RADICAL ISLAM IN GAZA Middle East Report N°104 – 29 March 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. SALAFI-JIHADI GROUPS IN GAZA ........................................................................... 5 A. SALAFISM .................................................................................................................................... 5 B. EMERGENCE AND GROWTH .......................................................................................................... 7 C. HAMAS’S SOURING RELATIONS WITH SALAFI-JIHADI GROUPS ..................................................... 8 1. A partnership strained: The case of Jaysh al-Islam ...................................................................... 8 2. Hamas’s Red Lines: Confronting Jund Ansar Allah .................................................................. 11 D. SALAFI-JIHADI GROUPS IN GAZA TODAY ................................................................................... 13 1. Smaller groups ........................................................................................................................... 15 2. The question of Jaljalat .............................................................................................................. 16 3. Foreign membership .................................................................................................................. 18 III. HAMAS’S POLICY OF CONTAINMENT .................................................................. 19 A. THE RADICAL ISLAMISTS WITHIN .............................................................................................. 19 B. INVESTIGATING THE SALAFI-JIHADIS ......................................................................................... 20 C. THE IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE ................................................................................................. 22 D. HAMAS’S INTERNAL REVIEW ..................................................................................................... 23 E. PRESSURE ON OTHER FACTIONS ................................................................................................ 24 IV. ISLAMISATION IN GAZA ........................................................................................... 26 A. ISLAMISATION THROUGH GOVERNANCE .................................................................................... 26 B. ISLAMISATION THROUGH VIOLENCE .......................................................................................... 31 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 35 APPENDICES A. MAP OF GAZA STRIP ........................................................................................................................ 38 B. GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................................................... 39 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 40 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2008 ... 41 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 42 Middle East Report N°104 29 March 2011 RADICAL ISLAM IN GAZA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The recent Israel-Hamas escalation returns a spotlight to Allah (Soldiers of God’s Supporters), a newer Salafi- Gaza and the Islamist movement’s relationship with more Jihadi group based in Rafah, denounced Hamas, declared militant organisations. Gaza arouses multiple concerns: does an Islamic Emirate in Palestine, and demanded the impo- Hamas seeks to impose religious law; has its purported sition of Sharia (Islamic law), Hamas brutally confronted Islamisation stimulated growth of Salafi-Jihadi groups; it, resulting in more than two dozen deaths, 100 injuries and will al-Qaeda offshoots find a foothold there? Hamas and the group’s near total elimination. faces competition from more radical Islamist groups, though their numbers are few, organisation poor, achievements Hamas’s policy since then has been one of containment, against Israel so far minor and chances of threatening Gaza’s directed not only at Salafi-Jihadi militants, who are arrested government slight. The significance of Gaza’s Salafi-Jihadis when caught violating the ceasefire it until recently had is less military capability than constraints they impose on been upholding, but also at Hamas members who sympa- Hamas: they are an ideological challenge; they appeal to thise with these groups. Most Salafi-Jihadis in Gaza are members of its military wing, a powerful constituency; young, low-ranking former members of the military wings through attacks within and from Gaza, they threaten secu- of established factions, primarily Hamas and Islamic Jihad rity; by criticising Hamas for not fighting Israel or imple- but also the Popular Resistance Committees and Fatah. menting Sharia, they exert pressure for more militancy and Reasons for their defections vary, but the majority state Islamisation. The policy of isolating Gaza and ignoring that primary among their sources of dissatisfaction with Hamas exacerbates this problem. As the international com- Hamas were its participation in the 2006 legislative elec- munity seeks new ways to address political Islam in the tions, acquiescence to ceasefires with Israel and failure Arab upheaval’s wake, Gaza is not the worst place to start. after taking over Gaza to implement Sharia. In the last few years, Hamas has faced new Islamist chal- The influence of Salafi-Jihadis is not prominent, but nor lengers in Gaza. They are groups of militants, known as is it negligible. They accuse Hamas of laxity in enforcing Salafi-Jihadis, who adhere to a strict interpretation of religious mores, a charge that resonates with many move- Islamic law and see themselves not as liberators of Pal- ment supporters and leads the government to greater de- estine but as part of a global movement of armed fighters termination in applying Islamic law. At the same time, the defending Muslims against non-Muslim enemies, a cate- exigencies of governing, hope of increasing diplomatic gory many of them believe also includes Shiites and Pal- ties and pressure from many Gazans, human rights activ- estinian secularists. Although their current strength is low, ists and Westerners pull in an opposite direction. The result these groups – which are responsible for a sizeable propor- has been a zigzagging policy in which Islamising decisions tion of Gaza-based rocket attacks toward Israel – could are announced, at times retracted when citizens object, well trigger an escalation that, as illustrated in the past and on occasion nonetheless enforced. More worrying has week, could have serious consequences for Gaza, Israel been a series of bombings, shootings, burnings and loot- and the region as a whole. ings aimed at targets that appear un-Islamic and for which no suspect has been publicly tried. In many cases, it is Over time, Hamas’s relationship with such militants has still unclear who or what was behind them. Some suspect shifted from cooperation to antagonism. One of Gaza’s Salafi-Jihadi groups, others Hamas’s more militant mem- oldest Salafi-Jihadi groups, Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam), bers, who were thought difficult to reprimand while the participated with Hamas and another faction in the 2006 government faced criticism for imposing a ceasefire – now capture of Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit. In the years since, broken – that had neither convinced Israel to lift its clo- Hamas has cracked down on Jaysh al-Islam and similar sure of Gaza’s borders nor ended the Islamist movement’s groups, acting decisively when it met with anything re- diplomatic isolation. sembling a direct defiance of its governmental authority. In August 2009, when the spiritual leader of Jund Ansar Radical Islam in Gaza Crisis Group Middle East Report N°104, 29 March 2011 Page ii The international community’s policy of snubbing Hamas and isolating Gaza has been misguided from the outset, for reasons Crisis Group long has enumerated. Besides condemning Gazans to a life of scarcity, it has not weak- ened the Islamist movement, loosened its grip over Gaza, bolstered Fatah or advanced the peace process. To that, one must add the assist provided to Salafi-Jihadis, who benefit from both Gaza’s lack of exposure to the outside world and the apparent futility of Hamas’s strategy of seeking greater engagement with the international com- munity, restraining – until recently – attacks against Israel and limiting Islamising policies advocated by more zeal- ous leaders. There is no guarantee that engaging Hamas politically and normalising the situation in Gaza would lead the Islamist movement to greater pragmatism or di- minish the appeal of more radical alternatives. But it is worth the try. President Mubarak’s ouster likely will be followed by a revision of Egypt’s approach toward Gaza – notably a significant loosening of the border closure and improved relations with Hamas. This would appear to be the natural consequence of the eventual election of a more represen- tative, accountable government that better reflects the views of a citizenry