ARROYO CENTER Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare Appendixes Dan Madden, Dick Hoffmann, Michael Johnson, Fred T. Krawchuk, Bruce R. Nardulli, John E. Peters, Linda Robinson, Abby Doll Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/rr779 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report demonstrates the need for a strategic and operational approach to securing U.S. interests called special warfare. The United States requires new approaches for exerting influ- ence, filling the missing middle between the limitations of distant-strike options presented by armed unmanned aerial systems and Tomahawk missiles and the costly, indefinite commit- ment of conventional forces. Special warfare is an Army Special Operations Forces doctrinal term meaning the “execu- tion of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.” It includes “special operations forces conducting combinations of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and/or counterinsurgency through and with indigenous forces or personnel.”1 The report has four aims: (1) to adapt conventional operational art to the unique charac- teristics of special warfare, (2) to identify the strategic advantages and risks associated with spe- cial warfare, (3) to explore how special warfare campaigns could be used to address challenges identified in strategic guidance, and (4) to provide guidance to military and civilian leaders and planners in designing and executing these campaigns. This report, the second in a two-volume series, includes seven appendixes offering addi- tional context to supplement the discussions presented in Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare (available at www.rand.org/t/RR779). Appendix A provides a brief overview of the evolution of operational art. Appendix B summarizes the literature on developing consen- sus among groups or individuals with disparate goals and approaches and explains how this could be used in special warfare planning. Appendix C reviews the resources and authorities for special warfare. Appendix D provides additional details on our data set of special warfare campaigns conducted by the United States since World War II. Appendix E presents notional special warfare campaigns that could be used to train special warfare campaign planners and assist the U.S. Department of Defense in identifying capability requirements for special war- fare campaigns. Appendix F explores in greater depth the special operations activity “prepara- tion of the environment.” Finally, Appendix G offers a detailed discussion of the recommenda- tions presented in Chapter Six of the companion report. This research was sponsored by LTG Charles T. Cleveland, then commanding general of U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and conducted within the RAND Arroyo Cen- 1 Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, Special Operations, Army Doctrine Publication 3-05, Washington, D.C., August 2012, p. 9. iii iv Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare: Appendixes ter’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this docu- ment is RAN136470. Contents Preface ........................................................................................................... iii Figures and Tables .............................................................................................vii Acknowledgments ............................................................................................. ix Abbreviations ................................................................................................... xi APPENDIX A The Evolution of Operational Art and Insights for Special Warfare .................................. 1 APPENDIX B Collaborative Planning for Unified Action ...............................................................11 Purpose ...........................................................................................................12 People .............................................................................................................13 Place ..............................................................................................................16 Process ............................................................................................................17 APPENDIX C Resources and Authorities for Special Warfare ..........................................................19 Requests for Forces and Force Management ................................................................ 20 General DoD Funding ........................................................................................ 22 Debates over Resources and Authorities ..................................................................... 23 FID-Related Authorities ........................................................................................25 Unconventional Warfare–Related Authorities .............................................................. 28 Covert- and Clandestine-Related Authorities ............................................................... 28 Conclusion .......................................................................................................32 APPENDIX D Universe of U.S. Special Warfare Operations ............................................................33 APPENDIX E Notional Special Warfare Campaigns for Strategic Challenges ......................................37 Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area-Denial Challenges ...............................................39 Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction ......................................................................41 Provide a Stabilizing Presence .................................................................................45 Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations ..........................................49 v vi Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare: Appendixes APPENDIX F Preparation of the Environment ............................................................................51 Improving PE Employment ................................................................................... 54 Improving PE Capabilities .................................................................................... 56 APPENDIX G Discussion of Study Recommendations ...................................................................59 Strengthen Special Warfare Planning Capabilities ..........................................................59 Create a Special Warfare Planning Culture ..................................................................61 Institutionalize Unified Action ................................................................................63 Develop Capabilities to Prevail in the Human Domain ...................................................65 Adjust for the Future Operating Environment ..............................................................67 References .......................................................................................................69 Figures and Tables Figures A.1. Anaconda Operational Design in Iraq ........................................................... 4 D.1. Special Warfare Outcomes Since World War II............................................... 34 D.2. U.S. Special Warfare Operations Since World War II ........................................35 E.1. Notional Special Warfare Campaign Types and Defense Strategic Guidance ............ 38 G.1. Framework for Raising Special Warfare to the Operational Level ...........................59 Tables B.1. Stakeholder Characteristics and Collaboration Efforts ........................................12 D.1. Average Duration of Special Warfare Campaigns ............................................ 34 vii Acknowledgments We thank LTG Charles T. Cleveland, then commanding general of U.S. Army Special