Policy Briefing Africa Briefing N°53 Nairobi/Brussels, 19 August 2008 Burundi : Restarting Political Dialogue I. OVERVIEW a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. How- ever, this move will not resolve the crisis in the long term. On the contrary, it illustrates a clear desire to limit Despite progress in implementing a peace agreement all checks on its power, including the media as well as with the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People – human rights and anti-corruption non-governmental National Forces of Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL), the organisations. This authoritarian ambition could lead to last active rebel movement, Burundi is going through a radicalisation of opposition parties which could be a dangerous political crisis which could compromise tempted to look for alliances with the Palipehutu-FNL. the holding of free and fair elections in 2010 and the country’s future stability. The return of rebel leader Participation of the Palipehutu-FNL in future elections Agathon Rwasa to Bujumbura and the 11 June 2008 could lead to a re-introduction of ethnic dimensions to signing of the Magaliesburg agreement are important the political discourse while unity within defence and steps forward in the Burundian peace process. How- security bodies remains fragile and the authority of the ever, FNL disarmament has barely started and the issue fundamental law and Constitutional Court is damaged. of the integration of former rebels into state institu- In this context, lack of an internal political dialogue tions and security forces remains unresolved. In this runs the risk of a premature loss of credibility and context, the absence of dialogue between the govern- legitimacy for these polls, leading to violent clashes dur- ment and the main opposition parties is harmful to the ing the electoral campaign. All parties must promote, in country’s governance. Local political actors and inter- a consensual way, constitutional reforms necessary to national partners of Burundi urgently need to assess the peace process and to set up an adequate frame- these risks and revive the national political dialogue. work for the organisation of free, credible and democ- ratic elections in 2010. The current political deadlock stems from the crisis within the leadership of the National Council for For that purpose, it is essential that Burundi’s regional the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of partners and donors pressure all political parties to: Democracy (CNDD-FDD) in early 2007 and from Resume a constructive internal political dialogue ori- President Nkurunziza’s refusal to conclude a power- ented towards compromise. CNDD-FDD, Frodebu sharing agreement with the leaders of the Front for and Uprona must reach a political agreement on: Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu) and Union for Na- 1) the resolution of conflicts of competence between tional Progress (Uprona). Following Hussein Radjabu’s ministers and vice-ministers; 2) the representation removal from the head of the CNDD-FDD, the party of Frodebu and Uprona within the administration split and the faction loyal to President Nkurunziza lost and in senior civil service and semi-public positions; its majority in the National Assembly. and 3) a minimal program of economic, fiscal and The November 2007 cabinet reshuffle that brought legislative reforms to be launched urgently so as members of Frodebu and Uprona into the government to finally bring peace dividends to the population. failed to provide a lasting solution to the crisis. In the Pressures, intimidation attempts and judiciary harass- National Assembly, tensions between political parties ment against media and civil society must stop and have heightened amid mounting insecurity in the individual and public freedoms must be guaranteed. capital, grenade attacks against opposition members Create a national reflection committee on institu- of parliament (MPs) and continuing recruitment by tional reforms. The committee’s membership should the Palipehutu-FNL. reflect all political sensitivities and ethno-regional realities. It should consider the view of all stake- In early June 2008, the CNDD-FDD pressured the holders as well as national and international experts Constitutional Court to authorise the replacement of to prepare a set of proposals in advance of a possi- 22 dissident MPs with loyal supporters of the party’s ble review of the fundamental law. leadership. The Court ruled favourably on this request on 5 June and the CNDD-FDD and its allies regained Burundi: Restarting Political Dialogue Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°53, 19 August 2008 Page 2 Open political consultations to reach a national con- lysed, while acts of political violence increased and the sensus on the make-up of the Independent National institutional deadlock became a real national crisis. Electoral Commission (CENI), the review of the electoral code and the drafting of a code of good con- duct between political parties and security forces. A. THE CRISIS IN THE CNDD-FDD Create the office of the Ombudsman, as envisioned The removal of Hussein Radjabu from leadership in the Arusha Agreement and the Constitution. The of the CNDD-FDD caused an upheaval in the party. Ombudsman should be led by a Burundian person Thanks to his exclusive network of external contacts2 chosen by consensus and with irreproachable moral and his control of the inner workings of the party,3 authority. The office should gather citizens’ com- Radjabu had been de facto leader of the movement for plaints against government agents and could see five years.4 After the victory in 2005, he became the its mandate expanded to arbitration and securing most powerful politician in Burundi.5 His sudden fall compromises in the case of a political crisis within from favour is explained by internal6 and external the institutions. Open a consultation with Burundi’s international partners and the United Nations on the possibilities of international support for organisation of elections and the presence of international police units, along- 2 An agricultural extension worker by training, Radjabu side local security forces, as well as for the accel- joined Palipehutu-FNL before joining Léonard Nyangoma’s eration of the national intelligence services reform CNDD in 1994. After the war began in the Democratic Re- supported by the United Nations Integrated Office public of Congo (DRC), Radjabu became one of the linch- in Burundi (BINUB). Moreover, Burundi’s financial pins of cooperation between the CNDD-FDD and Joseph partners and guarantors for the peace process could Kabila, president of the DRC. Kigali, Kampala and Pretoria set up a contact group in order to better coordinate also turned to him when seeking contact with the CNDD- international action vis-à-vis the government. FDD. After 2002, Radjabu often visited South Africa where he formed close links with leaders of the African National Congress (ANC), particularly with the South African media- tor Jacob Zuma. Crisis Group interview, a former member of II. MUSCLING THROUGH AN the CNDD-FDD leadership, Bujumbura, April 2008. END TO THE CRISIS 3 Radjabu played a key role in the internal purges of the movement, in 1998, when President Léonard Nyangoma was removed and in 2001, when his successor, Jean-Bosco Nday- The origin of the political deadlock in Burundi stems ikengurukiye was removed. Crisis Group interviews, former from the crisis in the president’s party, the CNDD- FDD leaders, Bujumbura, February 2007. FDD, in early 2007, after the removal of Hussein 4 After the removal of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye in Oc- Radjabu from the presidency of the party and the in- tober 2001, Hussein Radjabu became general secretary of the ability of the political parties represented in the gov- CNDD-FDD and installed Pierre Nkurunziza as president of ernment (particularly the CNDD-FDD, Frodebu, and the movement. He thought he would be able to control Nku- runziza after helping him rise through the ranks of the party. Uprona) to work together in the administration of In 2002-2003, Nkurunziza represented the CNDD-FDD in public affairs. After the CNDD-FDD MPs loyal to negotiations for a ceasefire and the technical forces agree- Radjabu moved into opposition, the president lost ment, but Radjabu took the decisions. Moreover, during his two-thirds majority in the National Assembly and the 2005 campaign, it was Radjabu and not Nkurunziza who was forced to negotiate with the opposition to form a determined the CNDD-FDD’s strategy and led the party to coalition government.1 With the parties finding it im- victory. Crisis Group interview, former member of the possible to reach an agreement, the assembly was para- CNDD-FDD leadership, Bujumbura, February 2008. 5 At the beginning of the five-year term, and against the opin- ion of Nkurunziza who wanted to keep this position, Rad- jabu took over as CNDD-FDD president. Crisis Group 1 Article 129 of the Constitution: “government members are interview, CNDD-FDD members and diplomats, Bujum- drawn from political parties receiving more than five per cent bura, July 2007. of the vote and who want to form part of the government. 6 In April 2006, Mathias Basabose MP, the commissioner These parties have the right to a proportion of the total number responsible for monitoring and evaluation on the CNDD- of ministerial posts, based on the number of seats they occupy FDD’s executive committee, publicly denounced the corrup- in the National Assembly”. In 2005, Uprona and Frodebu ob- tion within the party. He was immediately expelled from the tained one and three ministerial posts respectively. Frodebu movement. In September 2006, the second vice-president, left the government in March 2006 in protest at the removal Alice Nzomukunda resigned in protest at Radjabu’s drift to- of its members from their posts as local administrators, wards authoritarianism. See Africa Report N°120, Burundi: human rights violations and several corruption scandals.