Catastrophe and the public service: A case study of the government ... Cohen, Steven;Eimicke, William;Horan, Jessica Public Administration Review; Sep 2002; 62, S1; ProQuest pg. 24 Steven Cohen William Eimicke Jessica Horan Columbia University Catastrophe and the Public Service: A Case Study of the Government Response to the Destruction of the World Trade Center The destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 200 " resulted in a rapid response by government to evacuate the area and, in subsequent days, to bring the city back to a sem­ blance of normalcy. This article provides a case study of government action in New York City during and after the World Trade Center catastrophe. What is most striking is the skill and intensity of government's response to the emergency and the hard work, dedication, and bravery of New York City's government officials. This article presents government and public service at its finest, under some of the most difficult conditions one can imagine. Learning from the Unthinkable This article presents a chronology of events subsequent City officials knew the importance of the day ahead. It was to the attack on the World Trade Center and analyzes the primary election day, and for many, September 11 had the role of leadership and standard operating procedures in potential to redefine and transform their political careers. crisis management. It tells the story of the mayor and his By 9:00 a.m., the election had been overshadowed by the team of emergency response advisors and staff. We de­ crash of American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower scribe and assess the role of local elected officials in reas­ of the World Trade Center (Wall Street Journal 2001). suring the city's residents, boosting morale, and prevent­ Minutes later, a second plane, United Airlines Flight 175, ing disorder after the catastrophe. We also provide profiles crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. of the actions of local public servants. New York City was under attack. In less than one hour, the One purpose of this article is to present a positive story of priorities of government officials in New York and across public service and the centrality and importance of govern­ the nation had shifted dramatically~ommand centers and ment leadership in emergency response. The role of private triage centers replaced voting booths, while news organi­ citizens, private firms, and volunteers will be discussed. The zations posted emergency phone numbers rather than voter article also recounts the fiscal impact of the event on New York City's government and the impact of this catastrophe Sleven Cohen is the director of the executive MPA progrom ond the grodu­ ate progrom in Earth Systems Science, Policy and Management at Columbia on resource allocation for government emergency response. University's School of International and Public Affairs. He is the author ofThe Finally, we analyze the lessons learned in the response ac­ Effective Public Manager (1988), coauthor of Environmental Regulation through Strategic Planning (with Sheldon Kamieniecki, 1991), and coouthor tion and conclude with steps to be repeated and avoided in of Total Quality Management in Government (with Ronald Brond, 1993). future emergency response actions. Email: [email protected]. William Eimicke is the director of the Picker Center for Executive Education at Columbia University's School of Internotional and Public Affairs. Cohen and Eimicke are the coauthors of The New Effective Public Manager (1995), The Catastrophe and the Response Tools for Innovators: Creative Strategies for Managing Public Sector Organi­ Described zations (1998), and the Effective Public Manager (3rd edition, 2002). Email: wbe J @columbia.eclu. September 11, 2001 Jessica Horan received her master of public administrotion in 2002 from I, Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs. Email: At 8:00 a.m. on September 11, 200 local New York jph [email protected]. 24 Public Administration Review • September 2002, Vol. 62, Special Issue Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. turnout rates. Most important, partisan politics were put Twin Towers just as the second plane hit at 9:03 a.m. aside in favor of four mutual goals: safety, communica­ (Marzulli 2001). Unable to contact the Emergency Opera­ tion, funding, and recovery for New York City. tions Center, the staff moved to a makeshift command post Like many Americans, New York City mayor Rudolph at 75 Barclay Street to avoid the falling debris. Here, Giuliani's breakfast was interrupted by a telephone call Giuliani, Kerik, and top aides received briefings about the alerting him of a horrible accident at the World Trade unfolding situation and, from that location, managed ini­ Center's North Tower (Seifman 2001). Giuliani quickly tial safety actions and communications. During this time, finished the meal he was sharing with top aide Denny Giuliani conferred with Sheirer, who directed the closure Young, and the two drove downtown from the 50th Street of all nonemergency activity and entrants below 14th Street. restaurant toward City Hall. Within minutes, the mayor's Just as Sheirer attempted to communicate with federal phone rang again, this time alerting him of a plane hitting officials in the Capitol, Kerik tried to coordinate efforts the South Tower of the World Trade Center. Giuliani with NYPD officers throughout the five boroughs. Yet, like changed his route and headed directly to the scene. most offices located in lower Manhattan, access to tele­ As Giuliani raced to the World Trade Center from the phone, cellular, pager, and email communications was spo­ north, Richard Sheirer, director of New York City's Office radic. Nevertheless, Kerik was able to put the department of Emergency Management rushed to the World Trade on "Condition Omega," its highest state of alert (Marzulli Center from the south. Established in 1996 by Mayor 2001). Established in preparation for terrorism threats co­ Giuliani in response to the 1993 World Trade Center at­ inciding with Y2K, Condition Omega "calls for lightning tack, the office acts as a liaison between all city agencies action minutes after any incident, with thousands of New involved in emergency situations (Sandberg 2001). Prior Yorkers being stopped and questioned and entire sections to September 11, Sheirer's responsibilities included con­ of the city being closed off' (Marzulli 1999,6). As Kerik trolling the city's rat population and communicating infor­ coordinated the overall response of the department, offic­ mation to residents about impending snowstorms. ers from the NYPD, fire department, and Port Authority On this day, Sheirer's priority was securing lower Man­ worked methodically to evacuate approximately 25,000 hattan. To this end, he ordered the police department to close people from the World Trade Center complex. all roads below Canal Street, as well as all tunnels and Four minutes after the United flight crashed into the bridges. He also activated the city's Emergency Operations World Trade Center, the first NYPD Emergency Service Center, a $13 million, 50,OOO-square-foot "watch command" Unit arrived on the scene (McPhee and O'Shaughnessy located on the 23rd floor of 7 World Trade Center (Bowles 2001). Carrying rescue harnesses, hand and hydraulic tools, 2001). Housing numerous telecommunications and secu­ ropes, and medical supplies, four teams of five to six Emer­ rity systems, the Emergency Operations Center was expected gency Service Unit workers climbed the North Tower stair­ to serve as the core logistics center for as many as 68 city ways, "administering first aid where necessary." When agencies immediately following the attacks (ArcNews alerted to the South Tower plane crash, two of the Emer­ Online 2002). From here, Sheirer, Mayor Giuliani, and per­ gency Service Unit teams headed for that building, and sonnel from organizations including the New York Police more police arrived on the scene to support the effort. Department (NYPD) and the Federal Emergency Manage­ Machine guns and extra handguns now supplemented medi­ ment Agency could collect and redistribute orders and up­ cal and rescue equipment. dates to both law enforcement and residents. Also climbing the stairs to aid rescue efforts were mem­ When the second plane hit, debris flew into 7 World bers of the Fire Department of New York (FDNY), who ar­ Trade Center, forcing Sheirer to evacuate the Emergency rived on the scene about the same time as the Emergency Operations Center and set up a command center in the lobby Service Unit. They entered the North Tower and immedi­ of the North Tower (Campo-Flores 2001). Sheirer then ately began directing people down the stairwells and out of ordered the Coast Guard to seal New York harbor and asked the building via the former floor-to-ceiling glass walls of the Pentagon to close the city's airspace (Griscom 2001). the mezzanine that had been shot out by a Port Authority Concerned about additional attacks, Sheirer spoke with officer. By this time, Deputy Fire Chief Peter Hayden com­ NYPD brass, which agreed that its helicopter pilots should manded evacuation of the entire World Trade Center area. be prepared to crash their choppers into any other planes Supporting the 500 firefighters in the Twin Towers were attempting to attack the city (CBS News 2002). approximately 200 Port Authority police officers (McPhee Shutting down lower Manhattan facilitated quicker and O'Shaughnessy 2001), many of whom were already in movement of emergency workers and supplies to the "hot the building, as the Port Authority had offices within the zone" (Archibold 2001). Police commissioner Bernard World Trade Center complex (Schwaneberg 2001). Kerik spearheaded the latter effort. Kerik met Giuliani and Supporting the FDNY effort was the department's com­ several top fire department officials near the base of the missioner, Thomas Von Essen.