben, da sie über das Bild (imago) und das Imaginiren zu keinem klaren Verständ- nisse gekommen sind […]?2 In the doctrine of human capacities it is generally taken for granted that reason strongly differs from imagination. Reason is said to guarantee the most reliable and direct access to justified insights, whereas the 1. 2 Cor 3:18. 2. Franz X. von Baader, Vorlesungen über speculative Dogmatik 5, in Sämtliche Werke, Bd. IX, 199: “How can our philosophers and theologians give us a clear notion of God’s image, if they have not acquired a clear conception of the image (imago) and of the act of imagining?” – All translations from German texts in this article are originally mine (J.G.). 995517_Louv_Stud_2012/1_01_Geldhof.indd5517_Louv_Stud_2012/1_01_Geldhof.indd 3 111/07/121/07/12 113:503:50 4 JORIS GELDHOF imagination is often downplayed or dismissed as a bundle of wild fanta- sies, incapable of grounding norms and ideas. Due to its focus on pictures and stories, the imagination would have less epistemic quality; knowledge is by preference only delivered through the intellect. A general mistrust towards the imagination and imaginative thinking has been prevalent in the history of Western theological and philosophical thought, but the time has come to enfeeble the reasons behind the manifold biases against the imagination and to change the basic attitude of suspicion and disdain.3 In this contribution, I not only challenge the traditional mistrust towards the imagination but I also make a case for speculation. More specifically, I argue that the same pejorative bias against the imagination adversely affects the capacity of speculation and speculative thinking and this paper will investigate how these biases are intertwined. In any case, theology and its perennial attempt to lay bare truth through understand- ing can be served very adequately by holding on to the imaginative powers of speculation and the speculative powers of the imagination. To express my ideas on the topic as clearly as possible, I have opted for a fourfold structure. In the first section, I delve into the history of ideas and try to evaluate the common fate of imagination and specula- tion. I also present working definitions of both these capacities and connect these thoughts with the model of a romantic concordant thinking, which I have previously discussed.4 Secondly, I outline several reasons why theology should display a genuine interest in speculation and the imagination. In this context, I will refer to the liturgy as the primary bearer of Christian belief contents. The third part of this contribution then consists in the analysis of the work of two theologians who ardently defended the capacity of speculation and its importance for theology’s search after truth. Both having close relations to what has become known as the Catholic Tübingen School, Franz Xaver von Baader (1765-1842) and Johannes Evangelist von Kuhn (1806-1887) developed an elaborate speculative theology, the reestablishment of which might be most 3. Douglas Hedley, Living Forms of the Imagination (London/New York: T & T Clark, 2008). 4. Joris Geldhof, “Pro Veritate: A Case for a Method of Concordance in Theol- ogy,” New Blackfriars 90 (2009) 303-321; “Ways of Finding Truth: A Proposal for a Method of Concordance in Systematic Theology,” Orthodoxy: Process and Product, ed. Lieven Boeve, Mathijs Lamberigts, Terrence Merrigan, Maarten Wisse, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, 227 (Leuven: Peeters, 2009) 231-256. The basis for this idea was laid in my Revelation, Reason and Reality: Theological Encoun- ters with Jaspers, Schelling and Baader, Studies in Philosophical Theology, 39 (Leuven: Peeters, 2007). 995517_Louv_Stud_2012/1_01_Geldhof.indd5517_Louv_Stud_2012/1_01_Geldhof.indd 4 111/07/121/07/12 113:503:50 MIRRORING TRUTH 5 interesting in light of contemporary theological discussions about truth- finding. In the final section I explain why and how the capacity of the imagination can be reasonably interpreted as a speculative faculty, and why theology’s efforts and purposes can be met very well by relying on it. I. Imagination, Speculation, Concordance, and Romanticism Both the imagination and speculation keep strained relations with reason and the intellect, especially since the emergence of modernity and the paradigmatisation of scientific knowledge. This does not need to be the case, however, at least not according to the theological concordance- epistemology I am developing. The essence of this approach consists in favouring the heart instead of the brain as the basic metaphor for human beings’ cognitive capacities, and hence in an integrative and synthetic view on the variegated ways through which human beings (try to) under- stand reality and give meaning to their lives. It is assumed that people do not only attain justified knowledge through a cooperation between the senses, as the deliverers of rough material, and the intellect, which thereupon first filters and structures this material, and finally judges. Knowledge is not only constituted through formulating justified propo- sitions but also, e.g., through acquiring insights. Much of the material delivered by the senses is elaborated upon by other faculties as well, which are not always the receivers of this material but also the directors and sometimes even the manipulators.5 This being the case, insight into reality, events and states of affairs is also gained through emotions, impressions, desires, actions steered by the will, imag- ination, and speculation. If reason is to keep its central and decisive role in the acquisition of knowledge, its scope and function must certainly be enlarged since the cognitive mind is much more than a mere mechan- ical, sense-data-processing unit. It is as this juncture that the imagination and speculation are endowed with a mission. Stated negatively, they should prohibit reason to limit itself to scientific standards or to reduce itself to a controlling mechanism. Put positively, speculation and the imagination should inspire, motivate, enthuse, and at times liberate the human mind, so that 5. What I am suggesting here is that the basic opposition between ‘action’ and ‘passion’ does not completely fit to define the role of, respectively, reason and the senses in the process of acquiring knowledge – although the majority of modern epistemologies seems to presuppose this. 995517_Louv_Stud_2012/1_01_Geldhof.indd5517_Louv_Stud_2012/1_01_Geldhof.indd 5 111/07/121/07/12 113:503:50 6 JORIS GELDHOF it is ceaselessly as attentive as possible to whatever it encounters and experiences. In this regard, it is relevant to recall the original meaning of imag- ination and speculation. Both concepts reveal a special relationship with the eye, sight, and ‘visuality’. The imagination, or Einbildung(skraft), operates with images (Bilder) and is sometimes considered as the capac- ity to ‘see’ things absent or inexistent. Although this is not entirely false, a much more prudent definition is appropriate, e.g., “the power of form- ing mental images or other concepts not directly derived from sensation.”6 Speculation, for its part, is derived from the Latin verb speculari, which means ‘to look around’ (like guardsmen do). A speculum, moreover, is a mirror; the German word Spiegel is derived from it. Therefore, on the one hand, speculation has always been associated with a relation between the mirroring and the mirrored. It should come as no surprise, then, that the concept has significantly contributed to the Platonic-Augustinian tradition, for which speculation functioned as the mediating faculty between nature and the supernatural, reality and the world of ideas, the down-here and the beyond, etc. On the other hand, the concept of speculation was also used as the Latin alternative for the Greek term theoria, and by consequence contrasted with praxis. This rather Aristo- telian background clearly yields another connotation to the term, but it steadily confirms the connection with ‘seeing’.7 Much of what has been said above about a method of concordance and about the suggestion that both the faculties of imagination and specu- lation can (and should) play a leading role in further developing the con- ceptual richness of this theological approach is influenced by Romanticism. In the general schemes of the history of thought, Romanticism is consid- ered to be a restorative and emotional reaction against the exaggerations of the Enlightenment, which has been, correspondingly, reduced to a certain kind of rationalism.8 Furthermore, Romanticism is known as an influential 6. A. R. Manser, “Imagination,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.