AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC STUDIES Published by Macmillan in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies Studies in International Security Hedley Bull: HEDLEY BULL ON ARMS CONTROL James Cable: GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY, 1919-1979 Donald C. Daniel: ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND SUPERPOWER STRATEGIC STABILITY Paul Dibb: THE SOVIET UNION: The Incomplete Superpower Lawrence Freedman: THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (editor): ARMED FORCES AND THE WELFARE SOCIETIES: Challenges in the 1980s Hanns W. Maull: RAW MATERIALS, ENERGY AND WESTERN SECURITY Adam Roberts: NATIONS IN ARMS: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence International Institute for Strategic Studies conference papers Christoph Bertram (editor): NEW CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND EAST-WEST SECURITY PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s THE FUTURE OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE THIRD-WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 1980s DEFENCE AND CONSENSUS: The Domestic Aspects of Western Security Robert O'Neill (editor): THE CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE 1980s NEW TECHNOLOGY AND WESTERN SECURITY POLICY DOCTRINE, THE ALLIANCE AND ARMS CONTROL Barry Buzan AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC STUDIES: Military Technology and International Relations Fram;ois de Rose: EUROPEAN SECURITY AND FRANCE Series Standing Order If you would like to receive future titles in this series as they are published, you can make use of our standing order facility. To place a standing order please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address and the name of the series. Please state with which title you wish to begin your standing order. (If you live outside the UK we may not have the rights for your area, in which case we will forward your order to the publisher concerned.) Standing Order Service, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, RG212XS, England. An Introduction to Strategic Studies Military Technology and International Relations Barry Buzan Senior Lecturer Department of International Studies University of Warwick M in association with the MACMILLAN PALGRAVE MACMILLAN PRESS © International Institute for Strategic Studies 1987 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act 1956 (as amended), or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 7 Ridgmount Street, London WClE 7AE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First published 1987 Published by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world Typeset by Wessex Typesetters (Division of The Eastern Press Ltd) Frome, Somerset British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Buzan, Barry An introduction to strategic studies: military technology and international relations.-(Studies in international security) 1. Security, International I. Title II. International Institute for Strategic Studies III. Series 327.1'16 JX1952 ISBN 978-0-333-36506-9 ISBN 978-1-349-18796-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-18796-6 To Deborah, who wisely doesn't let the grass grow under her feet, and whose partnership happily prevents me from letting it grow too much under mine Contents List of Tables xii List of Abbreviations xiii Foreword XV 1 Introduction: Strategic Studies and International Relations 1 1.1 Strategic Studies and International Relations 2 1.2 The Agenda of Strategic Studies and the Organization of the Book 7 PART I MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY 2 The Revolution in Military Technology 17 2.1 The History of the Revolution 17 2.1.1 Firepower 19 2.1.2 Protection 21 2.1.3 Mobility 22 2.1.4 Communications 24 2.1.5 Intelligence 25 2.2 The Civil Foundations of the Revolution 26 2.3 The General Consequences of the Revolution 29 2.4 The Consequences of the Revolution for Strategic Thinking 31 3 The Global Spread of Military Technology 36 3.1 The Interaction between Spread and Qualitative Advance 36 3.2 The Mechanisms of Spread 39 3.3 The Historical Process of the Spread 42 3.4 The Current Position and the Outlook 47 3.5 The Arms Trade Literature and its Controversies 51 4 The Special Case of Nuclear Proliferation 57 4.1 The Process of Proliferation 57 4.2 Controlling Proliferation 62 vii Vlll Contents PART II STRATEGIC RIVALRY AND MILITARY TECHNOLOGY: THE ARMS DYNAMIC 5 Arms Racing and the Arms Dynamic 69 5.1 Controversies about the Term 'Arms Racing' 69 5.2 The Arms Dynamic: An Alternative Framework for Analysis 72 6 The Action-Reaction Model 76 6.1 The Idiom of Action-Reaction 79 6.2 The Variables of Magnitude, Timing and Awareness in the Action-Reaction Process 83 6.2.1 Magnitude 84 6.2.2 Timing 86 6.2.3 Awareness 89 6.3 Motives 90 7 The Domestic Structure Model 94 7.1 The American Case 95 7.2 How Applicable is the Domestic Structure Model to Other Cases? 103 8 Completing the Picture 105 8.1 The Technological Imperative Model 105 8.2 Relating the Three Models 108 8.2.1 Technological Imperative 108 8.2.2 Action-Reaction 110 8.2.3 Domestic Structure 111 9 Problems in Studying the Arms Dynamic 114 9.1 Working with the Distinction Between Arms Racing and the Maintenance of the Military Status Quo 114 9.1.1 The superpowers: Arms Race or Maintenance of the Military status quo? 116 9.1.2 Conclusion 120 9.2 Problems in Developing a Theory of Arms Racing 121 9.3 The Level of Analysis Problem 125 9.4 Arms Production and the Arms Dynamic 128 9.5 Conclusion 130 Contents IX PART III DETERRENCE 10 Introduction: Deterrence and Defence 135 10.1 Retaliation versus Denial in Deterrence Strategy 135 10.2 Deterrence Theory as a Western Artifact 138 11 The Evolution of Deterrence: Theory and Policy since 1945 143 11.1 The First Wave 143 11.2 The Golden Age 144 11.2.1 The Coming of Bipolarity as the Background to the Golden Age 144 11.2.2 The Central Ideas of Golden Age Theory 147 11.2.3 The Problem of Extended Deterrence 151 11.3 After the Golden Age: a Third Wave? 155 11.3.1 The Relative Gain of Soviet Military Power 155 11.3.2 Changes in Military Technology 159 11.4 The Future of Deterrence 161 12 The Logic of Deterrence 163 12.1 Basic Logic: What Produces Inaction in Opponents? 163 12.2 The Impact of Nuclear Weapons: Is Nuclear Deterrence Easy or Difficult? 167 12.2.1 The 'Easy' School 168 12.2.2 The 'Difficult' School 169 12.2.3 The Policy Implications of 'Easy' versus 'Difficult' 170 12.3 Intervening Variables in Deterrence Logic 172 12.3.1 Polarity 173 12.3.2 Technology 177 12.3.3 Geography 180 12.3.4 The Deterrer's Political Objectives: Core versus Extended Deterrence 182 12.3.5 Political Relations 190 12.3.6 Conclusions on Intervening Variables 192 12.4 Deterrence Logic and Deterrence Policy 193 X Contents 13 The Debates about Deterrence 197 13.1 Deterrence versus Defence 197 13.1.1 The Issue of Ends and Means in Warfighting Strategies for Deterrence 199 13.1.2 Defence as Escape from Deterrence: SDI 203 13.2 The Method of Deterrence Logic: The Assumption of Rationality 204 13.3 Deterrence and Ethics 210 13.3.1 The Ethical Strengths of Deterrence 210 13.3.2 The Ethical Weaknesses of Deterrence 212 13.4 Deterrence and the Arms Dynamic 215 13.5 Conclusions: Deterrence and Foreign Policy 222 PART IV RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY MEANS 14 Military Means as a Security Problem 227 14.1 Military Means as a Problem in Themselves 227 14.2 Disagreements About the Nature and Seriousness of the Problem 229 14.3 Military Versus Political Approaches to the Problem 234 15 Disarmament 237 15.1 The Military Logic 238 15.2 The Economic Logic 243 15.3 The Political Logic 245 16 Arms Control 252 16.1 The Military Logic 256 16.1.1 Reasons for Rivals to Co-operate 256 16.1.2 The Impact of Strategic Doctrine on Arms Control 261 16.1.3 Dilemmas of the Technological Approach 262 16.2 The Economic Logic 270 16.3 The Political Logic 271 17 Non-Provocative Defence 276 17.1 The Military Logic 280 17.2 The Economic Logic 284 17.3 The Political Logic 285 Contents Xl 18 Summary and Conclusions 289 Bibliography 302 Index 320 List of Tables 12.1 The calculation of deterrence logic 166 13.1 Ends and means in military policy 200 14.1 Opinion on military means as a problem 230 Xll List of Abbreviations ABM anti-ballistic missile AD assured destruction ASAT anti-satellite ASW anti-submarine warfare/weapons BMD ballistic missile defence CBM confidence-building measures CBW chemical and biological warfare/weapons CTB comprehensive test ban C3I command, control, communications and intelligence ECM electronic countermeasures ED extended deterrence GCD general and complete disarmament GLCM ground-launched cruise missile GNP gross national product IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies INF intermediate-range nuclear forces LNO limited nuclear options LNW limited nuclear war LoW launch -on-warning LRTNW long-range theatre nuclear weapons MAD mutually assured destruction MIRV multiple, independently manoeuvrable, re-entry vehicle MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NPT Non-proliferation Treaty NTM national technical means PGM precision-guided munitions PNE peaceful nuclear explosion Pu239 plutonium 239 R&D research and development RUSI Royal United Services Institute SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SD strategic defence SDI Strategic Defence Initiative xiii XIV List of Abbreviations SDV strategic delivery vehicle SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile SSBN ballistic missile-carrying nuclear submarine START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks TNW tactical or theatre nuclear weapons U235 uranium 235 U238 uranium 238 Foreword This book is addressed to everyone who wants to understand the contemporary strategic debate in some depth.