View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by LSE Theses Online The London School of Economics and Political Science When Elites Fight: Elites and the Politics of U.S. Military Interventions in Internal Conflicts Luca Tardelli A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2013 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 100.000 words. 2 Abstract Military intervention in internal conflicts represents a recurrent practice in international history. This thesis provides a theoretical framework for the study of the political and sociological processes that lead political elites to militarily intervene in internal conflicts. Following the renewed interest in political elites both in Sociology and International Relations, the thesis draws on Elite Theory to address the dual nature of political elites as both domestic and international actors. In doing so, it develops a framework for the study of military intervention centred on political elites that overcomes the limits of existing contributions on the subject. In particular, the thesis highlights how interventionary policies are shaped by three overlapping causal antecedents: elites’ contending ideological claims; elites’ struggle for both domestic and international power; and the relationship established by the intervener’s elite with elite and counter- elite groups in the target state. The thesis tests the plausibility of the proposed framework by examining US decisions in three cases: US intervention in the Cuban War of Independence (1898-1902); US intervention in the Russian Civil War (1918- 1920); and US non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). This analysis highlights three elements. First, ideological considerations set significant limits to US cooperation with leaders in the target country despite the strategic rationale for cooperation against common enemies. Second, the interplay between international and domestic political considerations represented a fundamental ‘push factor’, shaping the objectives US elites sought. Third, foreign elite groups played a crucial role in ‘pulling’ US interventions, both by representing local allies instrumental to Washington’s objectives and by directly accessing and influencing US decision-making processes. For the same reasons, the lack of these push and pull factors are key to explaining US non-intervention in the Spanish case. Overall, the thesis offers a twofold contribution to the study of military intervention. First, it explores how military intervention permits decision- makers to affect the ‘circulation of elites’ in both their own societies and in other societies. Second, it indicates how military intervention affects the international system by altering ideological homogeneity, international alliances and hierarchical relations between elites. 3 to my parents, Margherita and Idelbo Table of Contents Acknowledgements 9 List of Figures 10 INTRODUCTION 11 The Eternal Return of Intervention 11 The Research Question and its Relevance 13 The Argument and its Contribution 17 Defining Intervention 19 The modality of military intervention 26 What is non-intervention? 29 Defining the Scope and Limits of the Research 31 Chapter Outline 36 PART I - INTERVENTION AND ELITE POLITICS CHAPTER 1 - EMERGING TRENDS, PERSISTENT GAPS: TOWARDS A REALIST THEORY OF INTERVENTION 39 The Study of Intervention in International Relations 39 Intervention and IR Theories 44 The English School: early insights, missed opportunities 44 Marxism and economic factors 48 Liberalism and democracy 51 Constructivism, norms, and ideas 54 Realism’s silence on intervention? 59 Towards a Realist Theory of Intervention 65 Intervention, historical practice and the balance of power 66 Intervention, norms, and sovereignty: a Realist perspective 70 5 CHAPTER 2 - ELITE POLITICS 76 The Inevitability of Elites 79 Political Elites 84 Political Elites and Power 88 Coercion and Consent 92 Domestic Elite Politics 96 International Elite Politics 100 Back to Intervention 105 CHAPTER 3 - WHEN ELITES FIGHT: THE POLITICS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION 107 Elite Politics and the Drivers of Intervention 108 Political Formulas: Elite Cooperation 111 The Struggle for Power: Push Factors 116 Elite Relations: Pull Factors 122 The Decision to Intervene 127 Methodology 133 PART II - THE POLITICS OF US MILITARY INTERVENTIONS CHAPTER 4 - FORBIDDEN FRUIT: US INTERVENTION IN THE CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1898-1902 138 Introduction 138 Contending Explanations 141 Political Formulas: Competing Claims over Cuba 147 Power Struggle: The Primacy of Cuba and of Domestic Politics 153 Elite Relations: A Success of the Cuban Counter-elite? 158 The Decision to Intervene: ‘Neutral’ Intervention 161 6 After Intervention: Selecting the Cuban Elite 170 Conclusions: The Consequences of Intervention 175 CHAPTER 5 - TO START A REPUBLIC IN SIBERIA: US INTERVENTION IN THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR, 1918-1920 180 Introduction 180 Contending Explanations 182 Political Formulas: From Cooperation to Confrontation 189 Power Struggle: A Twofold Threat 195 Elite Relations: Russian Allies, American Friends 198 The Decision to Intervene: From Indirect to Direct Intervention 202 After Intervention: White Flag 210 Conclusion: The Consequences of Intervention 216 CHAPTER 6 - THE GREATEST ERROR: US NON-INTERVENTION IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939 221 Introduction 221 Contending Explanations 224 Political Formulas: Communism, Fascism, and Progressivism 230 Power Struggle: Limiting the Impact of the Spanish Conflict 235 Elite Relations: Not our ‘SOB’ 238 The Decision Not to Intervene: Beyond Neutrality 243 After Non-Intervention: A Second Chance 249 Political formulas: prioritising the Fascist challenge 250 Power struggle: contrasting push factors 251 Elite relations: Loyalist limits, Nationalist success? 255 From non-intervention to failed intervention 257 Conclusion: The Consequences of Non-Intervention 260 7 CONCLUSION - AN INTERVENTION IN HISTORY AND THEORY 265 Summary of the Theoretical Framework 265 An Assessment 268 General considerations 269 Political formulas 271 Power struggle 273 Elite relations 275 Concluding observations and future research 278 Beyond 1939: Implications for the Study of Intervention 279 Elite dynamics and Cold War interventionism 279 The politics of humanitarian interventions 284 Intervention today 290 The Consequences of Intervention: Implications for Theory 295 BIBLIOGRAPHY 300 8 Acknowledgements First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisors for helping me throughout this process: Mick Cox and George Lawson. Their comments, suggestions, and criticisms have been invaluable. They always pushed me to overcome my (many) limits and helped me transform an incoherent set of ideas into a PhD thesis. In particular, my gratitude goes to George, with whom I have had the opportunity to work both on this thesis and other projects during these years. He led by example, showed me the ropes, helped me during difficult times, and was an indefatigable source of encouragement. I could not have asked for more. My gratitude goes to all the other people who commented on earlier drafts of this thesis or segments thereof: Roland Dannreuther, Orlandrew Danzell, Nicholas Kitchen, Jan Ruzicka, and Paul Springer. Thanks also to the convenors of the ESRC seminar series on ‘Intervention in the Modern World – George Lawson, Richard Little, and John MacMillan – for giving me an early opportunity to discuss my ideas. Further, I want to thank the LSE Department of International Relations for its support and for having offered me a unique intellectual environment. In particular, my gratitude goes to the convenors and all the participants of the International Theory workshop whose comments and suggestions have been tremendously useful to improve this project. This thesis also benefited from working together with the LSE IDEAS crew (past and present): the directors, Mick Cox and Arne Westad, Emilia Knight, Tiha Franulovic, Antonio Moneo, George Adelman, Nick Kitchen, Vinna Baptist, Wes Ullrich. Thanks to all the people that have been close to me during these years, starting from my parents, Margherita and Idelbo, to whom this thesis is dedicated. They supported my choice of going back to academia, I will always be thankful for that and for having taught me the value of culture and hard work. This thesis, despite all its faults, represents my attempt to show what I have learned from them. A big ‘thanks’ goes also to my other families – Anna and Roberto, Sandra and Antonio – and all the relatives and friends that have helped me while I was writing this thesis, particularly: Maria and Rina; Marco for his help at the beginning of this process; and especially my ‘brothers’ (Bane, Francesco, Giulio, John, Nicola, Teo). Finally, and most