Philosophy 523/Problems of Philosophy: Epistemology Themes from Boghossian, Christensen and DeRose Princeton University Spring 2009 Wednesdays, 7-9:45(ish), Marx 201 Thomas Kelly 221 1879 Hall [email protected] In this seminar, we will look at a number of central topics in contemporary epistemology. We will approach these topics through the recently published and forthcoming work of three leading figures in the field: Paul Boghossian (NYU), David Christensen (Brown) and Keith DeRose (Yale), each of whom will visit the seminar over the course of the semester. In addition, we will also read some work by their critics (e.g., Williamson, Hawthorne, Harman and Rosen). Specific topics to be addressed include the following: contextualism about knowledge and its rivals; contextualism as a response to the skeptic. Epistemic relativism. Recent debates over ‘epistemic’ conceptions of analyticity and whether the traditional project of accounting for a priori knowledge by appeal to analyticity is viable. Rationality over time (diachronic principles of conservatism, reflection, etc.) and across persons (the epistemic significance of disagreement). All readings listed below will be available on the Princeton blackboard site for the course https://blackboard.princeton.edu/pucourse/PHI523_S2009 under Course Materials>Readings. 1. February 4th. Overview *February 11th. Seminar will not meet this week. (Note: in order to make up for this session, we will have an additional meeting of the seminar on Thursday, 5/7—this is the week after classes officially end.) Part I. Contextualism, Knowledge, and Skepticism (Keith DeRose) 2. February 18th. Contextualism as a Response to the Skeptic 2 *Keith DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem”, Philosophical Review 104 (1995). Available online via JSTOR at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2186011 DeRose, “How Can We Know that We’re Not Brains in Vats?” The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2000) Vol. XXXVIII, Supplement: 121-138. David Lewis, “Scorekeeping in a Language Game”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979): 339-359. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, vol.1. 3. February 25th. The Case for Contextualism (I) *DeRose, chapters 1,2, and 4 of his manuscript The Case for Contextualism. (Some pages to be omitted.) 4. March 4th. The Case for Contextualism (II): Knowledge as the Norm of Assertion. *DeRose, “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context”, chapter 3 of The Case for Contextualism. Timothy Williamson, “Assertion”. Chapter 11 of his Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 238-269. 5. March 11th. Keith DeRose visits the seminar. Additional reading for this session: *DeRose, Chapters 6 and 7 of The Case for Contextualism. John Hawthorne, “Contextualism and the Puzzle”. Chapter 2 of his Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). [Excerpts] March 18th. No Seminar/Spring Break Part II. Relativism in Epistemology; Analyticity and A Priority (Paul Boghossian) 6. March 25th. Epistemic Relativism. *Paul Boghossian, selections from Fear of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 3 Gideon Rosen, “The Case Against Epistemic Relativism” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4.1 (2007): 10-29. Available online at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/episteme/v004/4.1rosen.pdf Crispin Wright, “Fear of Relativism?” forthcoming in Philosophical Studies. John MacFarlane, “Boghossian, Bellarmine, and Bayes”, forthcoming in Philosophical Studies. 7. April 1st. Analyticity (1): The Background *Boghossian, “Analyticity”. In Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Blackwell, 1997): 331-368. Gilbert Harman, Reasoning, Meaning and Mind, pp.119-129, 144-152. 8. April 8th. Analyticity (2): The Boghossian-Williamson Debate *Timothy Williamson, “Epistemological Conceptions of Analyticity”. Chapter 4 of his The Philosophy of Philosophy (Blackwell, 2007). *Boghossian, “Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic”, forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Paul Boghossian visits the seminar. Part III: Rationality Through Time and Across Persons (David Christensen) 9. April 15th. Rationality Through Time. *David Christensen, “Diachronic Coherence vs. Epistemic Impartiality”, Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 349-371. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2693694 Christensen, “Conservatism in Epistemology”, Nous (1994): 69-89. Available online via JSTOR at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215920 10. April 22nd. Disagreement (1). *Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: the Good News” Philosophical Review 116 (2007): 187-217. Available online at 4 http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/2/187.pdf Christensen, “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy”. At http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/faculty/christensen/Compass%20Article.pdf . 11. April 29th. Disagreement (2). *Christensen,“Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-criticism”. At http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/faculty/christensen/Conciliationism.pdf Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence”. Forthcoming in Feldman and Warfield (eds.) Disagreement and in Goldman (ed.) Social Epistemology. [excerpts] 12. May 7th. David Christensen visits the seminar. Further readings for this session: TBA .