Russia’s Eastern Direction—Distinguishing the Real from the Virtual Bobo Lo January 2014 Russia/NIS Center Ifri is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental and a non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European debate. Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debates and research activities. The opinions expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not reflect the official views of their institutions. The picture on the cover (by Dmitry Divin) is reprinted by kind permission of Russia Now Russia/NIS Center © All rights reserved – Ifri – Paris, 2014 ISBN : 978-2-36567-226-9 IFRI IFRI-Bruxelles 27 RUE DE LA PROCESSION RUE MARIE-THERESE, 21 75740 PARIS CEDEX 15 – FRANCE 1000 BRUXELLES TEL. : 33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 TEL. : 32(2) 238 51 10 FAX : 33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 FAX : 32 (2) 238 51 15 E-MAIL : [email protected] E-MAIL : [email protected] WEBSITE: www.ifri.org Author Bobo Lo is an independent analyst and Associate Research Fellow at IFRI. He was previously Director of the Russia and China Programmes at the Centre for European Reform; Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House; and Deputy Head of Mission at the Australian Embassy in Moscow. Bobo Lo has an MA from Oxford and a PhD from the University of Melbourne. He writes extensively on Russian and Chinese foreign policy. Publications – Russia and the New World Disorder, Brookings and Chatham House, forthcoming in 2014. – “A 21st Century Myth—Authoritarian Modernization in Russia and China” (with Lilia Shevtsova), Carnegie Moscow Center report, June 2012. – “How the Chinese See Russia”, Russie.Nei.Reports, No 6, December 2010. – Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics, Brookings and Chatham House, 2008. – Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, Blackwell and Chatham House, 2003. – Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Contact E-mail: [email protected] 1 © Ifri B. Lo / Russia’s “Turn to the East” Contents Executive Summary ........................................................................ 3 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 4 CONCEPTS ......................................................................................... 7 THE “TURN TO THE EAST” IN PUTIN’S FOREIGN POLICY ........................ 9 OBJECTIVES ..................................................................................... 12 Security ................................................................................................... 12 Development of the Russian Far East ................................................. 14 Geopolitics ............................................................................................. 16 Economic interests ................................................................................ 18 Good regional citizenship ..................................................................... 21 THE VERDICT .................................................................................... 24 Intent ....................................................................................................... 24 Performance ........................................................................................... 26 Potential .................................................................................................. 29 OUTLOOK ......................................................................................... 31 2 © Ifri B. Lo / Russia’s “Turn to the East” Executive Summary The Asia-Pacific region has assumed primary importance as a center of global politics and economic dynamism. For Moscow, this development highlights a world in which many long-standing assumptions about international politics are being overturned. It speaks of “global power … shifting to the East,” and of Russia becoming involved in the “dynamic integration processes in the ‘new Asia’.” But for all the rhetoric about a “turn to the East”, Russia’s commitment to serious engagement with the Asia-Pacific is uncertain. Its elite retains a strongly Western-centric world-view, even as it criticizes Western shortcomings. Although Moscow has begun to appreciate Asia as important in and of itself, it is mainly concerned to assert Russia as an “independent” Eurasian center of power within the “polycentric system of international relations”. Cooperation with Asian countries is the means to a larger end rather than the end itself. The outcome of these contradictions is predictably mixed. On the one hand, Moscow is investing greater effort into the Asia- Pacific—a focus heightened by the critical importance of the “strategic partnership” with China, the vulnerability of the Russian Far East, and the need to diversify energy exports. On the other hand, Russia remains a peripheral actor in the region—a country that may be in Asia, but is far from being of Asia. The Kremlin’s tendency to see international relations primarily in terms of Great Power relations means, in particular, that it does not have an Asia policy so much as a policy toward the major Asian powers, above all China. Over the next decade, Putin will continue to prioritize the relationship with Beijing, and Russia’s China-dependence will increase despite efforts to diversify ties with Japan, Vietnam, and India. Economic engagement will be dominated by energy exports, although Russia will be a niche rather than primary supplier of Asian requirements. More generally, the Asia-Pacific will remain a secondary “vector” for Moscow, and the vision of Russia as a “Euro- Pacific power” aspirational at best. 3 © Ifri B. Lo / Russia’s “Turn to the East” Introduction In an era of international relations abounding in clichés, it has become de rigueur to speak of the decline of the West, the rise of the rest, and the consequent “shift of global power to the East”.1 This enthusiasm is not limited to the commentariat, but is also shared by political and business leaders. Just as the 19th century was notable for the European “scramble for Africa”,2 so today we are witnessing a collective rush toward Asia—only even more so. For whereas Africa was a relative sideshow in the age of imperialism, contemporary Asia has assumed primary importance as a center of global politics and economic dynamism. Barely a day goes by without some Western leader or other “going East” to tout for business while leaving any squeamishness about human rights and “values” at the door. Russia, too, has become a dedicated follower of fashion. The most recent (2013) Foreign Policy Concept speaks of “profound changes in the geopolitical landscape”, the “creation of a polycentric system of international relations”, and of “global power and development potential … shifting to the East, primarily to the Asia- Pacific region.”3 In slightly more specific terms, President Vladimir Putin has spoken of the opportunity to “catch the Chinese wind in the sales of our economy”, of promoting the “further development of Siberia and the Russian Far East”, and of Russia becoming more involved in the “dynamic integration processes in the ‘new Asia’.”4 The logic of Russia’s involvement in Asia is impeccable. In addition to the influence of recent international trends, there are also long-standing realities that demand it take a close interest in Asian affairs. More than three-quarters of Russia’s territory lies east of the Urals, the traditional divide between Europe and Asia. Most of its natural resources are located within this vast expanse. And it is Asia that gives Russia its identity as a Eurasian civilization-state. 1 K. Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East, Public Affairs, New York, 2008. 2 Th. Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, Abacus, London, 1992. 3 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 12 February 2013, <www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns- osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d9002b 1c38!OpenDocument>. 4 V. Putin, “Russia and the Changing World,” Moskovskie Novosti, 27 February 2012, reprinted on the Valdai Club website, <http://valdaiclub.com/politics/39300.html>. 4 © Ifri B. Lo / Russia’s “Turn to the East” The issue, then, is not whether Russia should engage with Asia, for no self-respecting modern power can afford not to, but whether it is doing so in earnest. Do recent declarations about Asia’s importance for Russia reflect a new level of interest and commitment among decision-makers? Or is Moscow’s “turn to the East” (povorot na vostok)5 an artificial construct, one that illustrates a perennial problem of Russian foreign policy, namely, the disjunction between rhetoric and substance? This article examines the Putin regime’s approach toward Asia in terms of context, objectives, results, and prospects. First, what is the thinking behind Moscow’s “turn to the East”, and how does it fit into the larger picture of Russian foreign policy? There is a critical tension here between the traditional Western-centrism of