University of Wollongong Research Online University of Wollongong Thesis Collection University of Wollongong Thesis Collections 2013 The combat effectiveness of Australian and American infantry battalions in Papua in 1942-1943 Bryce Michael Fraser University of Wollongong Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library: [email protected] Faculty of Arts School of History and Politics The combat effectiveness of Australian and American infantry battalions in Papua in 1942-1943 Bryce Michael Fraser, BA. This thesis is presented as the requirement for the Award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Wollongong March 2013 CERTIFICATION I, Bryce Michael Fraser, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Department of History and Politics, University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. The document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution. B M Fraser 25 March 2013 ii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES iv ABBREVIATIONS vii ABSTRACT viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS x Introduction: 1 Chapter 1: Theory and methodology 13 Chapter 2: The campaign and the armies in Papua 53 Chapter 3: Review of literature and sources 75 Chapter 4 : The combat readiness of the battalions in the 14th Brigade 99 Chapter 5: Reinterpreting the site and the narrative of the battle of Ioribaiwa 135 Chapter 6: Ioribaiwa battle analysis 185 Chapter 7: Introduction to the Sanananda road 211 Chapter 8: American and Australian infantry battalions in attacks at the South West Sector on the Sanananda road 249 Chapter 9: Australian Militia and AIF battalions in the attacks at the South West Sector on the Sanananda road. 303 Chapter 10: The Australian 2/7th Cavalry Regiment and the American 1st /163rd Battalion in the area of Huggins roadblock 349 Conclusion: 405 Map Appendix: 434 Bibliography: 465 iii LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES Table 1.1: Factors in fighting power .....................................................................45 Figure 2.1: General map of Papua between Port Moresby and Buna....................56 Table 2.2: Amount of continuous training undertaken by a Militia Battalion 1939-41............................................................................................... 64 Table 4. 1: Table of time taken to achieve combat efficiency (both readiness and effectiveness) in the Middle East in 1940............106 Figure 5.1: Map of Ioribaiwa plotted from an air photo of 3 September 1942.......136 Figure 5.2: HQ 25th Brigade sketch 3 showing relativity of platoon dispositions in 3rd Battalion.....................................................................................144 Figure 5.3: 2010 map of Ioribaiwa area with the 1942 tracks and place names...149 Figure 5.4: The profile of Ioribaiwa ridge south-east of the village......................150 Figure 5.5: Photograph of the knob overlooking Ioribaiwa village.......................151 Figure 5.6: The map provided to Brigadier Eather while being given his orders to take offensive action along the Kokoda Trail..................... 158 Figure 5.7: The 25th Brigade plan to move around Ioribaiwa............................ 162 Figure 5.8: Australian unit locations on Ioribaiwa ridge before the Japanese attacked............................................................. 164 Figure 5.9: The Japanese depiction of the planned attack on Ioribaiwa............. 165 Figure 5.10: 2/16th Battalion sketch map of company locations at Ioribaiwa........169 Figure 5.11: Engineer sketch of Ioribaiwa ridge................................................... 171 Figure 5.12: Sketch by the 2/6th Field Company of area around Ioribaiwa village. 172 Figure 5.13: The Japanese incursion and the Australian counter attacks............. 176 Figure 7.1: Terrain and disposition of Allied forces approaching the Japanese beachhead............................................................................................213 iv Figure 7.2: Indicative layout of the three Japanese perimeters forward of the Sanananda base area..................................................222 Figure 7.3: A rear elevation and plan view of a Japanese bunker.......................224 Figure 7.4: Translation of a Japanese sketch map of installations and strength at the Killerton track junction...........................................................227 Figure 7.5: An American marked map showing the locations along the Sanananda road..................................................................230 Figure 7.6: Sanananda front – last phase 15-22 January 1943.............................239 Figure 8.1: American map showing the left flanking attack by 126th Regiment which created Huggins‟ road block................................................251 Figure 8.2: Sketch of the area at the South West Sector....................................257 Figure 8.3: Location of the white tree at the South West Sector......................269 Figure 8.4: Attack plan of the 30th Brigade on 19 December ...........................279 Figure 9.1: The attack of the 36th Battalion on 21 December ...........................306 Figure 9.2: The attack plan of the 36th Battalion on 26 December ....................311 Figure 9.3: The attack plan of the 36th Battalion on 28 December ....................314 Figure 9.4: The result of the 36th Battalion attack on 28 December ..................315 Figure 9.5: The 2/9th Battalion attack near Kessels ............................................334 Figure 10.1: Map showing the Allied and Japanese perimeters in the vicinity of Huggins roadblock in January 1943 .....................356 Figure 10.2: An enlargement of the area between Huggins and James ................361 Figure 10.3: The regimental plan for the attack on 16 January 1943 ...................390 Figure 11.1: A view of combat effectiveness as a spectrum ................................417 Figures 11.2: How combat effectiveness may increase on the spectrum............................................................................................418 v Figure 11.3: How combat effectiveness may decrease on the spectrum...................418 Figure 11.4: Separate spectra for primary and secondary group cohesion ..............419 Figure 11.5 The quadrants of combat effectiveness ................................................420 Figure 11.6 Details of behaviour of a battalion using the quadrant theory .............421 vi ABBREVIATIONS AIF Australian Imperial Force AWM Australian War Memorial, Canberra CG Commanding General C in C Commander in Chief CO Commanding Officer DCM Distinguished Conduct Medal Div Division GHQ General Headquarters GOC General Officer Commanding HQ Headquarters LMG Light Machine Gun MBE Member [of the Order of the] British Empire MC Military Cross MM Military Medal MMG Medium Machine Gun NARA National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, USA NGF New Guinea Force US United States USMC United States Marine Corps XO Executive Officer vii ABSTRACT The first combat experience of many Australian and American infantry battalions in Papua in 1942-1943 was against the Imperial Japanese Army. It was a contest between recently raised battalions of citizen soldiers and a professional force of two-year conscripts with combat experience. The Allied battalions in Papua were not combat ready when they were first committed. Combat readiness and effectiveness are examined in the three components of Allied infantry in Papua: the Australian Militia, the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) and the American infantry from the US National Guard. Their journey towards combat effectiveness was painful, as they faced superior Japanese fighting power. Training an infantry battalion for combat has been usually assumed to be a process which takes men through recruit and basic infantry training, then collectively trains them in the combat skills of the battalion‟s tactical groups in a generally agreed amount of time: approximately six months. The battalions committed to combat for the first time in Papua had this amount of time yet they were not combat ready. The purpose of the research was to investigate what was lacking in the preparation for combat in Papua, by comparing the performance of inexperienced battalions from the Australian Militia, the AIF and the American Army with combat experienced battalions from the AIF. Four case studies compared two of the three Allied infantry components in the same first combat experience against the same Japanese force on the same terrain in the same time period and weather conditions. The thesis argues that combat effectiveness depended on creating primary groups with fighting spirit suited to close combat in very difficult terrain, but this was neglected. Such primary groups existed where the organisational culture of a battalion fostered cohesive social structures in its primary groups and supported them with a cohesive secondary group. To achieve this before first combat the primary groups must viii rigorously train under their own leaders in physical circumstances which would be suited to the close country conditions encountered in Papua. Although there was time to achieve combat readiness, training at primary group level was neglected. The Papuan campaign offers a rare opportunity. It was a campaign where American and Australian battalions were involved