Gettysburg Day One:Layout 1 4/6/09 15:38 Page 1 THE FIRST DAY AT GETTYSBURG The course of the war hangs in the balance. By Neil Smith FROM BRANDY STATION TO GETTYSBURG The day after the fighting at Brandy Station, Lt. General Richard S. Ewell’s II Army Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia left the Culpeper area to cross the Blue Ridge Mountains into the Shenandoah Valley. His mission was to neutralize the Union presence at Winchester, opening the way for Robert E. Lee’s proposed advance into Pennsylvania. Major General “Fighting Joe” Hooker, commanding the Army of the Potomac, still did not know where his antagonist was, but had surmised that Lee planned a northern offensive. He wrote to President Abraham Lincoln, asking permission to attack a presumably unguarded Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia. The President replied that Hooker needed to keep his mind on the job of beating Lee. Nevertheless, it took Hooker another Left: Foundry 28mm couple of days to realize Lee’s army was in motion, allowing the Confederates Rebel Standard bearer to get a head start and capture the strategic initiative. In the meantime, Ewell’s arrival at Winchester shocked the Strategic Situation by Nightfall on June 20 Union commander, Major General Robert H. Millroy, who abandoned the town on 14 June, retreating to the more defendable Harper’s Ferry. Hooker was still none the wiser on 16 June as to Lee’s position, even though that day Ewell crossed the Potomac at Williamsport into Maryland with Lt. General James Longstreet’s I Corps and Lt. General Ambrose P. Hill’s III Corps not far behind. Lee himself would follow a few days later. The Union commander ordered his cavalry out to find Lee, but despite their best efforts at Aldie and Middleburg, the Federal cavalry could not penetrate a by now thoroughly alert JEB Stuart’s cavalry screen. Of course, the reverse was also true; if Stuart was protecting Lee’s army from prying eyes, he could not be spying on the Army of the Potomac. Lee surmised correctly, however, that Hooker was tied to the defence of Washington DC and that his Confederate army would be relatively free to operate in Pennsylvania, at least until Hooker took the bait and could be lured into the decisive battle Lee sought. Hooker continued to dither, even though he had intelligence from Confederate deserters confirming Lee’s movements; Hooker chose not to believe them. Instead, he rode to Washington DC for orders convinced that the capital was Lee’s target, but he confessed he had no idea where Lee was or what his objective might be. The following day, went. Stuart was then to meet up with the lay the groundwork for much of what Lee released Stuart to raid north and get main army again at Harrisburg, was to follow. between the Union army and Washington Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, that left Lee DC, creating confusion wherever he ‘blind’ to the Army of the Potomac’s June 27 proved a propitious day in the movements, and Stuart’s abscence would Gettysburg campaign. Finally 72 Gettysburg Day One:Layout 1 4/6/09 13:41 Page 2 recognizing that Lee had got the jump on him, Hooker crossed into Maryland but The Battlefield - Key Roads, Woods and Farms THE FIRST DAY AT only with some of his army. He also demanded of the President and General- in-Chief Henry Halleck that Harper’s Ferry be evacuated to add to his strength, GETTYSBURG and he put his command on the line to show his seriousness. Lincoln called Hooker’s bluff, much to the delight of Halleck who despised Hooker and undermined him at every opportunity, and it was a surprised Major General 1861-1865 George G. Meade that was awoken before dawn on the 28th to be told he was now in command of the Army of the Potomac. Meade reacted with his American War Civil customary modesty, arguing that others were better qualified than he, but to no avail; he now had the arduous task of finding out where all his army was then lead them against the Confederate General who had destroyed every other effort to bring him to heel. That same day, June 27, Lee began to see that the most likely site of any showdown with the Union army was in the vicinity of the sleepy little Pennsylvania town of Gettysburg. He, therefore, ordered his scattered units to abandon their foraging and converge west of the town. Lee’s plan was simple; hit the demoralized Union army as it marched, driving corps after corps onto each other, and smashing it. That would leave the road to the Federal capital open, and surely Lincoln must then sue for peace. Meade knew Notes what was at stake too and his orders were This map shows the entire battlefield as it was in 1863. A the Angle PO the Peach Orchard GH Cemetery Gatehouse Included are some contour lines, woods, orchards, streams CT the Copse of Trees WF the Wheatfield URC unfinished railroad cut explicit in ensuring he was to cover both And fences/walls with places of importance named. PW the Point of Woods DD Devilʼs Den SS Spanglerʼs Spring Washington DC and nearby Baltimore. After some reorganization of command, to his original rendezvous, not yet Above Map: Highlighted area shows where the Meade ordered the Army of the Potomac knowing the plan had changed: Lee was action on day one took place. to take up positions on the Susquehanna still blind. River along a broad front, but to be Maps shown on pages 72 & 73 are from The Gettysburg Companion by Mark Adkin. Used within mutually supporting distance once Reynolds began his march, pushing by kind permission of Aurum Press Ltd. he found the enemy. Brigadier General John Buford’s First www.aurumpress.co.uk Division of Union cavalry ahead to At this junction, neither commander knew provide protection and to secure the offered to make a reconnaissance with his where the other was, but they were very ground around Gettysburg. On the other division the following day. Hill agreed close, almost operating in each other’s side, the Confederate convergence had and reported the situation to Lee. The shadows. Meade too had surmised that begun. On the evening of 30 June, ingredients for the battle to follow were Gettysburg might be important and Ewell’s Corps camped to the north and quickly coming together. dispatched Major General John Reynolds northeast of Gettysburg; Hill’s divisions with I and XI Corps to the town. Meade’s lay eight miles to the west of the town at On his arrival at Gettysburg, Buford plan was for Reynolds to find Lee’s army Cashtown; the rest of Lee’s army established skirmish lines across the then pull back to a previously scouted remained further west, screened by the Chambersburg Pike about three miles to position along the so-called Pipe Creek mountains. If the fight kicked off at the west of town, but he did not yet know Line in Maryland where Meade would Gettysburg, however, seven of Lee’s nine that Heth’s division was barreling make his stand. Only, Meade seems to divisions would have to traverse along towards his dismounted troopers. The have omitted any instruction to Reynolds one road, ensuring delays in getting to first grey columns emerged from the not to engage the enemy. In the meantime, the field. That day, Brigadier General J. woods at 7:30am to be confronted with Meade’s cavalry had found Stuart, but Johnston Pettigrew’s brigade of Major an unknown force of Union troopers. General Judson Kilpatrick (nicknamed General Henry Heth’s 2nd Division of Buford knew that if his troops could hang ‘Kill-cavalry’ for his propensity for Hill’s III Corps advanced to the outskirts on until supporting infantry and artillery recklessness) and General George of Gettysburg where he saw Union arrived, the Army of the Potomac could Armstrong Custer (whose fame was cavalry approaching from the south up occupy the high ground to the south and growing, although not yet his notoriety) the Taneytown Road. He reported back to west of the town. When Reynolds rode both came up short against the Hill that this was the vanguard of the up to him on the field, Buford turned and Confederate horsemen. After seeing off the Army of the Potomac, but Heth and Hill said, “the devil’s to pay.” The Battle of Federals, however, Stuart continued north did not believe Pettigrew, and Heth Gettysburg was on. 73 Gettysburg Day One:Layout 1 4/6/09 13:41 Page 3 INTRODUCTION - THE ACTION ON DAY ONE The Battle of Gettysburg, fought 1-3 July 1863, is replete with potential wargame scenarios and classic vignettes that give great insight into how the American Civil War was fought. It is the first day, however, that I find most intriguing; that was the set-up day, pregnant with possibilities and opportunities for both sides. If the Confederates can smash through Buford’s cavalry screen, or if Ewell can drive his men through the town onto the heights, then everything that followed would change. For the Union, Buford must hold for as long as possible, and the infantry deployment north of the town might prove crucial, not only for the battle, but for the future course of the American Civil War. The scenario for Day 1 is framed for 6- 15mm because of the nature of the OPENING MOVES Above: The view from behind Heth’s battlefield that saw fighting in two main division on McPherson’s ridge areas north and west of the town (see The sun rose over Gettysburg at 5:15am highlighted area on map pxx), although at on the morning of 1 July, but Heth’s they had met and there was no reason some distance from each other.