This dissertation has been microiilmed exactly as received 68-727 MORRIS, Herman Paul, 1938- A HISTORY OF BRITISH HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE MUNICH CRISIS. The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1967 History, modem University Microfilms, Inc.. Ann Arbor, Michigan Herman Paul Morris 1968 All Rights Reserved THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE A HISTORY OF BRITISH HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE MUNICH CRISIS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY HERMAN PAUL MORRIS Norman, Oklahoma 1967 A HISTORY OF BRITISH HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE MUNICH CRISIS APPROVED BY A ^ /< x /c'Al - DISSERTATION COMMITTEE PREFACE My purpose in this study is to show the development of British historiography of the Munich Crisis of 1938. To accomplish this, I trace British historians, diplomats, journalists, and politicians' interpretations of Munich through successive phases of British history from 1938 to 1965» Emphasis is placed on the forces which have influenced British writing and speech-making on Munich: personal polit­ ical opinions, Britain's social and political structure, Britain's world position, and the British traditions of Munich historiography. I attempt to show that these fac­ tors are different in Britain than in either Europe or Amer­ ica and that British writers' conclusions are largely deter­ mined by such influences. Thus, hopefully I establish the existence of a unique historiography of Munich in Britain. The main body of the study is primarily concerned with two products of this uniqueness; the rise of a revisionary treatment of the origins of the Second World War, and the tendency to see Munich as an historical model for present policy. I first became interested in the British writing on Munich in I963. At that time I did a Master's thesis iii on British foreign policy in the spring of 1938, and part of the background research included a review of the better known British works on Munich. Several things struck my attention. I found that British policy-makers in 1938 did not believe Czechoslovakia important to British se­ curity. Also, they seemed more impressed with the Sudeten Germans' right to self-determination than with Czech claims to democratic solidarity. The point of view of most later British writers seemed exactly the opposite, and I was interested to find out why Britons frequently ignored or seemed unaware of the difference betweeen their own values and those of 1938. Further, I was curious to know why British historians, whom I then considered models of de­ tachment, were still so emotional about Munich. These motives provided the original impetus to study British historiography as a dissertation topic. As my research progressed in 1964-63, American involvement in Viet Nam intensified, and the Johnson Admin­ istration increasingly justified its policy by historical analogies between the present situation in Southeast Asia and Europe at the time of Munich. I had finished my own military service and was too involved with graduate school to have strong feelings about the Government's course of action. I was, however, interested to discover how Amer­ ican leaders had become so sure of the validity of parallels which seemed dubious to me. Also, I knew that British leaders on an earlier occasion, during the Suez Crisis of iv 1956, had had a similar preoccupation. The answer in both cases, I suspected, lay in British writing on Munich, if for no other reason than the sheer volume of British writ­ ing on the subject, which was greater than that of any other nation. I was able to satisfy my own curiosity on these matters, and I hope that I have been able to communicate my findings with clarity. In my attempt to do so, I have had the invaluable direction of Dr. William H. Maehl, Jr. Dr. Maehl gave me kindness, helpful criticism, and en­ couragement at every step in the research and writing of this dissertation. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE................................................. iii CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION................. 1 II. MUNICH TO WAR, THE FIRST PHASE: THE HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE.................... 19 III. MUNICH TO WAR, THE LATER PHASES: OCTOBER 7, 1938-SEPTEMBER 3, 1939.................. 51 October and November 1938 December to March Prague to War IV. WAR TO DUNKIRK: SEPTEMBER 3, 1939- MAY 10, 1940................................ 82 The Apologists for Munich: Carr, Henderson, and Medlicott The Critics of Munich: Dell, Keith, and Nicolson V. DUNKIRK TO THE GENERAL ELECTION; 1940-5...... 114 The Summer and Fall of 1940 The Wartime Pamphlets VI. THE DOMINATION OF THE CONSERVATIVE CRITICS: 1945-61............................ 139 VII. A.J.P. TAYLOR. A MUNICH REVISION AND ITS IMPACT: 1961-65............................. 169 APPENDIX................................................. 205 BIBLIOGRAPHY................................... 211 VI A HISTORY OF BRITISH HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE MUNICH CRISIS CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION British and American statesmen have at various times since 19^5 accepted Munich as an historical model for present policy, and they have made foreign policy decisions on the basis of the supposed lessons of Munich. In the years after the end of the Second World War, British and American lead­ ers determined Western policy towards Soviet Russia partly on the basis of the apparent parallels between Nazi and Soviet actions. Such analogical thinking also influenced British policy in the Middle East in the late 1950's. The present United States Government justifies American intervention in Viet Nam on similar grounds. The common element is aggres­ sion, Secretary of State Dean Rusk has said.^ Critics of the policies so based have rejected the validity of such analogies. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has emphasized the ^Rusk in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "On the Inscruta­ bility of History," Encounter, XXVII (November, I966), 14. 2 dissimilarities between Europe in 1938 and Southeast Asia O in 1967. A. J. P. Taylor once called the seeming resem­ blance of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia "twaddling scraps of history."^ Yet, the reference to even remote parallels seems an inevitable part of twentieth century decision-making. British and American statesmen have repeatedly faced terri­ fying situations for which their personal experience was no guide. Consequently, they have looked to history for direc­ tion in making the unfamiliar somehow familiar. Munich is only the latest historical guide. In 1938 at least one politician and historian judged Munich in terms of his view Ij. of the origins of World War I. Munich has acquired special significance as such an analogue. A British magazine in 1958 complained that British statesmen had a "Munich complex."^ The same charge could be made against American political leaders even before Viet Nam. In 1955 Vice-President Nixon ordered that officials not bring umbrellas to the airport when President Eisenhower returned from the Geneva Conference. The day was rainy, but ^Ibid., 13-4. ^A. J. P. Taylor, "Munich Ten Years After," New Statesman, XXXVI (October 2, 1948), 279. ^Great Britian, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCCXXXIX (1937-38), 31. Referred to hereafter as Pari. Deb. ^(anon.), "The Fallacy of Slogans," Spectator, CCI (October 3, 1958), 424. Nixon did not want anyone to be reminded of the umbrella- carrying Neville Chamberlain coming back from Munich.^ This concern with Munich is not the result of the Agreement's continued importance. The Treaty was signed nearly thirty years ago, on September 30, 1938. Since then we have had World War II and the Cold War. The Great Powers who signed the Treaty--Britain, France, Germany, and Italy--are great no more. The Treaty terms, the cession of Czechoslovakia's German-speaking border districts to Nazi Germany, were thrown over in 19^5 * Rather, the preoccupation rests on a sequence of conclusions about Munich. Historians have looked at Munich solely in terms of its common characteristic with their own experience. They have seen Munich as the confrontation of democracies with totalitarian dictatorships. In effect they have seen Munich as the first event of the modern age. They have concluded that on this occasion Western leaders had a choice of policies and that World War II came from the wrong decision. From these conclusions about Munich, historians and politicians have reasoned that all concessions to dic­ tators are surrenders, which they have called "appeasement," Appeasement always whets the appetites of dictators. Thus appeasement always makes wars. These generalizations have ^Keith Eubank, Munich (Norman: University of Okla­ homa Press, 1963), 298. k been persuasive. They have created for many Britons and Americans a new way of looking at the world. The responsibility for such analogical thinking be­ longs to British writers. During the years 19^5-8 a small group of British Conservative politicians and historians pointed to the parallels between Munich and the present in support of Western resistance to the Soviet Union. Their action involved a choice. These men disliked Munich. They believed that Britain should have resisted Germany in 1938 and that she had the strength to do so successfully. Part of their belief rested on confidence in the Soviet Union as a 1938 ally. However, in 1943-8 the Soviets seemed to aim at conquering the West. In this light some American histor­ ians began to question Soviet sincerity in the Munich crisis. They wrote that perhaps British leaders had been right to mistrust Russia and conciliate Germany in 1938. The British Conservatives, all former critics of the 1938 British Govern­ ment, wanted to resist Russia. At the same time they did not want to admit that they had been wrong about Munich. They resolved their dilemma by keeping their old opinions about Munich and generalizing from them about the present. Their decision was paradoxical in two ways. The Conserva­ tive critics offered a legend about Munich as a guide for British action against the Soviets, but one element of the legend was an earlier Soviet fidelity to Britain.