STRATEGIC CYBER DETERRENCE A Thesis Presented to the Faculty Of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy By CHRISTOPHER FITZGERALD WRENN In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy JULY 2012 Dissertation Committee Professor Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Chair Professor Antonia H. Chayes Professor William C. Martel UMI Number: 3539954 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI 3539954 Published by ProQuest LLC (2012). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346 COLONEL CHRISTOPHER F. WRENN (CHRIS) 26 Pearl Street, Medford, MA, 02155 · 325-864-1515 · [email protected] Education Tufts University, the Fletcher School Medford, MA PhD Candidate, 2009–present Pursuing doctoral study in International Relations. Research topic: Deterrence, cyber deterrence Tufts University, the Fletcher School Medford, MA National Defense Fellow, 2006–2007 Pursued a course of study in areas central to United States national security: nuclear proliferation, counterproliferation, terrorism, crisis management, homeland security, and intelligence. Research topic: Global Salafi jihadist insurgency Air University, Air Command and Staff College Montgomery, AL Master of Military Operational Art and Science, June 2000 Completed a course of study with focus on national security and military studies. Partial curriculum: national and international studies; nature of war; joint operations; future capabilities and concepts; intervention, peacekeeping and the U.S. Research topic: United Nations peacekeeping operations in Western Sahara Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government Cambridge, MA Master of Public Administration, June 1995 Completed a course of study in national security, international security, and domestic public policy. Partial curriculum: uses of history in assessing foreign governments; pursuing the national interest; international mediation and conflict resolution; drug control policy. North Carolina State University Raleigh, NC Bachelor of Arts Economics and Business Management, December 1984 Experience Division Chief, Nuclear and Homeland Defense Capabilities Based Planning (2007–2009) Washington, DC Headquarters, United States Air Force Led the development and assessment of Air Force nuclear and homeland defense capabilities, shortfalls, and risk to ensure required U.S. strategic forces were fielded. Conducted quantitative research for the Air Force resulting in an assessment of existing and future force development to help shape the $122B Air Force budget strategy. ii Director of Operations, then Commander 7th Operations Support Squadron (2003–2006) Abilene, TX Led combat operations in the B-1 bomber over Afghanistan. Commanded 242 Airmen in planning and executing operations for a conventional bomber base and an airlift group. Ensured the readiness and combat training of an expeditionary operations center, intelligence unit, mission planning cell, air traffic control facility, combat communications suite, and weather station. Assistant to the Commander, then Deputy Chief, Commander Staff Group (2001–2003) Omaha, NE United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Led staff of eight in formulating courses of action regarding strategy, policy, force structure, arms control, and proliferation. Shaped policy and debate leading to the Presidential decision for USSTRATCOM to develop global strike; missile defense; information operations; and Command and Control capabilities. Commander’s speechwriter and action officer for Operations, Logistics, and Intelligence directorates. Nuclear War Plan Advisor to the Commander USSTRATCOM (2000–2001) Omaha, NE Personal advisor to the Commander on the Nation’s nuclear war plan. Responsible for assisting the Commander in directing the strategic nuclear triad during wartime and exercise operations. Prepared to formulate war plan recommendations for the President. B-1B Navigator, Instructor Navigator, Assistant Flight Commander (1992–1999) Grand Forks, ND and Abilene, TX Held various positions, including supervising the production of seventy-five B-1B navigators yearly and the recurrent training of seventeen permanent team members. As Wing Battlestaff director, deployed 143 troops, 290 tons of cargo, and two B-1B bombers for Operation DESERT FOX. Served as Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and Chemical Weapons Convention officer. United Nations Military Observer (1997–1998) Western Sahara, Africa Participated in UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, an African peacekeeping mission that monitors the cease-fire between Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO forces along a 900-mile front. Located two new mine fields, six unknown water wells, and mapped 243 kilometers of uncharted roads. Discovered and then ensured the protection of thirty-one unknown prehistoric cave painting sites. Instrumental in refining UN High Commission for Refugees plan to repatriate 65,000 refugees. Air Operations Officer, Operation Support Justice IV (1993) Panama City, Panama Served at focal point for all U.S. aerial operations in Central and South America. Responsible for theater-wide counter drug missions, airlift support, search-and- iii rescue missions, and aerial reconnaissance. Coordinated missions involving U.S. Department of Defense, Coast Guard, Customs Service, Drug Enforcement Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and forces from fourteen nations. B-52 Training, Navigator, and Evaluator/Instructor Navigator (1988–1992) Sacramento and Merced, CA; and Shreveport, LA Flew twenty-six combat missions during Operation DESERT STORM. Senior B- 52 navigator on the base; assessed training for 400 aviators. iv Abstract The world has witnessed two cyber wars, the first between Estonia and Russia in 2007 and the second between Georgia and Russia in 2008. In both of these wars, the same problem existed and will continue to proliferate as without imposed costs and/or denied benefits, state and non-state actors will further develop and refine capabilities that have the ability to take advantage of cyber vulnerabilities. The scope of this study is to understand the nature of cyber war and its purpose in order to develop a theory of cyber deterrence. An initial challenge surfaced because of a lack of definitional consistency for terminology in the cyber domain. To address this challenge, I relied upon time-tested Clausewitzian ideals to define cyber war as the continuation of state policy by cyber means. The principal research question focused on developing requirements for cyber deterrence theory that are applicable to cyber war. The requirements that emerged were grounded in preceding deterrence theories and forged from a vulnerability-based assessment of the existing cases of cyber war. I closely analyzed exploited and unexploited vulnerabilities to help inform the requirements for cyber deterrence by denial. This permitted me to reverse engineer what actually occurred to design a theory that may prove more relevant to deterring cyber war in other cases. In the course of the case studies, I learned that cooperation appears to play a larger role in cyber deterrence than earlier forms of deterrence theory. This inspired a theory of cyber deterrence based upon denial, punishment, and cooperation. v Four hypotheses informed by basic deterrence, criminal justice deterrence, and nuclear deterrence theories were rooted in a critical question regarding the cyber domain: How is cyber deterrence possible if attribution, offensive capabilities, defensive capabilities, or cooperative relationships are either missing from or inadequate to deter a malicious actor? The hypotheses, structured on the triadic components of denial, punishment, and cooperation, were tested using the two cases of cyber war. What I discovered in the process of analyzing and evaluating the cases and then synthesizing this with the literature left me with neither a full account of what is possible nor an account of what is not possible. Instead, the analysis indicated the presence of a middle ground where cyber deterrence becomes conditional and/or variable in its effectiveness based on attention or inattention to the triadic components. This means that cyber deterrence requires tailoring for different classes of actors based on their kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. It also means that the elements, which comprise the triadic components, require constant attention because of the rapid pace of technological developments. Because of these developments, capabilities and vulnerabilities constantly expand and contract, which indicates that the effectiveness of cyber deterrence is perhaps more conditional as a function of time than previous deterrence variants. vi Dedication To Andi Wrenn My wife’s sacrifice on this long journey was greater than that of any other. I am forever indebted to her for the love, encouragement, patience, and kindness that she extended without fail for three years – all of which carried me through many difficult days and long nights. vii Acknowledgements I am grateful to many