CHAILLOT PAPER / PAPER CHAILLOT 153 THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP A DECADE ON DECADE A THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP A DECADE ON Looking back, thinking ahead Edited by | LOOKING BACK, THINKING AHEAD BACK, LOOKING Stanislav Secrieru and Sinikukka Saari With contributions from Vano Chkhikvadze, Iulian Groza, Mikayel Hovhannisyan, Leonid Litra, Dzianis Melyantsou, Zaur Shiriyev and Kateryna Zarembo CHAILLOT PAPER / 153 July 2019 THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP A DECADE ON Looking back, thinking ahead Edited by Stanislav Secrieru and Sinikukka Saari With contributions from Vano Chkhikvadze, Iulian Groza, Mikayel Hovhannisyan, Leonid Litra, Dzianis Melyantsou, Zaur Shiriyev and Kateryna Zarembo CHAILLOT PAPER / 153 July 2019 European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) 100, avenue de Suffren 75015 Paris http://www.iss.europa.eu Director: Gustav Lindstrom © EU Institute for Security Studies, 2019. Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EUISS or of the European Union. print ISBN 978-92-9198-842-6 online ISBN 978-92-9198-841-9 CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-19-003-EN-C CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-19-003-EN-N ISSN 1017-7566 ISSN 1683-4917 DOI 10.2815/279488 DOI 10.2815/61360 Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Belgium by Bietlot. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019. Cover image credit: Daniel Born/unsplash The editors Stanislav Secrieru is a Senior Analyst and Sinikukka Saari is a Senior Associate Analyst at the EUISS. Their area of expertise focuses on EU‑Russia relations, Russia’s foreign and se‑ curity policy, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The EUISS Chaillot Paper series The Chaillot Paper series, launched in 1991, takes its name from the Chaillot hill in the Trocadéro area of Paris, where the Institute’s first premises were located in the building oc‑ cupied by the Western European Union (WEU). The hill is particularly famous for the Palais de Chaillot which was the site of the UN Univer‑ sal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and housed NATO’s provisional headquarters from 1952 until 1959. 1 CONTENTS Executive Summary 2 Introduction 5 Doom or bloom for the Eastern Partnership? Sinikukka Saari and Stanislav Secrieru CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 5 Shifting ground 7 Belarus 71 How megatrends are shaping the eastern From discord to humming the same tune? neighbourhood Dzianis Melyantsou Sinikukka Saari and Stanislav Secrieru CHAPTER 6 CHAPTER 2 Armenia 84 Ukraine 28 Striving for complementarity New engines for the partnership Mikayel Hovhannisyan Kateryna Zarembo and Leonid Litra CHAPTER 7 CHAPTER 3 Azerbaijan 96 Moldova 42 An enduring ambivalence? Renewed hope after a string of setbacks Zaur Shiriyev Iulian Groza Conclusion 106 From ‘Eastern’ to ‘Partnership’ Sinikukka Saari and Stanislav Secrieru CHAPTER 4 Georgia 57 Abbreviations 112 Overcoming the libertarian legacy Vano Chkhikvadze Notes on the contributors 114 2 The Eastern Partnership a decade on | Looking back, thinking ahead EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Ten years ago, the EU sought to revamp its pol‑ metamorphosed and is gradually turning into icy in the eastern neighbourhood. This endeav‑ a ‘post‑post‑Soviet’ space as the states make our became the Eastern Partnership initiative their own political and economic choices and which offered Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, as the shared history that once united them is Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine a much closer being interpreted and re‑interpreted from dif‑ institutional, economic and political relation‑ ferent national perspectives. Although reforms ship with the EU. This Chaillot Paper analyses and democracy have not progressed in a line‑ how attitudes towards the Eastern Partnership ar fashion in the region, in some EaP states a (EaP) have evolved in these states, assesses ret‑ fragile pluralism and a kind of rudimentary so‑ rospectively which elements of the programme cial contract are emerging as people turn from have worked and which have not, and finally passive subjects into active citizens. This trend suggests ways in which the EaP could be adapt‑ is likely to intensify in the next decade. One of ed to fend off regional challenges and take ad‑ the most persistent trends since the fall of the vantage of rising opportunities in the coming Soviet Union however, has been demographic decade. decline powered by high levels of migration, which runs increasingly towards other parts of The starting point for this analysis is a recog‑ the world than to Russia. One of the key reasons nition that the eastern neighbourhood is not for emigration is weak economic development some retrograde post‑Soviet backyard but in the region. Among the relatively new trends that its states and societies are changing and is the growing role of cyber in both the econo‑ moving on. Six interlinked megatrends, which my and politics in the eastern neighbourhood, manifest with different degrees of intensity which opens opportunities but also brings throughout the region, shape the present and challenges. The future will be shaped by these future trajectories of the countries of the east‑ major regional and internal shifts; policymak‑ ern neighbourhood. Since the fall of the USSR ers need to factor them in when thinking about there has been a centrifugal diffusion of pow‑ how to upgrade and improve the EaP for the er away from Moscow towards the capitals lo‑ next decade. cated at the borders of the former Soviet space. This rise of polycentrism gathered pace during In parallel with these regional megatrends, the last decade as eastern neighbours diversi‑ each EaP state has its own dynamics too. The six fied their foreign policy options by engaging country case studies in this paper demonstrate with other regional powers. Russia first tried the complexities of democratisation and reform to impede this trend and later to reverse it. Its as well as the fact that the developmental paths increasingly assertive policy vis‑à‑vis former of these six states are increasingly varied. Thus, satellites has fuelled the security deficit in the differentiation in the EaP region is already a re‑ region. This negative trend, in turn, has led to ality. In the associate partner states, the degree a bigger demand for the EU and the gradual of integration with the EU has deepened signif‑ transformation of the EU into one of the re‑ icantly, whereas in the non‑associate states the gion’s security managers. EU plays an important but a more limited role. Against this background of the rise of polycen‑ The case of Ukraine is emblematic in some re‑ trism and a growing security deficit, the region spects: significant progress in reform has been is becoming progressively more heterogeneous, made in this country despite extremely chal‑ to the extent that the designation ‘post‑Soviet’ lenging conditions, including an ongoing war in is becoming obsolete. This neighbourhood has the east of the country. Paradoxically, Russia’s Executive Summary 3 aggression has improved rather than hindered economic model: the country has experienced Ukraine’s performance in implementing re‑ some growth but little economic diversifica‑ forms. The changes are however still reversi‑ tion and development. Despite the Association ble and achievements fragile. The creation of Agreement (AA) and DCFTA, trade with the EU is the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area not growing as rapidly as was expected and un‑ (DCFTA) proved to be not only one of the key employment remains very high. More positive drivers of reforms, but also an important tool effects of the EaP have been seen in the tourism to offset the effects of Russia’s multiple trade industry as mobility has increased and Georgia embargoes. As a result, the EU has become by has become more connected to Europe and the far Ukraine’s key trade partner. Visa liberalisa‑ world. In the future, the EU needs to consider tion is having an equally positive impact on the ways in which it can best support the increase transportation sector and people‑to‑people in the competitiveness of Georgian business contacts. Much still needs to be done, in par‑ and its capacity to reach European markets. ticular in the domain of fighting corruption and improving the business climate. Ukrainian Among the non‑associated partner states, Ar- citizens support Europeanisation and expect menia stands out positively at least for now. more effective reform implementation from The Armenia–EU relationship seems to have the government. The best EU strategy in the found a new equilibrium after several years of case of Ukraine is a bottom‑up approach with soul searching. Armenia pulled out of the AA/ strict conditionality and a renewed package of DCFTA negotiations at the last minute and concrete benefits to provide sustained stimuli. joined instead the Russian‑dominated Eura‑ sian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015. Despite Moldova has zigzagged with reforms and in its this, Armenia still sees the EU as a major part‑ relationship with the EU. While economically ner in pursuing reforms and wants to utilise Moldova is much closer to the EU than was the the existing potential of cooperation with the case a decade ago (almost 70% of exports are EU – as codified in the new Comprehensive and destined for the European market), politically Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) – to it has experienced significant democratic back‑ the full extent. The EU is the biggest donor in sliding. The simplistic labels of ‘pro‑Russian’ Armenia and its efforts have not gone unno‑ and ‘pro‑European’ have proven unhelpful in ticed: the majority of Armenian citizens and a country where oligarchic structures are par‑ policy‑makers alike regard the EU as a trust‑ ticularly strong, and where the majority of citi‑ worthy organisation and view the EaP with op‑ zens are primarily concerned about widespread timism.