PHILOSOPHIC ANTHROPOLOGY IN ROUSSEAU AND ELIZABETH MARSHALL THOMAS Nelson Lund, George Mason University School of Law Apples of Gold in Pictures of Silver: Honoring the Work of Leon R. Kass, Yuval Levin, Thomas W. Merrill, and Adam Schulman, eds. (Lexington Books, 2010) George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series 10-52 This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1691237 Philosophic Anthropology in Rousseau and Elizabeth Marshall Thomas Nelson Lund Anyone who knows anything at all about the lives of Leon Kass and Jean- Jacques Rousseau should think instantly of the contrast.1 Th eir writings are as diff erent as their conduct, with clarity and sobriety opposed to self- indulgent excess and infuriating paradoxes. But they can also look like brothers in arms, skeptical about modernity and determined to resist some of its most char- acteristic developments. Th ey also share a philosophic interest in the natu- ral sources and ends of the human soul. Th is essay seeks to throw some light on Rousseau’s search for man “as Nature formed him,”2 through the work of Elizabeth Marshall Th omas, who has presented new evidence of a kind that Rousseau hoped would come to light. Introduction Th e nature of the soul is a matter of such manifest scientifi c interest that Aristotle’s De Anima opens with only a brief explanation of its importance. Aristotle then off ers a pointed warning: “In every way, however, reaching any assured conviction about the soul is one of the most diffi cult undertakings.”3 Th is is followed by a lengthy and intimidating discussion of the methodological 1. For many gory details about Rousseau’s behavior, see his Confessions, which has been usefully and painfully supplemented by Maurice Cranston’s three-volume biography. 2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality [Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes], in Oeuvres Complètes, vol. III, ed. Bernard Gagnebin & Marcel Ray- mond (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1959-1995), 122. All page references to Rousseau are to this edition. Th e translations are my own, but I have borrowed freely from Th e Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, Victor Gourevitch, ed. & trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), and from Th e First and Second Discourses, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964). Th e Gourevitch edition includes references to the pagination in the Pléiade edition. 3. Aristotle, De Anima 402a10-11. 120 Nelson Lund diffi culties posed by the inquiry.4 I will mention only two. It is not immediately apparent whether the soul is divisible or indivisible; nor is it immediately clear how, if at all, the soul is separate from the body. In the course of the meth- odological discussion, Aristotle also warns against focusing exclusively on the human soul. In his own way, Rousseau seeks to begin working us through such diffi cul- ties in the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men. Th e epigraph to this book is a quotation in Latin from Aristotle’s Politics: “What is natural must be viewed not in things that are corrupted but in those things that are well-ordered according to nature.” Th e quotation, taken from a discus- sion of natural and conventional slavery, is immediately preceded in the text of the Politics by the assertion that the soul naturally rules the body in all living things. Th e quotation is immediately followed by Aristotle’s assertion that what is natural in human beings will be clear in people with the best disposition in both body and soul.5 Th e Discourse on Inequality investigates this linkage or analogy between the rulership of human masters and what we might call self-rulership or the soul-body relationship. Rousseau’s method is to trace the coming into being of man and his political relations from their pre-political and even pre-human origins up to modern times. Th e practical importance of this undertaking, according to some of Rousseau’s statements, arises from its political implica- tions. For example: “[S]o long as we do not know natural man, we will wish in vain to fi gure out the Law which he has received or that which best fi ts his constitution.”6 Th ose implications are potentially so radical that the truth or falsity of the underlying analysis becomes a matter of signifi cant political im- portance.7 But even apart from politics, there could hardly be many proposi- tions whose truth or falsity matter more than Rousseau’s claim that “Society no longer off ers to the eyes of the wise man anything but an assemblage of artifi cial men and factitious passions which are the product of all these new [social] re- lationships, and have no true foundation in Nature.”8 4. Ibid., 402a11-403b19. 5. Aristotle, Politics 1254a34-1254b2. 6. Discourse on Inequality, 125. 7. See, e.g., ibid., 180: “[T]he thing to do would have been to begin by clearing the ground and setting aside all the old materials, as Lycurgus did in Sparta, in order aft erwards to erect a good Building.” 8. Ibid., 192. Observations of great apes that have been raised as pets, or like adopted human children, may give us a glimpse of what Rousseau believed he saw. Cf. Anne Russon, Orangutans: Wizards of the Rainforest (Buff alo, New York : Firefl y Books, 2004), 104-12; Jane Goodall, Th rough a Window: My Th irty Years with the Chimpanzees of Gombe (Boston and New York: Houghton Miffl in, 1990), 13; and Notes A and B at the end of this essay. Philosophic Anthropology 121 Th e presentation of Rousseau’s thought in this book is simultaneously daring and cagy.9 An adequate commentary would have to extract the whole of Rousseau’s considered views from his deliberately paradoxical presentation and assess the truth of those views. In this short essay I off er a few tentative comments on a handful of passages. The State of Nature As the full title of the Discourse suggests, and as the context of the epigraph from Aristotle’s Politics confi rms, Rousseau’s focus is on the relation between natural and conventional inequality. Almost at the outset, he defi nes the former as that which “is established by Nature, and which consists in the diff erences in age, health, strength of Bodies, and qualities of Mind, or of Soul.”10 Th is he distinguishes from moral or political inequality, which depends on the consent of men and consists of diff erent privileges that some enjoy, including even the privilege of making themselves obeyed. Rousseau dismisses the possibility that there is some essential correspondence between natural inequalities and dis- parities of political power or wealth.11 Later, however, he asserts that “personal merit” or “personal qualities” are the origin of all the political and moral forms of inequality.12 Th e statements are not logically inconsistent, and their relationship is il- luminated by Rousseau’s account of the state of nature. He emphatically denies that the state of nature should be thought of as a set of circumstances in which people essentially like ourselves once existed without laws or governments. Rather, the state of nature was an articulated period of time during which our ancestors made a transition from life as independent, speechless animals roam- ing in the forests to socialized beings with stable governments and laws. Natural or physical inequalities among individuals would have had little eff ect when in- dividuals had little to do with one another. “[T]here was neither education nor progress, generations multiplied uselessly; and as everyone always started at the 9. In Book IX of the Confessions, Rousseau characterizes the Discourse on Inequality as the place in which he revealed his principles “with the greatest daring, not to say audacity.” Oeuvres Complètes, vol. I, 407. In an unfi nished draft of a response to criticism of the Discourse on the Sci- ences and Arts, written just before he began work on the Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau said that he believed he had discovered great things and set them forth with a “somewhat dangerous frankness,” but that he had also oft en “been at great pains to try to condense into a Sentence, into a line, into one word tossed off as if by chance, the result of a long series of refl ections.” Preface to a Second Letter to Bordes, in Oeuvres Complètes, vol. III, 103, 106. 10. Discourse on Inequality, 131. 11. Ibid., 131-32. 12. Ibid., 189. 122 Nelson Lund same point, Centuries passed in all the crudeness of the fi rst ages, the species had already grown old, and man remained ever a child.”13 Th is original condi- tion is sometimes described in rather disparaging terms, as in this quotation, and sometimes more appealingly. Its crucial feature, however, is that it must have ended through “the fortuitous intervention of a number of foreign causes.”14 By this Rousseau means that changes in the natural environment or migration into new environments led individuals to begin cooperating with one another, per- haps in such activities as hunting for the purpose of self-preservation.15 Rousseau acknowledges, as he must, that such acts of cooperation — and all of the much more elaborate forms and achievements of society that eventually came to be — must be natural in the sense that nature provided our ancestors with the capacity to bring them about.