No. In the Supreme Court of the United States KINDRED NURSING CENTERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP DBA WINCHESTER CENTRE FOR HEALTH AND REHABILITATION NKA FOUNTAIN CIRCLE HEALTH AND REHABILITATION, ET AL., Petitioners, v. BEVERLY WELLNER, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF JOE P. WELLNER, DECEASED, AND ON BEHALF OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES OF JOE P. WELLNER, Respondent. On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Kentucky PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ANDREW J. PINCUS Counsel of Record ARCHIS A. PARASHARAMI DANIEL E. JONES Mayer Brown LLP 1999 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 263-3000 [email protected] Counsel for Petitioners i QUESTION PRESENTED This Court in Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017), re- versed the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision refus- ing to enforce arbitration agreements based on a state-law rule that singled out arbitration agree- ments for discriminatory treatment—because Sec- tion 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires courts “to put arbitration agreements on an equal plane with other contracts.” Id. at 1427. On remand from this Court’s decision in Kindred, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the power of attorney granted to respondent Beverly Wellner did not authorize her to agree to arbitration on be- half of her principal, even though (1) the power of at- torney authorized her to make “contracts of every na- ture in relation to both real and personal property”; and (2) legal claims are personal property under long-settled Kentucky law. Instead, the court held that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement relates solely to the principal’s constitutional rights to a trial by jury and to go to court, and does not relate to the principal’s legal claims. The question presented is: Whether Section 2 of the FAA preempts the Ken- tucky Supreme Court’s newly-announced rule hold- ing that a power of attorney authorizing the holder to enter into “contracts of every nature in relation to both real and personal property” does not encompass arbitration agreements because those agreements instead relate to rights to trial by jury and access to court. ii RULE 29.6 STATEMENT The parent corporations of Kindred Nursing Cen- ters Limited Partnership are Kindred Nursing Cen- ters East, LLC and Kindred Hospital Limited Part- nership. The parent corporation of Kindred Nursing Centers East, LLC is Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc.; and the parent corporations of Kindred Hospital Limited Partnership are Kindred Hospital West, LLC and Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partner- ship. The parent corporation of Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. is Kindred Healthcare, Inc. Kindred Healthcare, Inc. is a publicly traded cor- poration with no parent corporation. No publicly traded company owns 10% or more of the stock of Kindred Healthcare, Inc. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTION PRESENTED..........................................i RULE 29.6 STATEMENT......................................... ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES......................................iv OPINIONS BELOW...................................................1 JURISDICTION .........................................................1 CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED..................................1 STATEMENT .............................................................2 A. Factual Background. .....................................4 B. Respondent’s Lawsuit. ..................................5 C. This Court’s Reversal and Remand. .............7 D. The Kentucky Supreme Court’s Decision on Remand. .....................................8 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ......11 A. The Decision Below Conflicts With The FAA And Defies This Court’s Precedents....................................................12 B. Summary Reversal Is Appropriate. ............19 CONCLUSION .........................................................22 APPENDIX A – The Kentucky Supreme Court’s opinion on remand (November 2, 2017).........................1a iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)..............................................21 Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 758 (2016) (per curiam) ......................21 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)..............................................13 Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66 (1946) .................................9, 14, 19 Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2002) (per curiam) ..........................20 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).................................... passim Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996)........................................11, 13 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002)..............................................12 Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d 306 (Ky. 2015)........................... passim First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)..............................................13 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)..............................................19 Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017).................................. passim v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued Page(s) KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. 18 (2011) (per curiam) ..........................20 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)..............................................14 Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012)........................................11, 20 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995)................................................13 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)..............................................17 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)..............................................14 Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17 (2012) (per curiam) ..........................20 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987)..............................................13 Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581 (Ky. 2012).................................5, 6 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)..............................................17 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)..................................................17 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued Page(s) Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989)..............................................13 Statutes 9 U.S.C. § 2 ............................................................1, 13 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)......................................................1 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.510 et seq....................................5 PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI Petitioners Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership, et al. (“Kindred”) respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in this case. OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky (App., infra, 1a-21a) is reported at 533 S.W.3d 189. This Court’s prior opinion is reported at 137 S. Ct. 1421. The Supreme Court of Kentucky’s prior opinion is reported at 478 S.W.3d 306. JURISDICTION The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky was entered on November 2, 2017. App., infra, 1a. On January 22, 2018, Justice Kagan extended the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including March 16, 2018. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2, provides in pertinent part: This Constitution, and the Laws of the Unit- ed States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not- withstanding. Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 2, provides in pertinent part: 2 A written provision in * * * a contract evi- dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, * * * or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. STATEMENT This case arises from the Supreme Court of Ken- tucky’s continued refusal to adhere to this Court’s precedents interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act—including the Court’s prior opinion in this very case, Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017). This Court held in Kindred that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s clear- statement rule—that a “power of attorney could not entitle a representative to enter into an arbitration agreement without specifically saying so”—violated the FAA’s mandate “to put arbitration agreements on an equal plane with other contracts.” Id. at 1425, 1427 (emphasis in original). This Court reversed the Kentucky Supreme Court’s judgment in favor of Janis Clark, and it va- cated and remanded the Kentucky court’s judgment with respect to Beverly Wellner—the respondent here—instructing the court below to determine whether its prior construction of Wellner’s power of attorney was “impermissibl[y] taint[ed]” by its erro- neous, arbitration-specific rule. Id. at 1429.