Congressional investigations document China’s massive acquisition of US technology. The China Problem n 1992, US intelligence agencies has detailed years of systematic PRC started to become concerned spying, outraging many members about China’s designs for its of Congress. It might well have an next-generation nuclear weap- impact on the relationship between ons. A series of explosions Washington and Beijing for years I monitored by the West suggested to come. that the People’s Republic of That US companies, through their China was working on smaller, own laxity or greed, may have speed- lighter thermonuclear warheads, with ed the loss of secrets is faint comfort an increased yield-to-weight ratio. to Washington. China has obtained US officials did not think Chinese everything from US nuclear data to science was advanced enough to crucial help in missile upgrades and produce such sophisticated weapons US computers and machine tools far on its own. They suspected something more powerful than domestic Chinese else—that the PRC had stolen US models. nuclear secrets. Many of the details alluded to in Three years later the US received the House report remain classified apparent confirmation of such thefts and beyond public view. In general, from the Chinese themselves. An however, purloined US technology unsolicited Chinese individual—a and data could allow the Chinese to “walk-in,” in the argot of espionage— produce state-of-the-art nuclear weap- turned a pile of PRC documents over ons, upgrade their combat aircraft and to the CIA. Among them was a paper submarines, conduct more extensive stamped “secret” which contained and effective anti-submarine warfare, design information on perhaps the equalize battlefields via information most advanced warhead in the US warfare, and improve their command- arsenal, the Trident II’s W88. and-control capabilities, according to Since then, the CIA has come to the Congressional study. believe that the walk-in was a plant, “The PRC seeks foreign military someone who in fact worked for PRC technology as part of its efforts to intelligence. The US conclusion is place the PRC at the forefront of na- that China, for some reason known tions,” concludes the House Select only to its own top officials, had de- Committee on US National Security By Peter Grier cided to flash a glimpse of its stolen and Military/Commercial Concerns knowledge in front of US eyes. If with the People’s Republic of China that is the case, it could turn out to report—more simply called the Cox have been a colossal misjudgment. report. “The PRC’s long-run geopo- The recent report of a special House litical goals include incorporating panel, chaired by Rep. Christopher Taiwan into the PRC and becoming Cox (R–Calif.), on Chinese espionage the primary power in Asia.” 70 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 1999 Use of Western military technol- The report alleges that, at one re- China has focused espionage ac- ogy obtained under questionable cent international arms exhibit, PRC tivities on the relatively open envi- circumstances is not new for China, nationals were seen videotaping every ronment of the US national labs for of course. Its current arsenal of CSS-4 static display and collecting all pos- decades, according to the report of nuclear-tipped ICBMs traces its de- sible brochures. When a contractor the select panel. The penetration sign lineage to the US Titan ICBMs left his booth unattended, Chinese “almost certainly continues today,” of the 1950s, thanks to CSS-4 lead spies stole a display videocassette that claims the study. designer Qian Xuesen, who worked had been playing continual informa- Impetus for the PRC effort came on the Titan program. tion on the US Theater High Altitude following the end of the domestic A Chinese citizen educated in the Area Defense system, a theater mis- chaos of the Cultural Revolution in US during the Japanese occupation sile defense program. 1976, when military planners sat of China, Qian became one of the “Converting the stolen cassette to a back and assessed the state of their world’s top experts on jet propulsion frame-by-frame sequence could yield atomic weapons. PRC warheads of the during World War II. After earning valuable intelligence information to late 1970s were large, multimegaton a PhD at the California Institute of the PRC,” says the select committee devices comparable to US technol- Technology and then working with report. ogy of the 1950s. Officials may have a Cal Tech rocket research group, he Simple purchase of equipment decided that it was time to move to was recruited to join the US mili- plays a part in PRC intelligence more advanced warheads and a new tary’s long-range missile programs. gathering. Chinese front companies generation of ballistic missiles. He received a direct commission to take advantage of US military down- Over the years, the Chinese colonel in the US Army Air Forces sizing to buy surplus high-tech US made major moves on American and began work on what became military goods, including some that national laboratories located at the Titan. However, spy allegations are proscribed from export to all but Los Alamos and Sandia, N.M., dogged Qian, and eventually he lost close allies. Livermore, Cal if., and Oak Ridge, his security clearances. Negotiations Two years ago, the US Customs Tenn. The effort evidently yielded between the US and the PRC resulted Service seized more than $36 million the PRC a trove of stolen secrets. in his return to China in 1955. After in excess military property being The Cox report says the Chinese serving as chief project manager in shipped overseas illegally. Among the obtained classified information all PRC ballistic missile programs, goods bound for the PRC and Hong on every currently deployed US he became head of the government Kong were 37 inertial navigation Intercontinental Ballistic Missile arm responsible for all aeronautics units for F-117 and FB-111 aircraft, and Submarine-Launched Ballistic and missile development research. Patriot missile parts, 500 electron Missile. Details remain classified, tubes used in the F-14 fighter, and but the study says the warheads on Theft and Diversion 26,000 encryption devices. which the PRC obtained informa- Today, China uses what US intel- Military goods that find their way tion include the W56 warhead for ligence calls a “mosaic” approach to the PRC can be reverse-engineered, the Minuteman II; the W62 for the to the collection of technical data, or copied, for indigenous models. Minuteman III; the W76 Trident which takes small bits of information Thus the PRC’s C-801 anti-ship cruise C-4 SLBM, the W78 Minuteman III collected by many individuals, then missile is thought to be a copy of Mark 12A ICBM; the W87 Peace- pieces them together in the PRC. the French Exocet anti-ship cruise keeper ICBM; the W88 Trident D-5 Classic spying remains a major missile. The Chinese Z-11 helicopter SLBM; and the W70 Lance short- part of this approach. Witness the is a reverse-engineered French Aero- range ballistic missile. case of Peter Lee, a Taiwanese–born, spatiale AS-350 Ecureuil, according In 1996, US intelligence reported naturalized US citizen who worked to the Cox report. that China had stolen technology for at US national laboratories until Because of the decentralized na- the neutron bomb, which is intended evidence of espionage surfaced. In ture of the Chinese collection effort, to maximize radiation damage while 1997, Lee passed China classified Washington finds it very difficult to reducing heat and blast. Such a US developmental research on very track, according to the report. It adds weapon would be a useful tool if its sensitive detection techniques that that, because of the FBI’s historic possessor wished to wipe out human could be used to threaten previously focus on the Soviet Union during the defenders but occupy the battlefield invulnerable US nuclear subs, alleges decades of the Cold War, the US has following conflict and avoid inflicting the Cox report. In 1985, Lee passed never made monitoring the PRC’s destruction on the area. to China data about the use of lasers acquisition activities a priority. The PRC has also stolen data on to create nuclear explosions on a “There is little or no coordina- weapons design concepts, on weap- miniature scale. tion within the US government of onization features, and on re-entry Mosaic intelligence also takes ad- counterintelligence that is conducted vehicles—the hardened shells which vantage of the relative openness of against the PRC–directed efforts to protect warheads during their plunge US society. PRC nationals attend US acquire sensitive US technology,” back into the atmosphere. universities, host foreign scientific concludes the Cox report. It may have obtained classified delegations, and pump visiting sci- nuclear weapons computer codes. entists for information that is on the Nuclear Weapons Theft of the so-called legacy com- edge of classified. The PRC also gets It is in the area of nuclear weaponry puter codes, such as those used in valuable bits from open forums such that this lack of spy defenses may development of the W88 Trident as arms exhibits and computer shows. have hurt the US the most. warhead, would fill in gaps in Chi- AIR FORCE Magazine / August 1999 71 nese knowledge about how advanced For one thing, smaller, more command-and-control installations thermonuclear devices perform when efficient designs could allow the benefit from HPC power. exploded. To successfully produce PRC to deploy missiles tipped with To keep HPCs from being used a W88–like weapon, the PRC may Multiple Independently Targetable for military purposes, the Commerce need dynamic, three-dimensional data Re-entry Vehicle warheads.