Clemson University TigerPrints All Dissertations Dissertations August 2020 Making Pandora’s Box: The Politics of Science Funding Grant A. Allard Clemson University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations Recommended Citation Allard, Grant A., "Making Pandora’s Box: The Politics of Science Funding" (2020). All Dissertations. 2662. https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/2662 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MAKING PANDORA’S BOX: THE POLITICS OF SCIENCE FUNDING A Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of Clemson University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy Policy Studies by Grant A. Allard August 2020 Accepted by: R. Andrew Hurley, Committee Chair Chad Navis Gregory Pickett Adam L. Warber ABSTRACT How do politics influence the geographic distribution of science funding? I investigate this question in the context of presidential politics. Science policy scholars endeavor to develop a systems-level understanding—using empirical data and quantitative analysis—of how governments make decisions about science. In the United States, one of the most important decisions that governments make is the allocation of federal funding from agencies such as the National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation to researchers and universities. Science policy scholars typically explain the distribution of science funding through scientists’ or universities’ merit. I challenge these explanations’ assumption that presidential politics does not play a role. I use the theory of presidential particularism to examine the role that presidential politics plays in the distribution of science funding. The allocation of science funding is a form of distributive policy, which is susceptible to various political stakeholders’ targeting funding to important districts. Scholars of the presidency such as Wood (2009), Hudak (2014), and Kriner and Reeves (2015a) have found that presidents also engage in this behavior, which they call presidential particularism. Through quantitative analysis of 22,115 county-year observations spanning the period 1984-2018, across the National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, and the Small Business Innovation Research program, I find evidence suggesting that scientists in electorally-competitive states, counties in Congressional districts that are represented by a Member of the same party as the president, and states that regularly vote Democratic, hold an advantage in receiving more science funding than other scientists. I ii also find evidence that peer review—when agencies make a credible commitment to following its recommendations—is an effective antidote for presidential particularism. I also find that, on average, counties can expect a decrease in the amount of science funding they receive in election years, although more counties will receive funding. Finding evidence for presidential particularism in science indicates that science is subject to what I call the Politics of Science Cycle, in which funding is contingent on its political impact. Science policymakers should re-envision science as a vast ocean—in contrast to the contemporary metaphor of an “endless frontier”—because science is a common-pool resource that must be stewarded by all of its stakeholders—not just governments. My dissertation opens the door for more research into presidential particularism in science, the theory of presidential particularism, and the broader relationship of politics and science. iii DEDICATION To my family and all who have advanced knowledge; and, so that people may continue to experience the simple joy of “finding things out.” iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Writing my dissertation is the culmination of several interwoven networks and life’s happenings. I simply could not have achieved this feat without the support of a great many friends, colleagues, and family. I would like to thank the members of my dissertation advisory committee—R. Andrew Hurley, Chad Navis, Greg Pickett, and Adam L. Warber—for your guidance, wisdom, and willingness to stand by me through thick and thin. Your feedback has been invaluable and your support tireless. In my opinion, our committee is a paragon of doctoral education. I would also like to thank Laura R. Olson, Jeffrey S. Peake, Lori Dickes, Bruce W. Ransom, II, and Carolyn Benson for their support of the Policy Studies Doctoral Program. It is important for me to recognize several mentors whose support started me on this journey. Doug Allison has helped me become an educator who is compassionate and invested in one’s students. Rick Slagle graciously supported my studies when I was a part-time student and full-time employee. Hemant Sharma—my high school goalkeeping coach and political science instructor—showed me that it is equally valuable to dive into the library’s stacks as it is on the football pitch. Lastly, I am eternally grateful to my family for their support, their patience, and their commitment to knowledge. My mother, Suzie Allard, and my aunt, Kitty McClanahan, helped me learn the joy of knowledge from a young age. You both inspired me by living what it means to do good with your Ph.D. My grandfather, Bill Grant, taught me of the importance of following one’s passions. Thank you. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TITLE PAGE .................................................................................................................... i ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... ii DEDICATION ................................................................................................................ iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................... v LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... ix LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... x CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1 II. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................ 24 Science Policy ........................................................................................ 25 How Scholars Have Studied Science Policy .......................................... 31 The Role of Politics in Science .............................................................. 36 The Effects of Federal Funding in Scientific Research ......................... 49 Attempts to Understand the Distribution of Science Funding ............... 54 Understanding the Politics Created by Distributive Policy ................... 57 Importance of the Presidency in Science Policy .................................... 61 Summary and Gap in the Literature ....................................................... 66 III. THEORY .................................................................................................... 70 Applying Presidential Particularism to Science ..................................... 76 Summary ................................................................................................ 88 vi Table of Contents (Continued) Page IV. RESEARCH APPROACH .......................................................................... 91 Response Variables ............................................................................... 95 Explanatory Variables ............................................................................ 98 Control Variables ................................................................................. 104 Summary .............................................................................................. 114 V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS .................................................................... 115 Data Description ................................................................................. 115 Statistical Model Performance ............................................................ 122 Hypothesis 1: Competitive States ....................................................... 125 Hypothesis 2: Competitive States in Election Years ........................... 127 Hypotheses 3 and 4: Partisan Targeting ............................................... 128 Hypothesis 5: Presidents Target Counties Represented in Congress by Co-Partisans ............................ 131 Hypothesis 6: Peer Review as Antidote to Particularism ................... 133 Presidential Particularism in Science Funding .................................... 136 VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ..................................................... 140 Politics of Science Cycle .................................................................... 140 Targeting Electorally Competitive Counties ...................................... 144 Political Parties Matter ........................................................................ 148 Peer Review as Particularism Antidote ............................................... 154 Interpreting Presidential Particularism in Science: A Necessary Evil? ...........................................................................