SPACE and DEFENSE Volume Two Number Three Winter 2009 China, Space, and Strategy Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation by Dean B. Cheng Space and Sino-American Security Relations by Peter L. Hays Engaging China on Space: Implications for Canada by Wade Huntley Strategic Communications with China about Space by Joan Johnson-Freese A Chinese Perspective on China-US Cooperation in Space by Dingli Shen EISENHOWER CENTER FOR SPACE AND DEFENSE STUDIES Space and Defense Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies Volume Two • Number Three • December 2009 Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation 2 Dean Cheng Space and Sino-American Security Relations 18 Peter L. Hays Engaging China on Space: Implications for Canada 41 Wade Huntley Strategic Communications with China about Space 43 Joan Johnson-Freese A Chinese Perspective on China-US Cooperation in Space 64 Dingli Shen The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within Space and Defense are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, the Air Force Academy, the Air Force, the Department of Defense, nor any other agency of the United States Government. Mailing Address Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies HQ USAFA/DFPS 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 6L16 US Air Force Academy, Colorado 80840 Space and Defense, Winter 2009 REFLECTIONS ON SINO-US SPACE COOPERATION DEAN CHENG Introduction room for overlap between levels, just as there may be instances of both bilateral and Since 2006, the US Air Force Academy’s multilateral cooperation for each level. Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies has sponsored an annual workshop Levels of Cooperation examining the strategic impact and implications of China’s space program. This The four levels of cooperation involve a workshop series has blossomed into a Track-II steadily greater level of interaction between process, with participants from the People’s the two sides. At the same time, each Republic of China (PRC), and unofficial US subsequent level of cooperation also entails government presence. greater disclosure, and increasingly involves not only revealing types of data, but also A key focus of many of the discussions during decision-making processes. these workshops has been the prospects for Sino-US cooperation in space. This issue has Sharing data. Most promising may be the gained prominence since the 2007 PRC ASAT possibility of sharing the data derived from test, and the US subsequent 2008 American space. With the increasing quantity and destruction of a malfunctioning satellite. Sino- quality of data derived from space that is US space cooperation is seen as potentially available commercially, it was suggested by serving a confidence-building function, some of the participants in the Eisenhower allowing the two sides to familiarize Center workshops that data-sharing may be a themselves with each other. means of facilitating cooperation between the US and the PRC. This paper will examine some of the proposals laid out in these workshops for proposal, and Indeed, there is already some degree of data discuss the potential pitfalls that confront sharing already, in both bilateral and them. It will then make some suggestions multilateral contexts. For example, the United about how cooperation might be fostered. States is on record as sharing debris data with the PRC prior to any manned Chinese Approaches to Cooperation launches. Some of this already occurs. The US, for example, has provided collision In the most general terms, there are four levels avoidance analysis to the PRC prior to several of cooperation: sharing data; establishing of its manned launches, including the common standards; planning missions jointly; Shenzhou-VI.1 and undertaking missions jointly. Each of these involves measures that might be In a more multilateral context, there are undertaken either bilaterally, between the PRC already several venues where the US and the and the United States, or multilaterally, as part PRC are both members. These include the of larger, multinational efforts. 1 “Chinese Experts Welcome US Offer of Warning Neither the levels nor the approaches are Datum for Spacecraft Launch,” Xinhua (October 16, mutually exclusive. That is, there is significant 2005). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200510/ 16/eng20051016_214641.html. 2 D. Cheng, Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation World Meteorological Organization (WMO), to the UN Registration, however, has been to which both nations provide data from their described in the past as “spotty.”4 respective meteorological satellites. In addition, the United States, the PRC, and the Establishing common standards and European Space Agency have all decided to baselines. A potentially deeper level of allow unrestricted access to their respective interaction would be cooperation in the Earth observation data and archives.2 Thus, creation of common technical standards or the US can now examine Chinese data from baselines. This level of cooperation would its CBERS (China-Brazil Earth Resources create not only equipment and procedures that Satellite) system, while the PRC may examine were compatible, but would also begin to the range of LANDSAT data. While this may expose scientists, technical staff, and not constitute direct sharing of data, each state administrators from each side to the other. can access the information that the other provides. To some extent, this has occurred in some areas of satellite services. Companies Similarly, the United States decided years ago manufacturing GPS receivers, for example, to make the GPS signal readily accessible. are all accessing the same GPS signal; While it initially only provided a downgraded therefore, to some extent they must work to a signal, today, the more accurate signal is made common standard (at least in terms of their available. While not specifically aimed at receivers). That does not mean, however, that China (or any other nation), this again the receivers are mutually compatible, only suggests that there is ample room for sharing that they rely upon a common signal source data. and format. Cooperation at this level would, in fact, encourage not just accessibility but Less sanguine observers would not, however, compatibility. that such cooperation is nonetheless extremely limited. Both nations, for example, are also Establishing common standards and baselines, party to the UN Convention on the however, would require each side providing Registration of Objects Launched into Outer the other with information on how each side Space, as well as the Outer Space Treaty.3 designs their systems, and, to some extent, Compliance by both states (as well as others) how those systems operate. Greater cooperation might require more detailed discussion of operating procedures. All of this may be seen as offering a potential venue for espionage. 2 Group on Earth Observations, “GEO Announces Free It was this type of concern in the Loral and and Unrestricted Access to Full LANDSAT Archive,” Hughes scandals that ultimately ended Press Release (November 20, 2008). American use of Chinese commercial space http://www.earthobservations.com/documents/pressrele launchers. In the wake of two launch failures ases/pr_0811_bucharest_landsat.pdf. involving APSTAR II atop a Long March-2E 3 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, United and Intelsat 708 aboard a Long March-3B, the Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space and Related General Assembly Resolutions, Addendum “Status of International Agreements Relating to 4 Christopher Noble, “US, China, G7 Countries Flout Activities in Outer Space as at [sic] 1 January 2008 Satellite Registry,” Space.com (August 16, 2001). (Vienna, Austria: Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2008), http://www.space.com/news/satellite_orbits_010816.ht pp. 9, 15. ml. 3 Space and Defense, Winter 2009 American partners, Hughes Space and Shenzhou mission. In the ASTP, the US and Communications International, Inc., and USSR agreed to a mission involving a Space Systems/Loral respectively, assisted in rendezvous and docking, with each nation the subsequent investigations. In each case, using its own spacecraft. To undertake the the companies helped identify shortcomings, mission required not only making sure that the involving both design flaws as well as failures docking systems were compatible, but that in analytical methodology. This assistance each side understood the other’s flight was seen as contributing significantly to procedures. Consequently, not only were there improvements in not only China’s space repeated exchanges of flight crews, but there systems, but China’s nuclear missile forces.5 were also repeated sessions involving both nations’ flight controllers mission control These worries have likely escalated in the centers and their respective communications intervening decade. Recent concerns about links.6 It should be noted that the ASTP cybernetic intrusions, especially American ultimately involved nearly four years of fears about Chinese electronic espionage, planning and exchanges, suggesting that joint might well discourage the creation of common mission planning will be an extensive, and standards and baselines, since it would extended, process. disclose aspects of the data formats and codes that operate equipment. Joint missions. There are several different ways in which one could conduct joint Joint mission planning. This level of missions.